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READING AND WRITING IN THE EXISTENTIAL MODE 
by 
Michael Reardon 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1994 
This study identifies, defines and analyzes a sub-genre of 
modern Anglo-American fiction distinguished by the presence 
of "visionary" characters, who possess the ability to see 
acutely into the contingency and anguish of the human 
condition in this world rather than—as with the popular 
conception of "visionary"—our potentialities in another. 
Their experience of vision flows from an "existential 
moment," a type of epiphany which discloses the essential 
Nothingness that exists beneath the systems, structures, 
attitudes and assumptions through which we attempt to order 
our daily lives. Most importantly, the visionary's 
heightened consciousness leads to an existence defined by 
individual choice, responsibility for oneself and toward 
others, and passionate commitment to the pursuit of Sartrean 
authenticity—and as such marks an ontological evolution 
from the "quotidian," a state of "bad faith" characterized 
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by "blindness" to the unsettling truths with which the 
visionary confronts us. It is my contention that visionary 
characters, who are invariably themselves readers, enact 
paradigmatic possibilities for being for their readers, and 
in so doing, demonstrate art's most essential function: the 
ability to rouse the faculties to act. 
This study deals with, in order, five texts: Ivor 
Winter's "The Brink of Darkness," Miss Lonelyhearts, Irwin 
Shaw's "Act of Faith," The Voyage Out and Lord Jim. The 
study's frame of "Brink" and Lord Jim provides a contrast 
between a character who recoils from the implications of 
vision and one who comes to be defined by his pursuit of 
them. ML and "Act" demonstrate the coherence of visionary 
narratives through the juxtaposition of a modern masterwork 
and a relatively obscure short story. Finally, Voyage, in 
reflecting the perspective of a woman visionary, offers 
perhaps the most intense experience of vision in the study. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF READING 
"That is the question...How to be!" (Conrad, Lord Jim) 
"There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, 
and that is suicide." (Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus) 
The goal of this study is the identification, definition, and 
analysis of what I feel to be a significant subgenre of modern 
fiction which portrays characters I call "visionaries." While 
the thematic and formal similarities of these disparate texts 
are in themselves compelling, their true value and power, I 
will argue, lie in their depiction of the problem of and 
strategies for attaining authentic being within an existential 
universe1. 
Now, having at the outset placed equivocal terms like 
"visionary" and "existentialism" on the table, I realize 
definition is essential. My primary goal in this chapter, 
however, is to establish a conceptual, historical, literary 
and ethical framework for the analysis of visionary 
1By "authentic being" I mean, first, that we are what we 
choose, or to look at this from the other end, we are the sum 
of our decisions. This is not to state something equivalent 
to, say, the United States Army's recent recruiting slogan, 
"Be all that you can be," which implies the presence of a kind 
of ontological blueprint which the individual can either 
choose to fulfill or not. Rather the experiences adumbrated in 
visionary texts show authenticity to be contingent on freedom. 
As John Macquarrie summarizes the point, authentic individuals 
"become truly themselves only to the extent that they freely 
choose themselves." This freedom, I will argue, results from 
two prominent manifestations of visionary experience: the 
question and the existential moment. Such freedom is also as 
rare as it is frightening. I hope to make this point most 
clearly through a consideration below of one small, dark 
corner of the Holocaust. 
I would also point out the cogency of the concept of 
authentic being in our everyday lives. For example, the 
emergence over the past decade of the Hip Hop culture and rap 
music is spoken of as a desire for "authenticity" among black 
inner city youths. The best example I have encountered 
recently was the observation that Vice President Albert Gore 
is who George Bush would be if the former President were 
"authentic." 
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characters. This frame begins with two "existential" questions 
which visionary texts address and which visionary heroes 
answer. The first of these—"how to be?"—appears in Lord Jim 
(1900) and epitomizes the profound ontological displacement 
caused by the social, economic, and scientific changes of the 
nineteenth century while simultaneously acting as prologue to 
the existential tenor of the twentieth. It will be recalled 
that in that passage the portentous Stein, in responding to 
Marlow's request for guidance in relation to Jim, is offering 
an imprecise paraphrase of Hamlet's meditation on suicide: 
"Ja! Ja! in general, adapting the words of your great poet: 
That is the question.. .How to be! Ach! How to be!" (199). 
Stein's linguistic awkwardness and consequent "adaptation" is 
a conscious move by Conrad to invest Jim's quest for identity 
with archetypal and personal2 significance. In doing so the 
second frame question is also prefigured: Camus's 
philosophical imperative (if I, too, may adapt)—"whether to 
be"—which opens The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) 3. Stein's and 
2Conrad, too, with English as his third language, was 
prone to the infelicitous phrase. 
3Conrad himself attempted suicide by placing a gun 
against his breast and pulling the trigger. He survived only 
because the bullet missed his heart by a fraction of an inch. 
See chapter five for context. The opening of Camus' work 
reads: 
"There is but one truly serious philosophical 
problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life 
is or is not worth living amounts to answering the 
fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest— 
whether or not the world has three dimensions, 
whether the mind has nine or twelve categories— 
3 
Camus's questions delineate an ominous progression. Yet does 
not the setting of Camus's query—the Europe of 1942—stand in 
bleak testimony of the utter seriousness, the very 
appropriateness, of that grim question as well as of our 
collective failure to adequately answer Stein's question? 
Indeed, given this century's unabated appetite for genocide 
and social disintegration, Camus's is perhaps the only serious 
philosophical question that can be asked in our time and 
completes the existential "frame" which the visionary 
characters I will analyze inhabit. 
The question of "how to be" is also implicit in this 
chapter's title, which is intended to suggest a complementary 
thesis which will inform my discussion of visionaries. As 
befits an analysis which will draw heavily upon the themes and 
ideas of existentialism, this underlying thesis has a personal 
cast which I want to acknowledge at the outset. My motivation 
in undertaking this topic is to reflect upon the connections 
between the hours of my life engaged in reading and in 
teaching and writing about what I read, and the rest of my 
life in the world of women and men and events; to investigate 
the possible links between any consciousness engaged with a 
literary work and the moral quality of an individual's 
existence beyond that text; in a phrase, to examine whether 
the study of literature is, can be, or even ought to be 
comes afterwards. These are games; one must first 
answer." 
4 
ethically "profitable." In a sense, I am carrying I.A. 
Richards' bold (and, many today would argue, naive) contention 
that literature "is capable of saving us; it is a perfectly 
possible means of overcoming chaos" a half-step further by 
suggesting that our most ethically valuable critical responses 
are those which apprehend the literature which confronts and 
responds to the question of "how to be" in a universe devoid 
of moral absolutes. 
To be sure, the question of the affective nature of 
literature has been addressed by others. Plato, through his 
banning of poets from his Republic, ironically lent a powerful 
eloquence to literature's ability to affect human conduct. In 
the sixteenth century, Sidney defined the object of poetry to 
be "to teach and delight (in order to) move men to take that 
goodness in hand, which without delight, they would fly as 
from a stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness 
whereunto they are moved" (Abrahms, 480). Indeed, he saw 
knowledge's purpose as its ability "to lead and draw us to as 
high a perfection as our degenerate souls...can be capable 
of." And the highest form of knowledge, in Sidney's view, was 
"knowledge of one's self, in the ethic and politic 
consideration, with the end of well doing and not of well 
knowing only" (Abrahms, 481, emphasis mine). In the 
seventeenth century, Ben Jonson's "Epistle Prefatory" to 
Volpone unabashedly claims as the "principal end of poesy" the 
desire "to informe men, in the best reason for living" (Booth, 
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231-32). And in the eighteenth century, Matthew Arnold wrote, 
"One must...be struck more and more the longer one lives, to 
find how much in our present society a man's life each day 
depends for its solidity and value upon whether he reads 
during that day, and far more still on what he reads during 
it" (Booth, 264). 
We can cite, too, testaments from writers' personal 
experience in gauging the ability of literature to offer 
psychic counsel and spiritual rejuvenation. Indeed, Saint 
Augustine, one of the most influential predecessors of the 
modern existentialists, is finally converted from his 
dissolute life when he hears 
a voice, as of a boy or a girl, I know not, 
chanting, and oft repeating, "Take up and read; 
Take up and read." Instantly, my countenance 
altered, I began to think most intently whether 
children were wont in any kind of play to sing such 
words. So checking the torrent of my tears, I 
arose; interpreting it to be no other than a 
command from God to open the book, and to read the 
first chapter I should find....I seized, opened, 
and in silence read that section on which my eyes 
first fell: Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in 
chambering and wantonness, not in strife and 
envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence. 
No further would I read; nor needed I; for 
instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light 
as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all 
the darkness of doubt vanished away (VIII, 131). 
Through his act of textual interpretation, and particularly 
through his application of his reading to the chaotic welter 
of his life, Augustine's experience offers a microcosm of 
visionary experience. During the Victorian Age, the 
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dislocating effects of the ascendancy of the city and the 
factory and the disconcerting ramifications of the higher 
criticism of the Bible, witnessed the emergence of the 
temporal writer as spiritual guide; the artist supplementing 
if not supplanting the priest. Essayists like Carlyle, Ruskin, 
Cardinal Newman, and Arnold played a tangible role in helping 
the reading public to confront and deal with profoundly 
disturbing ontological questions. Perhaps most famously, 
Tennyson epitomized the subgenre of the spiritual 
autobiography in In Memoriam by asking and working through the 
existential shock implicit in his perception of a universe 
heedless of human destiny. Nature has lost the nurturing 
benevolence perceived by the Romantics and has evolved into a 
mechanistic indifference: "I bring to life, I bring to death;/ 
The spirit does but mean the breath:/ I know no more." 
However, the experience of John Stuart Mill is perhaps most 
pertinent to my discussion. His spiritual autobiography 
recounts being trapped in a "dry heavy dejection" brought on 
by his assiduous Benthamite training whose object was "to be 
a reformer of the world": for "the time came when I awakened 
from this as from a dream." In what he assumes to be a passing 
funk, Mill asks himself what Dostoyevsky elsewhere calls "an 
accursed question," those with the capacity to challenge the 
very core of our lives: "Suppose that all your objects in life 
were realized; that all the changes in institutions and 
opinions which you are looking forward to could be completely 
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effected at this very instant; would this be a great joy and 
happiness to you?" When he can only answer "no," his momentary 
melancholy devolves into a consuming despair: "The fountains 
of vanity and ambition seemed to have dried up within me, as 
completely as those of benevolence." 
For reasons which will later become apparent, it is worth 
noting that during his depression, Mill was able to function 
quite well in his daily life: 
During this time I was not incapable of my usual 
occupations. I went on with them mechanically, by 
the mere force of habit. I had been so drilled in a 
certain sort of mental exercise that I could still 
carry it on when all the spirit had gone out of it. 
As his depression endures, he contemplates Camus's question, 
which evolves directly from his asking himself "How to be?": 
"I frequently asked myself if I could, or if I was bound to go 
on living, when life must be passed in this manner." It is 
here, on the brink of the abyss, that Mill encounters "a small 
ray of light": J.F. Marmontel's Memoires. Prior to this, 
Mill's attempts to find solace and direction in literature had 
been in vain. But now Marmontel's narrative of his family's 
own desolation and his role in rescuing them sparks an 
empathic response in Mill, the engaged reader4: "A vivid 
conception of that scene and its feeling came over me, and I 
was moved to tears." Mill is again able to feel, and slowly, 
inexorably he begins to break free of the desiccating grip of 
4The idea of an "engaged" or "committed" reader will 
assume increasing importance to my argument. For a working 
definition, see pages 11 and 38. 
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utilitarian analysis, a process which culminates in his 
rereading of Wordsworth: 
"What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my 
state of mind, was that they expressed, not mere 
outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of 
thought colored by feeling, under the excitement of 
beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of the 
feelings, which I was in quest of" (Abrahms, 
pp.1066-1074). 
What I wish to stress at this point is the importance of 
the individual's—if I may posit Mill's experience as a 
paradigm—discovering the medicinal text which will 
effectively minister to his or her psychic needs. Now I hasten 
to point out that this is not to advocate a kind of 
bibliotherapeutic, text-as-magic-bullet stance regarding 
reading and living; however, I am trying to establish through 
these various citations and examples two key points: first, 
the efficacy of literature, indeed, perhaps its integrality, 
for our living moral lives—by which I mean lives 
characterized by personal reflection, social connection, and 
perseverance in the face of the omnipotence of entropy—and, 
second, the special efficacy of certain texts and characters— 
specifically, those I designate below as "visionary"—in 
addressing specific problems endemic to human experience. 
Kenneth Burke has written: "A work is the strategic naming of 
a situation. It singles out a pattern of experience that is 
sufficiently representative of our social structure, that 
recurs sufficiently often mutatis mutantis. for people to 
'need a word for it' and to adopt an attitude towards it" 
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(259). The enduring human problem depicted in visionary 
literature is that of constructing a moral life in an 
existential universe, and the visionary hero is that character 
who offers paradigms and even strategies for confronting that 
problem. 
Certainly some modern and contemporary critics have 
recognized the connection between reading and living. That the 
primary fruits of literary study were ethical rather than 
theoretical in nature had, until the past twenty years, always 
carried substantial credibility. In the introduction to his 
Three Philosophical Poets (1936) George Santayana writes 
The sole advantage in possessing great works of 
literature lies in what they can help us to become. 
In themselves, as feats performed by their authors, 
they would have forfeited none of their truth or 
greatness if they had perished before their day. We 
can neither take away nor add to their past value 
or inherent dignity. It is only they, in so far as 
they are appropriate food and not poison for us, 
that can add to the present value and dignity of 
our minds. (5) 
Burke's article cited above, entitled "Literature as Equipment 
for Living," suggests an even more pragmatic end for 
literature, a "sociological criticism," by which he means one 
which would 
codify the various strategies which artists have 
developed with relation to the naming of 
situations....(It) would derive its relevance from 
the fact that it should apply both to works of art 
and to social situations outside of art....(It) 
would consider works of art, I think, as strategies 
for selecting enemies and allies, for socializing 
losses, for warding off evil eye, for purification, 
and desanctification, consolation and vengeance, 
admonition and exhortation, implicit commands and 
instructions of one sort or another (260-62). 
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Indeed, Louise Rosenblatt speaks of "aesthetic transactions" 
between reader and text in which the reading act is motivated 
by a desire in the reader for something to "carry away": moral 
guidance, wisdom, direction. Paul Hunter concurs with this, 
noting that while "none of us would rationally decide to turn 
our personal decisions over to novelists.., the desire for 
instruction (usually a little disguised) still remains one of 
the most powerful motives for reading novels or autobiography 
or history, or for seeing films" (269). John Gardner has 
further observed: "No one seriously doubts that...ideals 
expressed in art can affect behavior in the world, at least in 
some people some of the time" (27). More boldly, Wayne Booth 
argues that "anyone who conducts honest introspection knows 
that 'real life' is lived in images derived in part from 
stories" (228). And Gary Saul Morson asks where but in novels 
we are to discover "situations rich enough to educate our 
moral sense... .The entire impulse of novels is to provide just 
such information, as 'thickly' as possible. Ethics is a matter 
of prosaics, and great prose develops our ethical sense" 
(526). 
Most rigorously, reader response critics have traced how 
such effects might be realized through the act of reading. In 
its most profound form—and by that I mean a depth and 
intensity of reading characterized by intellectual and psychic 
engagement and immersion into the "destructive element" of the 
text—I believe the reading of fiction to be a form of putting 
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one's self into question with the certainty that when we 
retrace our identity, that self will only more or less 
resemble that with which we entered the work. Thus readers 
speak of "losing" themselves in a book. The question, then, 
becomes who are we when found? 
When Wolfgang Iser discusses the reading process as an 
"active interweaving of anticipation and retrospection" in 
which a fiction's "dynamism" is generated by the reader's 
"filling in the gaps left by the text itself," he is 
describing a phenomenological transaction which in effect 
vivifies the text. Iser employs the analogy of constellations 
in which the linguistic signs of the text are equated with the 
fixed stars in a night sky. The "lines" with which the chance 
patterns of heavenly bodies are transformed into recognizable 
forms are equated with the "variable" and "inexhaustible" 
permutations through which readers "transform" linguistic 
signs into the "active and creative" experience of reading. 
Iser points out that this process is "closely akin to the way 
in which we gather experience in life5. And thus the *reality' 
of the reading experience can illuminate basic patterns of 
real experience"6. 
5An excellent example of this process is in the reader's 
experience of Jim's character in Lord Jim, which will be 
discussed in chapter five. 
^hat also bears comment here is the existential nature 
of this analogy. Constellations are but a form of cosmic 
"connect the dots" upon which humankind, faced with the 
impenetrable and inexhaustible darkness of the universe, seeks 
to impose "significant form." 
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The most commented upon aspect of Iser's trenchant 
analysis is the concept of textual "gaps," the "unwritten" 
parts of a work which "stimulate the reader's creative 
participation and set into motion the reading dynamic. Yet 
what remains only implicit is the "abysmal" nature of gaps. 
They are terra incognita, an intellectual terrain devoid of 
signs, the "ground" in which the existent/reader is confronted 
with a continuum of choices between self-invent ion (how to be) 
and extinction (whether to be) ; that is, between sustaining or 
ending the literary experience. This last option is an aspect 
neglected in Iser's description. While he speaks of textual 
gaps as a series of opportunities for the reader to "climb 
aboard," even, in its fullest fruition, to "formulate 
ourselves," each gap or "blockage" also presents the reader 
with the possibility of "jumping ship." Thus does the reading 
act—through the reader's continuous negotiation of and 
decision making about textual gaps—constitute in fact an 
existential act. The reading experience does, in this sense, 
powerfully mirror reality not only mimetically through the 
situations it creates but more significantly 
phenomenologically through the raw existential quality of the 
experience itself. Herein lies the relevance, I trust, of my 
Conradian allusion above to the "destructive element" of the 
text. The act of reading can be seen as a type of ontological 
training in which one either learns to swim or one sinks; one 
either becomes or decays; that is, the reader—in the face of 
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all rational and pragmatic and sophisticated evidence to the 
contrary—affirms his or her belief in the literary work as a 
thing which, through the act of committed reading, "becomes" 
rather than "is." One, for example, hasn't "had" Shakespeare 
or the Romantic poets with the connotation of something 
mastered or endured but rather the individual turns and 
returns to these texts, as did J.S. Mill, as sources of and 
for life. Our experience of visionary characters reflects a 
prime example of this phenomenon. 
As I hope I have outlined historically, the existence of 
a correlation between the acts of reading, studying and 
responding to significant literary works and the ethical and 
quotidian content and conduct of our lives is an enduring 
ideal, but one, to judge from the rarified matter of much 
professional dialogue about literature, often forgotten, 
repressed, disguised, or in some cases even disdained. In his 
admirable The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, Wayne 
Booth discerns five reasons for the decline of "ethical 
criticism," by which he means "any effort to show how the 
virtues of narratives relate to the virtues of selves and 
society..." (11) : first, that a greater emphasis on the actual 
effects of literature would result in censorship; second, that 
value judgements are subjective and thus incompatible with a 
serious intellectual discipline, that knowledge is only 
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attainable from facts7; third, (an apparent corollary of two) 
true reason evolves only from critical doubt. From this 
perspective, it would be inappropriate for the reader to 
surrender him or herself to the "invitation" of the text8; 
fourth, the problem of variability in standards of taste and 
aesthetic value: the belief that "conflicting values cancel 
each other out"; fifth, the ascendancy of abstract theories of 
art, which, because of narrative's emphasis upon content, has 
proved particularly debilitating to ethical criticism of 
fiction (26-37). 
However valid any of these reasons may be, even a 
cursory view of the current state of literary studies reveals 
that a significant number of the most technically gifted 
readers have apparently come to view the critical act as 
primarily abstract and theoretical rather than ethical. 
Writing about what one reads is now more often than not denied 
an ethical dimension; it is, it seems to me, aimed more toward 
the delineation and defense of professional turf than toward 
personal discovery and decision. The concern is with "how to 
be" a formalist, structuralist, or deconstructionist critic 
rather than with how interaction with the literary work 
affects one's being beyond the work if, in fact, the post-
structuralist critic grants the existence of anything beyond 
7Cf. both Ambrose Ridley in The Voyage Out (chapter four) 
and Jim's naval tribunal in Lord Jim (chapter five). 
8Cf. my remarks on Wolfgang Iser's analysis of the 
reading process in this chapter. 
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the text. The argument becomes political, not ethical with the 
emphasis on theory not only preceding but seemingly obviating 
action. We think but, neglecting Spenser's advice, we do not 
do. 
In discussing reading as an ethical act, Gary Saul Morson 
expresses his discomfort at recommending Tolstoy's What Is 
Art? and "similar writings," recognizing that he "risk(s) 
seeming naive, because all that people remember about these 
essays is their narrow moral ism—the very thing that has given 
moral criticism a bad name. In reacting to such narrowness, we 
have mistakenly banned moral criticism altogether." But Morson 
sees beyond what he terms "Tolstoy's objectionable moralism" 
to the Russian's insight that what is essential to the 
literary work is not whatever explicit moral one may glean 
from it, but instead its ability to "infect" (Tolstoy's term) 
us with "moral values that we as readers practice moment to 
moment while reading it" (527) and, I would add, inculcate 
into our everyday lives as well. 
Near the end of his life, Hermann Hesse observed that he 
had a "charge, albeit small and confined: to help other 
seekers to understand and to cope with the world, if only by 
assuring them that they are not alone." Yet I suspect that 
many of us are uncomfortable with art and approaches to art 
that revolve around such bald questions as the "meaning of 
life." We are uncomfortable, I think, not primarily because 
the answers—or their absence—may prove, as with writers like 
16 
Conrad and Camus, disconcerting, but because we are 
embarrassed by their naivete or, to look at them from the 
other end, because they lack the patina of sophistication and 
intellectual rigor of, say, deconstruction. We are both 
compelled and rendered uneasy by the "accursed" question much 
as the inhabitants of fictional worlds will be seen to be 
alternately, even simultaneously, compelled and embarrassed by 
the visionary in their midst. 
As I stated, the question of the "aesthetic" potential of 
literature is the complementary thesis of my study. It is a 
theme, however, integrally related to my stated topic of 
visionary literature, not only because these fictions grapple 
with the difficult and daunting issue of individual identity 
in an existential universe but also because virtually all the 
visionaries in this study are themselves readers and many are 
artists or artisans, which is to say they are by nature 
inclined toward reflection and creative ways of interpreting 
their worlds. The cogent and provocative temper of their 
critiques is why these texts are valuable and remarkable to me 
for they have the power of shocking me into awareness. 
Heidegger, whose life described a moral chasm between reading 
and living9, speaks of the world being "lit up" for us when 
its "instrumentality"—the tools and services and institutions 
that constitute the fabric of everyday life—breaks down. This 
9See especially Victor Farias's Heidegger and Naziism and 
Jean-Francois Lyotard's Heideggar and the "jews". 
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"breakdown" and subsequent illumination is what the visionary 
hero experiences and shares with the reader: the ability to 
"light up" the habitual patterns and assumptions of our 
everyday psychic life. The visionary offers, in John Gardner's 
phrase, "the flicker of lightning that shows where we are" 
(16) and in so doing evokes reflection and response and change 
in us10. 
Having outlined an ethical context for my discussion, 
let me now turn to defining my two key terms. Since it will 
serve as the background for my analysis of visionary texts, I 
will begin with "existentialism," which is most often 
designated an "attitude" rather then a coherent philosophy11. 
Indeed, its complexity and broadly divergent manifestations 
have rendered it notoriously elusive as a concept12. Sartre, 
whose "existence precedes essence" is the closest one can come 
10By "change," I am speaking again of moral growth along 
the lines of my above definition of "moral." It is this type 
of change that is implicit in the conclusion of Forster's 
Aspects of the Novel when he envisions a time when "the phrase 
'the development of the novel' might cease to be a pseudo-
scholarly tag or a technical triviality, and become important, 
because it implied the development of humanity" (174). 
11We expect, too, I think it is safe to say, more 
objectivity and detachment from our ideal of a philosopher 
than most existential thinkers deliver. 
12As might well be expected of a world view which numbers 
among its elite a Protestant like Soren Kierkegaard, a Jew 
like Martin Bauber, a Catholic like Miguel de Unamuno, and an 
atheist like Jean Paul Sartre (which is not to mention those, 
like Albert Camus, who are wont to switch "affiliations" in 
search of spiritual solace.) I recognize, too, that in any 
event no self-respecting "existentialist" would allow her or 
himself to be classified as such. 
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to an actual definition, complained that "the word is now so 
loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means 
anything at all13" (Kaufmann, 289). However, in this study the 
term will mean something, to wit: the universe as indifferent 
to human needs and enterprise; human life as essentially 
tragic; and the individual's role within that universe and 
life as defined by individual choice, social responsibility, 
and spiritual commitment in the pursuit of authentic selfhood. 
This overview itself requires elucidation. Regarding my 
first two components, I would cite William Barrett's 
observation that "the radical feeling of human finitude14," 
which he sees as the defining characteristic of the modern 
human condition, is a result of "alienation and estrangement; 
a sense of the basic fragility and contingency of human life; 
the impotence of reason confronted with the depths of 
existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the solitary and 
13There is an interesting parallel between Sartre's 
observation regarding existentialism and the fortunes of 
deconstruction in the public linguistic domain. Although David 
Lehman makes a similar observation in his acerbic attack on 
deconstruction in Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the 
Fall of Paul de Man (see especially his first chapter) , he 
seems to also suggest an intellectual equation between the two 
concepts, labeling existentialism "that mid-century salute to 
death-of-god theorizing in the Gallic manner" (19). While 
Lehman is no doubt being arch here, it is ironic to note that 
existentialism, which stresses individual choice, decision, 
and responsibility, could not be further removed from the 
tenets of deconstruction, which in Lehman's own words "puts 
into question things like cause and effect, right and 
wrong...(and) that individuals are agents of volition..." 
(41). 
14Barrett defines "human finitude" as "the presence of the 
not in the being of man" (290). 
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unsheltered condition of the individual before this threat" 
(36) . It is perhaps easy when confronted with phrases like 
Barrett's to understand Lehman's waggishness (cited in the 
footnote above) in regard to existentialism. The brooding 
pessimism15 which is often unjustly attributed to existential 
thought seems to frequently provoke a (defensive?) desire to 
laugh and then to get on with one's life in the "real world." 
I am not entirely sure that this is unsound advice. But I 
know, too, that in its unwavering insistence on the 
individual's responsibility for "making" him or herself 
through a lifetime of choices; in its valorization of 
consciousness, by which I mean an accurate appraisal of the 
human condition16; and, most significantly, in its inextricable 
linking of the world of thought and the world of everyday 
15See Sartre's seminal essay "Existentialism Is a 
Humanism" for a spirited defense against charges of 
existentialism's pessimism. 
16Miguel De Unamuno asks: "Which would you find most 
appalling—to feel such a pain as would deprive you of your 
senses on being pierced through with a white-hot iron, or to 
see yourself thus pierced through without feeling any pain? 
Have you never felt the horrible terror of feeling yourself 
incapable of suffering and tears? Suffering tells us that we 
exist..." (207). If doubt exists as to the "terror" of which 
De Unamuno speaks, consult the Autobiography of John Stuart 
Mill cited above. While Olsen reminds us that 'Englishman' and 
'Utilitarian' are still dirty words in the existentialists' 
vocabulary" (15), Mill did once observe that it would be far 
better to be Socrates unhappy than to be a contented pig. 
Indeed for a temperament such as Mills' to be born the son of 
Jeremy Bentham's chief lieutenant seems a cruel twist of fate. 
As to the beneficial effects of suffering, see the comments 
below of Irving Howe regarding the value of questions. 
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life17, existentialism as a world view dwells more affectively 
and more concretely in that "real world" than any other 
perspective—however loosely defined—I have encountered. 
But what are the "realities" of our world, why are they 
"tragic," and why is existentialism a cogent way of 
confronting them? I suggested as part of my existential 
criteria a universe whose nature is "indifferent to human 
needs." In Woody Allen's18 Hannah and Her Sisters Allen's 
character is desperate for a source of spiritual direction in 
his life; consequently, he investigates a series of faiths, 
momentarily seizing upon Catholicism, a choice which, to 
understate the situation, nonpluses his Jewish parents. While 
his mother wails in another room, Allen confronts his father 
with Allen's need for spiritual certainty in a morally 
ambiguous world, finally blurting out, "How do you explain 
evil? How do you explain Nazis?" "Nazis?" the father responds. 
"How do you expect me to explain Nazis? I can't even figure 
out how the can opener works." Herein lies our burden—the 
need to discover a moral fulcrum upon which to balance our 
existence—enveloped within a dilemma: the desire and need to 
17Soren Kierkegaard, the so-called "father" of modern 
existentialism, is in my view a modern archetype of this type 
of integrated, holistic life: a man who "drank from his own 
well." 
18Since I originally wrote this chapter, Allen's fortunes 
have undergone a precipitous fall, which again serves to 
delineate the distinctions between theory and practice as well 
as the advisability of completing one's dissertation in a 
timely manner. 
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live our lives in the quotidian/material world—to both 
negotiate its myriad obstacles and, we hope, reap the benefits 
of our diligence and skill in doing so—while somehow also 
satisfying the moral imperative of confronting humankind's 
undiminished capacity for evil. This tension and clash— 
indeed, this incompatibility—between the desire for comfort 
and joy on the one hand and for psychic wholeness and moral 
rectitude on the other will be played out repeatedly in the 
visionary texts I will examine19. 
Allen's character's desire to find an articulated faith 
which will offer him moral direction likely touches a 
19Hannah and Her Sisters is a romance in which the myriad 
ills that gnaw at human happiness and harmony (disease, 
infidelity, jealousy, despair, and lust—to name but a few 
that appear in this film) are happily resolved as the various 
permutations of couples and relationships align or realign 
themselves. Allen's character comes to realize that being 
"part of (a life)" that includes the Marx brothers and the 
possibility of joy is "worth it." All ends harmoniously in and 
at Thanksgiving. Never resolved, however, is Allen's awkward 
question to his father about the prevalence and magnitude of 
human evil. Indeed, the film is peppered with references to 
Nazis almost as if Allen sought to inject his romance with the 
germ of darkness, which, his character realizes, like the 
cancer he feared had infected his brain, waits symbolically, 
ineluctably for and in us all. A more cynical and realistic 
vision of human endeavor is offered in Allen's later Crimes 
and Misdemeanors, in which the protagonist, mired in an 
extramarital affair gone dangerously sour, solves his 
"problem" through murder, a deed which propels him into an 
abyss of depression, which in turn (and herein lies true 
realism) he not only survives but transcends. By film's end, 
he has apparently resolved, psychically and spiritually, the 
despair that had threatened to engulf him. In the film's 
concluding scene, he cathartically retells his experience to 
the Allen character, who produces socially relevant (and thus) 
unsuccessful documentaries, in the form of a potential film 
script. Interestingly, the dominant image motif in Crimes and 
Misdemeanors is that of vision. 
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responsive chord in us all. It is, nonetheless, a futile 
desire. Sartre defines the human condition as "one of free 
choice (but) without excuse and without help" (307). Without 
excuse because we are the sum of our free choices; there 
exists neither a human essence/nature to explain or excuse 
those choices; nor a supernatural power to help us make them: 
The existentialist...finds it extremely 
embarrassing that God does not exist, for there 
disappears with Him all possibility of finding 
values in an intelligible heaven....Everything is 
indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is 
in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything 
to depend upon either within or outside himself. 
(294-95, Kaufmann) 
With this in mind, the implications of Sartre's phrase 
"condemned to freedom" begins to crystalize as does also, 
perhaps, what is meant by the "tragic condition of humankind." 
We will see characters confront such condemnation in, for 
example, Bartleby's brick wall reveries; in Terence Hewet's 
realization of Rachel's Vinrace's death; and in Jim's loss of 
his code of conduct. 
In the film, Allen's character, fearing an apparently 
imminent death, confronts and answers Camus's question, 
escaping death only because he is sweating so profusely that 
the rifle barrel slips as he pulls its trigger. His 
reclamation of life occurs, significantly, alone in a 
moviehouse watching the Marx Brothers. There, like Plato's 
prisoners in the cave20, he is literally and symbolically in 
Z0Plato's allegory will emerge as a prominent visionary 
motif in my discussion of "Act of Faith" and The Voyage Out. 
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the dark watching images flicker on a screen while surrounded 
by others in the same condition. It is in those circumstances 
that he must make his choice. His desire for an explanation of 
nazism is, of course, never granted. I think existentialism 
may provide one. 
Surely one must ask whether it is necessary to conjure 
the grim implications of Auschwitz, possibly the nadir of 
human experience, as representative of the "real world"21. 
Unquestionably the rhythms of the daily lives of most women 
and men are characterized by decency and decorum; without 
that, anarchy would be at every door. But is this perhaps too 
facile of an assumption in that it implies the Holocaust as 
aberration, as "an interruption in the normal flow of history, 
a cancerous growth on the body of civilized society, a 
momentary madness among sanity" to be commemorated by annual 
Holocaust observances and the like (Bauman, viii)? The 
suggestion is that while the Holocaust should be remembered, 
that that memory be sufficiently circumscribed so that it not 
encumber the solid and comfortable furniture of our everyday 
psychic life. Robert Nozick places the wages of confronting 
the truths of the Holocaust into stark perspective. Given the 
reality of the Holocaust, he writes, the termination of the 
human race is not unthinkable. Not desirable perhaps, but it 
"would now be no special loss above and beyond the losses to 
21Auschwitz was referred to as "the asshole of the world" 
by condemned and executioners alike. For a graphic depiction 
of the phrase, see Lina Wertmuller's film Seven Beauties. 
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the individuals involved. Humanity has lost its claim to 
continue" (238). Nozick images the Holocaust as "a massive 
cataclysm that distorts everything around it" (242) . I would 
suggest that it is this distortion—the abyss of human perfidy 
underlying the structures of everyday life—that the visionary 
ahistorically perceives. 
But such reasons for emphasizing the centrality of the 
Holocaust are perhaps insufficient. Let me cite others: first, 
as I hope my discussion below of Ordinary Men: Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland will 
demonstrate, the gap between quotidian and visionary 
experience is no gap at all but rather a distinction in moral 
acuity and, consequently, of how to be; second, the Holocaust 
was perhaps the ultimate "limit situation," which is a key to 
visionary experience22; third, the Holocaust was fueled by and 
the culmination of the triumph of the literature of anti-
Semitic myth; fourth, many of the most influential thinkers in 
the Western intellectual tradition fed into and off those 
myths23; fifth, the Holocaust may be seen as the inevitable 
outgrowth of modernity itself24; sixth, and most importantly, 
the career of anti-Semitism is integrally bound to the concept 
22This idea from Karl Jaspers will be discussed in chapter 
two. 
23And in this context it should be noted again that the 
Holocaust was perpetrated by perhaps "the most civilized 
nation on the face of the earth." 
24Bauman's Modernity and the Holocaust offers a cogent 
defense of this thesis and is indeed the source of this idea. 
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of identity. From the time of the Babylonian Captivity when 
Jews evolved many of their religious rituals as a defense 
against cultural assimilation, through the various attempts by 
European "liberals" to reform the "depraved Jewish character"25 
by ostensibly incorporating them into the body politic, and 
culminating with the Holocaust as the Final Solution to this 
age old "problem," the persecution of the Jews has always been 
to a significant degree the product of Jews' very 
authenticity—their refusal to relinquish their identity as 
Jews. The significance of this for each of us as we seek our 
own authenticity, sometimes utilizing visionary texts as 
possible models, would seem clear. 
It is interesting within this context, then, to note 
David Hirsch's observation that "the quintessence of Nazism 
was precisely an assault on the concept of the existence of 
the self carried to its logical extreme" (95) . The Jews, 
historically the archetypal Other26, were exterminated by the 
Nazis because they were perceived by their persecutors as 
subhuman, a process which was but the culmination of a mythic 
apparatus centuries in the making: the Jew as killer of 
"See Rose, especially chapter 6. 
26I have been asked why women wouldn't be a more logical 
historical choice for this dubious distinction. Two reasons: 
first, a grouping by race rather than gender offers a better 
microcosm of humanity; second, as mentioned above, the idea of 
Jewishness seems inextricably bound to the idea of identity. 
The larger point, however, is not which group has been more 
oppressed but rather humanity's indefatigable appetite for 
oppression. 
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Christ; as killer of Christian children; as drinker of their 
shed blood and slaughtered flesh (or, in a variant, as 
desecrater of the sacramental host); as poisoner of Christian 
wells; as usurer. These myths are the lifeblood of anti-
Semitism, and they have been perpetrated by some of the most 
influential thinkers in the Western intellectual tradition— 
Christian, Jew and atheist alike. In a pamphlet entitled "The 
Jews and Their Lies," Martin Luther condemned the Jews for all 
the above "crimes": 
So we are even at fault in not avenging all this 
innocent blood of our Lord and of the Christians 
which (the Jews) shed for three hundred years after 
the destruction of Jerusalem, and the blood of the 
children they have shed since then (which still 
shines forth from their eyes and their skin). We 
are at fault in not slaying them. 
Paul Rose observes, "Through the influence of Luther's 
language and tracts, a hysterical and demonizing mentality 
entered the mainstream of German thought and discourse; Luther 
in fact legitimated hysteria and paranoia in a major European 
culture" (163). In 1935 the Nazis reissued Luther's pamphlet 
in a popular edition. 
What evolves most tellingly and most frighteningly from 
the analysis by historians like Rose and Gavin Langmuir27 of 
the enduring career of anti-Semitism is, in the words of 
Robert Alter, "the awesome power over human events of word, 
image, and narrative." Alter argues that without the invention 
27See Langmuir's History. Religion, and Antisemitism and 
Toward a Definition of Antisemitism. 
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and propagation of anti-Semitic myths, the Nazi's holocaust 
would never have occurred: "Words are the first weapons of 
mass destruction." 
Words, however, are coined and manipulated by men and 
women. Alter notes the German language's wealth of "verbal and 
substantive terms for extirpation," and suggests that the 
"lethal ambiguity" of these terms as they were used in 
relation to the "Jewish Problem" afforded a "cover that made 
it possible for men of good conscience to speak about the 
unspeakable." These thinkers, among whom are listed Kant, 
Marx, and Voltaire "would have considered themselves men of 
humane values, certainly idealists..." (40). That is, they 
were men who would have conducted themselves with decency and 
decorum. 
In "Portrait of the Antisemite" Sartre seizes upon this 
discrepancy between appearance and reality in relating the 
story of a fishmonger in 1942 who, angered at competition of 
two Jewish competitors who had disguised their race, denounced 
them to the authorities. "I was assured," says Sartre, "that 
in other respects (the Christian fishmonger) was kind and 
jovial, the best son in the world. But," concludes Sartre, "I 
don't believe it: 
A man who finds it natural to denounce men cannot 
have our concept of the humane; he does not even 
see those whom he aids in the same light as we do; 
his generosity, his kindness are not like our 
kindness, our generosity; one cannot localize 
passion (276). 
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So we are reminded again of the difficulty of apprehending the 
real, of acknowledging the implications of truth, of attaining 
disillusionment. 
My concern, however, is not with "great thinkers," but 
as I stated, with myself and the connection between my life in 
literature and my life in the world. In this respect another 
recent study on a small corner of the Holocaust (which Rose 
calls "...the ultimate practical achievement of a century and 
a half of the mythogenic development of German revolutionary 
antisemitism," (58) may be more revealing. In Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
Christopher Browning examines the sixteen month career of an 
approximately 500 man German unit of what were euphemistically 
and paradoxically termed "order police"28 composed of ordinary 
Germans, men in their 30's and 40's, who, because of their age 
...went through their formative periods in the pre-
Nazi era. These were men who had known political 
standards and moral norms other than those of the 
Nazis. Most came from Hamburg, by reputation one of 
the least nazified cities in Germany, and the 
majority came from a social class that had been 
anti-Nazi in its political culture. These men would 
not seem to have been a very promising group from 
which to recruit mass murderers on behalf of the 
Nazi vision of a racial Utopia free of Jews. (48) 
Their job, which fell to them because of personnel shortages 
in other units, was nonetheless "executed" with skill and even 
zeal: they participated—through direct shootings and 
Z8These units were essentially occupying forces in areas 
conquered by the German army. 
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transportation to Nazi death camps—in the slaughter of 80,000 
Polish Jews. Browning's thesis, of course, is an investigation 
of the motivations of these "ordinary men": what induced them 
to become mass murderers of, mostly, women, children and 
elderly men? 
Not surprisingly, Browning's conclusions cite the 
influence of a virulent anti-Semitism and, more shockingly, 
the post-war ambitions of the killers. But he places most of 
the weight of his analysis upon simple peer pressure: "the 
social psychological conditions, the objective and keenly felt 
pressures of the group, the fear of being held in contempt by 
one's comrades: these were what turned these men into 
killers.. .and kept them at it" (Goldhagen, 50). The 
existentialists would label such a condition a "flight from 
freedom" or "bad faith" or simply inauthenticity. Moreover, 
Browning concludes his study with another example of 
Dostoyevsky's "accursed questions": "If the men of Reserve 
Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such 
circumstances, what group of men cannot?" 
It is important to remember that this unit did not 
experience the "crucible of combat." A Nazi commander observed 
that "the shooting of the Jews was not a matter of destroying 
elements that represented a threat either to the fighting 
troops or to the pacification of the field of operations 
behind the lines; it was simply a matter of destroying Jews 
for the sake of destroying Jews" (52). Virtually none of the 
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men of this unit were fired upon by or fired at a traditional 
enemy during the duration of the war. But what is truly 
revelatory in this book is that the participation in genocide 
by these ordinary men was voluntary; they were mass murderers 
by choice. As Daniel Goldhagen points out, previous Holocaust 
scholarship has assumed that German troops who participated in 
the actual killing of Jews fell into two groups: the Waffen 
SS, the "true" (authentic?) and rabid Nazis who manifested the 
"culture of death," and rank and file German troops who acted 
under coercion. 
What Browning shows, however, is far more chilling. On 
July 11, 1941, Reserve Police Battalion 101 had the task of 
rounding up the 1800 Jews of the Polish village of Jozefow. 
Unlike their previous actions which had involved relocating 
the Jewish population, the Germans were to summarily execute 
all women, children and elderly, with working age males being 
sent to work camps. The battalion commander, Major Wilhelm 
Trapp, with tears streaming down his face, gathered his men 
together, and, "after explaining the battalion's murderous 
assignment, made an extraordinary offer: any of the older men 
who did not feel up to the task that lay before them could 
step out" (57) . Previously, if the all too familiar cry of 
having "only followed orders" raised nothing other than 
revulsion when cited by death camp commandants and members of 
the Nazi hierarchy, there existed a tacit assumption that the 
common German soldier acted under some degree of compulsion: 
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The authoritarian political culture of the Nazi 
dictatorship, savagely intolerant of overt dissent, 
along with the standard military necessity of 
obedience to orders and ruthless enforcement of 
discipline, created a situation in which 
individuals had no choice...Disobedience surely 
meant the concentration camp if not immediate 
execution, possibly for their families as well. 
There is a problem with this explanation, 
however. Quite simply, in the past forty-five years 
no defense attorney or defendant in any of the 
hundreds of postwar trials has been able to 
document a single case in which refusal to obey an 
order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the 
allegedly inevitable dire punishment. The 
punishment or censure that occasionally did result 
from such disobedience was never commensurate with 
the gravity of the crimes the men had been asked to 
commit. (170)29 
The participation in the slaughter by the "ordinary men" of 
Police Battalion 101 was a matter of personal choice and 
commitment to ideas that had been inculcated in them through 
oral and written literature, specifically through the 
mythology of anti-Semitism that in fact fueled the Holocaust. 
Each of these men made an autonomous, cognitive, existential 
choice to become a killer of Jews—what Goldhagen calls 
"voluntary barbarism"—based upon "a profoundly anti-Semitic, 
hallucinatory image of them" (52)30. 
29Browning also addresses the reasonable argument of 
"putative duress," that these men had no way of knowing that 
they, in fact, would not face dire consequences for not 
participating in the slaughter. While some of the unit's 
officers and non-commissioned officers did pressure 
recalcitrant soldiers, there existed, because of the 
unambiguous sympathy and indeed protection extended by Major 
Trapp, a set of unwritten assumptions that any man could 
refuse participation with virtual impunity. 
30It is important here, I think, to understand that the 
choice these men made was existential. Of the approximately 
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The brute fact of the reality of the Holocaust stands as 
five hundred men in the battalion, about twelve took up 
Trapp's offer. Others, once the shooting had begun, found 
means of avoiding participation. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
between 80 and 90 percent of the battalion took part in the 
extermination, which lasted for seventeen hours. The manner of 
execution is revealing. The condemned Jews were trucked from 
a reception center to the edge of a nearby woods where they 
were met by squads of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Each squad 
member would, face to face, take charge of a prisoner, and the 
condemned were escorted to various clearings where they were 
ordered to lay face down. The executioners would then place 
their rifles at the base of the victim's skull and fire. 
Again, the massacre at Jozefow lasted for seventeen hours with 
the execution squads working in relays. There were regular 
"breaks" for food and even alcohol. Furthermore, the men who 
requested and received release from participation in the 
slaughter did so not from moral compunction but rather from 
physical revulsion at the visceral nature of the killings. One 
of the killers recalled: 
I especially asked to be relieved because the man 
next to me shot so impossibly. Apparently he always 
aimed his gun too high, producing terrible wounds 
in his victims. In many cases the entire backs of 
victims' heads were torn off, so that the brains 
sprayed all over. I simply couldn't watch it any 
longer (68). 
It seems to stretch credulity that the aesthetic sensibilities 
of these men could be acute while their moral sense remained 
dormant. Yet the numbing shock this unit felt almost to a man 
over their experience at Jozefow was soon replaced by 
workmanlike competence and even zeal (recall the experience of 
J.S. Mill). As the mass executions and transportations 
progressed, these "ordinary" men participated in what they 
called "Jew hunts," patrols whose goal was to search out and 
destroy any Jews who had eluded the general slaughter. 
Browning points out that this phase of the Holocaust was not 
incidental but rather "a tenacious, remorseless, ongoing 
campaign in which the 'hunters' tracked down and killed their 
'prey' in direct and personal confrontation. It was not a 
passing phase but an existential condition of constant 
readiness and intention to kill every last Jew who could be 
found" (132). Indeed, this activity, which again brought the 
Germans face to face with their victims and where again they 
could exercise a considerable amount of choice, became so 
prominent an aspect of these men's identities and duties that 
they began to refer to it as their "daily bread." 
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an objective correlative of the psychic implications of an 
existential universe: a world with a capacity for a voracious, 
irrational and, subsequent events would suggest, undiminished 
predatoriness framed by an indifferent and silent cosmos. 
Faced with the Holocaust's historicity, we are faced, too, 
with Browning's "accursed" question of our own innate 
capacity for complicity as ordinary men and women with the 
killers of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Existentialism, of 
course, would deny that connection for there exists no human 
essence that would dictate for any of us the choices made by 
those men. But the conditions within which those choices were 
made—racial myth, authoritarian rule, alienation, personal 
greed, the loss of empathy and the failure of responsibility— 
remain undiminished. In our own country one need only tap into 
the Zeitgeist concerning, say, AIDS or military escapades 
against the Other of the moment to be reminded of the 
alienating and isolating choices of ways to be that are made 
daily31. 
I suggested earlier that existentialist thought offers a 
reply to our puzzlement over the existence of nazism/evil. It 
is provided by Sartre in "Portrait of an Antisemite." I will 
quote his conclusion: 
We can now understand him. He is a man who is 
afraid. Not of the Jews of course, but of himself, 
of his conscience, his freedom, of his instincts, 
of his responsibilities, of solitude, of change, of 
31And consequently, of course, a de facto decision of the 
Other's right to be. 
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society and the world; of everything except the 
Jews. He is a coward who does not want to admit his 
cowardice to himself; a murderer who represses and 
censures his penchant for murder without being able 
to restrain it and who nevertheless does not dare 
to kill except in effigy or in the anonymity of the 
mob; a malcontent who dares not revolt for fear of 
the consequences of his rebellion. By adhering to 
antisemitism, he is not only adopting an opinion, 
he is choosing himself as a person. He is choosing 
the permanence and the impenetrability of rock, the 
total irresponsibility of the warrior who obeys his 
leaders—and he has no leader. He chooses to 
acquire nothing, to deserve nothing but that 
everything be given him as his birthright—and he 
is not noble. He chooses finally, that good be 
readymade, not in question, out of reach; he dare 
not look at it for fear of being forced to contest 
it and seek another form of it. The Jew is only a 
pretext; elsewhere it will be the Negro, the yellow 
race; the Jew's existence merely allows the 
antisemite to nip his anxieties in the bud by 
persuading himself that his place has always been 
cut out in the world, that it was waiting for him 
and that by virtue of tradition he has the right to 
occupy it. Antisemitism, in a word, is fear of 
man's fate. The antisemite is a man who wants to be 
pitiless stone, furious torrent, devastating 
lightning: in short, everything but a man (286-87). 
In touching upon the themes of the anti-Semite's fear before 
that which is in question or doubt; of his desire for a place 
in the world that is ready-made, not earned; of, in sum, his 
terror before his human condition, Sartre names some of the 
core issues of visionary fiction. In this vein, I wish to 
suggest that the fulcrum of this study, the visionary 
character, through his or her status as outsider, as alien to 
the quotidian world, as authentic individual, and ultimately 
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as reflector of that which is best or worst in all of us, to 
be a form of Jew.32 
Admittedly, "visionary," my second key term, is an 
exceptionally elusive, even vague, designation. It has been 
applied to historical and public figures from Attila to Saint 
Joan; from Martin Luther King to Leona Helmsley. In spite of 
the term's ubiquity, definitions within literary studies are 
few, and those that exist accent the term's connections with 
the unreal, imaginary, and speculative. Northrop Frye, in his 
seminal study of Blake, defines the visionary as one who 
"creates, or dwells in, a higher spiritual world in which the 
objects of perception in this one have become transfigured and 
charged with a new intensity of symbolism" (8). That is, the 
visionary is able to see deeper and further into the stuff of 
the physical realm, into its true nature/identity, in a manner 
that would suggest Hopkins' conception of inscape. While my 
sense of the visionary is integrally tied to the idea of 
insight. Frye's use of the phrase "higher spiritual world," 
both in its implication of a realm removed from the physical 
plane in which men and women exist and in its emphasis upon 
32I suggest this idea within the (continuing) historical 
framework of the wholeness of Jewish life—the 
interconnectedness of religion, state, and family—rather than 
in positing Jews as potentially or inherently any more 
authentic than members of any other ethnic or religious group. 
Nonetheless, as one recent commentator remarked, "Jews are now 
liable to be envied for their persistent sense of identity. 
They seem to be exempt from the blurred individualism of the 
lonely crowd of a society increasingly denied cohesion" 
(Raphael). 
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spiritual rather than existential values, treats the 
"visionary" antithetically to my sense of the term. 
However, Colin Wilson's conception of the "Outsider" 
shares important attributes with mine of the visionary. He 
emphasizes, most significantly, the idea of the Outsider as 
Truth-teller, one who sees "Too deep and too much" into the 
human condition and is compelled to act upon that vision: 
For the bourgeois, the world is fundamentally an 
orderly place, with a disturbing element of the 
irrational, the terrifying, which his preoccupation 
with the present usually permits him to ignore. For 
the Outsider, the world is not rational, not 
orderly. When he asserts his sense of anarchy in 
the face of the bourgeois' complacent acceptance, 
it is not simply the need to cock a snook at 
respectability that provokes him; it is a 
distressing sense that truth must be told at all 
costs, otherwise there can be no hope for an 
ultimate restoration of order....The Outsider is a 
man who has awakened to chaos." (15) 
In a chapter entitled "The Outsider as Visionary," Wilson 
deals with George Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends, 
and, almost de riqeur. William Blake, emphasizing the 
visionary as one who "starts from a point that everybody can 
understand, and very soon soars beyond the general 
understanding" (203). While Wilson speaks of the "actual" 
visions experienced by Fox and Blake, he argues, correctly 
(although perhaps in contradiction to his image of a recondite 
visionary knowledge in full flight) that the value of their 
writing "does not lie in the 'visions' their words can conjure 
up for us, but in the instructions they left for anyone who 
should want to see the same things that they saw" (204). That 
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is, Wilson places the ultimate value of visionary experience 
in its ability to guide our being in this world. 
Wilson's argument is compelling, in part admittedly 
because it is the only study I have encountered which strikes 
substantial harmony with my own ideas. However, besides 
distinctions in terminology and texts, there are important 
differences that should be noted. First, Wilson's Outsiders 
experience their otherness in medias res; the key element in 
my treatment of visionary experience is the existential 
moment, the evolution from blindness to insight, from being in 
the quotidian/bourgeois to being in the visionary realms. 
Second, Wilson speaks of "rid(ding) ourselves of the 
temptation to identify the Outsider with the artist" (14) . 
However, this identification is central to my argument, which 
extends and focuses this connection to the act of engaged 
reading by which I mean the reader's ability to see and 
perhaps enact the paradigmatic possibilities for living 
presented by the visionary text. Third, Wilson ignores female 
visionary experience when, given the lack of choices 
historically imposed upon women by a patriarchal culture, they 
are much better candidates for revolt than most men. 
Specifically, I will utilize "visionary" in the sense of 
the ancient Greek word for "truth," which meant 
"unhiddenness." That is, the visionary will be primarily 
defined by his or her ability to see what is in this world but 
hidden rather than the quality of being able to envision what 
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will be in this or another world but does not yet exist. The 
visionary's "sight" is an acting out of the biblical phrase 
"the evidence of things unseen." In this sense, Plato's 
"Allegory of the Cave" will serve throughout this study as a 
classical paradigm for modern visionary experience33. The 
visionary is the individual who, in William Barrett's phrase, 
"can no longer hide his nakedness by the old disguises." He or 
she has lost the ability to be pragmatic in responding to the 
world, rejected conventional morality, and embraced instead a 
personal ethic based upon his or her most profound self-
consciousness. In an existential sense, visionaries' actions 
in response to what they see might be labeled an "act of 
conscience"; always, having achieved vision, they are 
motivated by a quest for authenticity and thus an ability to 
not only see acutely and profoundly into the human condition 
but also to act upon that vision. That is, as in Shaw's 
conception of the genius/saint34, the visionary hero must 
33In its emphasis upon essences, Plato's thought is, of 
course, antithetical to existentialism. His allegory, however, 
loses none of its power even if one were to redefine the 
nature of the truth the freed prisoner discovers. It is also 
worth noting that Plato and existentialist thinkers from 
Kierkegaard onward all pursued essentially the same goal: 
human salvation. Plato sought his in the ideal forms that 
would transcend the mortal realm; the existentialist seeks 
only within that realm. 
34In Saint Joan, Shaw defines a genius as "a person who, 
seeing farther and probing deeper than other people, has a 
different set of ethical values from theirs, and has energy 
enough to give effect to this extra vision and its valuations 
in whatever manner best suits his or her specific talents" 
(10). While I certainly do not wish to embroil my discussion 
of visionary experience with the term "genius," Shaw's 
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reconcile and give effect to what he or she "sees" on a 
psychic plane within the everyday world of getting and 
spending, living and dying. Visionary heroes cogently 
illustrate art's ability to "rouse the faculties to act." 
In light of these criteria, I have chosen to work with, 
in order, "The Brink of Darkness," Miss Lonelyheartst "Act of 
Faith," The Voyage Out and Lord Jim. I hope these selections 
will accomplish several ends: first, the study's frame of 
"Brink" and Lord Jim provides a contrast between a character 
who recoils from the implications of vision and one who 
doggedly pursues them; second, ML and "Act" demonstrate the 
coherence of visionary fictions through the juxtaposition of 
a modern classic and a relatively obscure short story; third, 
Voyage. in addition to being the prototype for my conception 
of visionary fictions, simply offers one of the most powerful 
evocations of their function. Most significantly, of course, 
I hope to offer original insights for each of these works. 
Undoubtedly, the visionary fictions listed above are far 
from comprehensive nor are such effects limited to fiction. I 
have focused on narrative not only for the pragmatic reason of 
limiting a potentially amorphous topic but more significantly 
definition is nonetheless helpful. The distinction he makes 
between "seeing" and "probing" also foreshadows, respectively, 
what I will define below as the visionary's initial 
"existential moment" and his or her subsequent and persistent 
questioning of the accepted norms of a given milieu. The 
reference to differing "ethical values" succinctly captures 
the inherent tension between the visionary and the quotidian 
world. 
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because of fiction's mimetic properties. "Fiction," John 
Gardner has written, "goes after understanding by capturing, 
through imitation, 'the ineluctable modality of the world'— 
that is, characters who subtly embody values and who test 
them, with clear but inexpressible results, in action" (92). 
Moreover, the preponderance of "visionary" short stories and 
novellas reflects Langbaum's observation of the profound 
influence the related concept of "epiphany" has exerted on 
modern fiction and the short story in particular (336). But 
while the list in its present form is based upon the 
peculiarities and exigencies of my own reading, it more 
rigorously reflects my observation of a complex of traits I 
noticed repeated throughout these works, and although I again 
make no claim that each of the following characteristics 
appears in each of the listed works, enough do appear in each 
work to signal us of their probable significance: 
1. the existential moment (a special form of epiphany) 
2. absence or loss of visionary's correct name or any name 
at all 
3. encounters with primal settings 
4. "truth-telling" (and frequently subsequent 
obnoxiousness) 
5. the visionary's isolation/outsider status 
6. collapsing of topographical and psychic margins 
7. the visionary as reader and/or artist 
8. primacy of the interrogative mode 
9. existential motifs, themes, and imagery 
10. the strategic inclusion of reader in choice-making: the 
"one of us," "shock of recognition," "you, hypocrite 
lecteur" motif 
11. conflict between visionary and quotidian worlds 
12. the visionary's immersion in the "destructive element" 
13. the visionary's distrust of language 
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While these characteristics will be elucidated in my 
analysis of the individual texts, I would like to outline some 
here to demonstrate the coherence of the characters I have 
designated. Each visionary has, at some point, experienced a 
profound and irrevocable psychic shock—what I term an 
"existential moment"—that denies the sanctuary of blindness 
and places him or her in direct and often tragic opposition to 
the everyday world. By the "everyday world" I mean the mode of 
being in which most of us spend most of our lives: the 
cyclical core of actions and tasks which are largely performed 
without reflection. To be sure, this is not a value judgement, 
for, as Macquarrie points out, this mode of being is 
"concerned with the satisfaction of ordinary human needs (and 
is therefore) the most fundamental mode of existence..." (83) . 
This is the realm in which we certainly do not always find, 
but in which we seek, comfort and joy. Yet existential 
thinkers point to a real danger of individual identity being 
lost to the everyday world (Kierkegaard denigrates the "crowd" 
and Nietzsche the "herd"); of the self's being controlled by 
the very instruments through which comfort and joy were 
sought: 
Normally man's mind is composed only of a 
consciousness of his immediate needs, which is to 
say that his consciousness at any moment can be 
defined as his awareness of his own power to 
satisfy his needs. He thinks in terms of what he 
intends to do in half an hour's time, a day's time, 
a month's time, and no more. He never asks himself: 
What are the limits of my powers? (Wilson, 188) 
42 
The existence of the visionary's critique threatens the 
illusory structures and systems of order which constitute this 
everyday world and, in so doing, the very identity of those 
who inhabit it. The stakes of this confrontation are evident 
when we parallel it with the situation of the Jew in 
eighteenth century Germany: 
The urgent search for German authenticity...helps 
to explain the strange intensity of the debate on 
the Jewish Question....The Jews were a living 
reproach to them, a reminder of German weakness and 
sinfulness, a challenge to German self-esteem. 
Above all, the Jews seemed to possess an almost 
natural ability to remain a "people" endowed with 
its own natural culture and consciousness, an 
ability envied as well as hated by the less-than-
secure Germans.... Perhaps what more than anything 
was bound to rack up German insecurity and 
resentment to fever pitch was the outrageous fact 
that Jews had escaped from the ghetto, becoming 
"German" in appearance but still remaining Jews 
either in religious, or, more insidiously, in a 
social or psychological sense....When primal 
existential categories become blurred like this, 
the whole order of the world is thrown into doubt, 
assurance fails, and the hysterical temperament 
runs free (Rose, 41-2). 
Because the everyday world is empowered through sheer 
weight of numbers to name and define right and wrong, truth 
and falsehood, good and evil, it possesses the power and will 
to ostracize vision. One of its most potent weapons is the 
power of naming. (One might consider, for example, the cogent 
reinterpretation of the Cain story offered by the visionary 
Demian in Hesse's novel). This power of naming is evident, 
too, in Charles Marlow's recognition of the ability of 
language to eviscerate what vision reveals: 
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For a moment I had a view of a world that seemed to 
wear a vast and dismal aspect of disorder....But 
still—it was only a moment: I went back into my 
shell directly. One must—don't you know?—though I 
seemed to have lost all my words in the chaos of 
dark thoughts I had contemplated for a second or 
two beyond the pale. These came back, too, very 
soon, for words also belong to the sheltering 
conception of light and order which is our refuge. 
The truth of Marlow's observations is borne out by the 
awareness of other visionary characters of both the impotence 
and insidiousness of language. It is evident in Bartleby's 
laconic disavowal of his Sisyphean copying of words to 
perpetuate a sterile social order; it is present, too, in 
Frederick Henry's recognition of the hollowness inherent in 
terms of honor and glory; in the realization of the writer, 
Miss Lonelyhearts, of the emptiness and ineffectuality of his 
words; in the futility of Krebs' attempts in "Soldier's Home" 
to communicate his enveloping alienation to his parents; in 
the reversion to a prelinguistic state by the narrator of 
Surfacing; in the cloaking invisibility of Ellison's antihero 
who, in his quotidian incarnation, had been "honored" for his 
verbal powers; in the ultimate impotence of Kurtz's 
magnificent voice against the primal darkness; in the mute 
endurance of Kafka's Hunger Artist, who is devoid of "normal" 
appetites. And this disaffection for language is emblematized 
most cogently, perhaps, in the fact that so few of these 
figures bear full names, or their own names, or any name at 
all. It will be the task of the remainder of this study to 
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name these characters and to understand the ways in which they 
name and enlighten our own condition. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BRINK OF VISION: 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM OF BECOMING OURSELVES 
"I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings 
which came from my true self. Why was that so very difficult?" 
(Demian) 
"How many live in such a way as to have renounced or gained 
everything, how many are simply honest enough to know what 
they are and what they can and cannot be?" (Kierkegaard) 
"Who is it that can tell me who I am?" (King Lear) 
Ivor Winter's short story "The Brink of Darkness" (1932) is 
unusual in at least three important ways: first, it is the 
only work of fiction the eminent critic and poet produced, 
thereby imbuing it with a special curiosity, perhaps even with 
a human immediacy as if it were written from need or 
compulsion; second, primarily because it pretty much disdains 
exposition, the story is especially opaque, engulfing its 
reader in a universe that is simultaneously alienating, 
disorienting, and compelling. Such opacity is not in itself 
unusual in the modern short story, which Robert Langbaum has 
cited as being "plotless and apparently pointless in order 
that it may be epiphanic" (345, emphases mine), and Allan 
Swallow cites the "psychological story" as being "frequently 
experimental." To be sure, a precis of the story's plot is 
difficult. As Terry Comito points out, its incidents do not 
present a "cumulative weaving of a causal chain, but rather 
"isolated moments of perception" which are indicative of what 
Winters termed his "scattered method" (13)1. Those moments of 
Winters' conception of the four different ways of 
structuring a poem was expressed in "The Mechanics of the 
Mood" section of his essay "The Extension and Reintegration of 
the Human Spirit" (1929). As outlined by Davis they are the 
scattered method, the logical method, the narrative method, 
and the psychological method. Davis glosses the scattered 
method as a "list of details—images or statements—that 
'converge upon a common center' or serve as illustrations of 
the poem's theme." His claim that "from the amount of space 
allotted and from the tone of the discussion (in the above 
essay) that Winters was mainly interested.. .in the logical and 
psychological" (62), while a logical deduction, doesn't 
address two salient facts: first, the lone facticity of "The 
Brink of Darkness": why it had to be written and written, 
clearly, in the "scattered method; second, Winters' lifelong 
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perception, however, are of a cogency and nature which, along 
with the interrelated existential themes of the struggle for 
identity, the facticity of death2, and the omnipresence of 
chaos mark "The Brink of Darkness" as an example of visionary 
literature. As such, its third unusual characteristic is its 
visionary narrator's disavowal of his existential insight and 
subsequent withdrawal into the quotidian "limits of (his) old 
identity." This chapter will address the implications of that 
renunciation and conclude with a consideration of the 
pedagogical functions of visionary fictions. 
At the outset of the story, the nameless narrator 
describes and traverses an elemental landscape—bitterly cold 
in the winter months; in the summer, an "unbearable blaze of 
fascination with and dread of the demonic element in human 
existence. 
2Death is an especially powerful presence in Winters' 
story. The gruesome death of one of the narrator's students 
mirrors the passing of Mrs. Stone and in so doing performs the 
same function as the Gloucester subplot of Lear; it reminds us 
of the unexceptional nature of the dark events we are 
witnessing. These deaths are in turn reflected in the animal 
kingdom by the death of a mouse at the opening of the story 
and the pen of soon to be slaughtered coyotes encountered by 
the narrator. Finally death is present, too, in the plant 
kingdom; the flowers decorating the church at the student's 
funeral are described as "innocent and pathetic...curling 
imperceptibly inward, as if they were the sluggish dead 
incarnate, dying slowly again in pity..." 239). Death in 
visionary literature is not, it is important to note, a 
convention in the manner cited by Richards, that is, a 
strategy for completing a fiction; rather it is a palpable 
entity whose omnipresence and facticity renders the primary 
existential truth of death's ineluctability. We must remember, 
too, that on both a literal and symbolic level death remains 
a choice, e.g. Edna Pontellier, Mrs. Moore, Jim, and the 
narrators of Invisible Man and Surfacing to name but a few. 
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heat"—that in its extremity foreshadows the ontological 
crucible he is about to experience. He refers to his being a 
teacher although we do not see him in the classroom. His 
living arrangements—the setting of his daily life—are barely 
sketched. He rents (apparently) an apartment—perhaps no more 
than a room—from the Stones, an elderly couple (we infer). 
Throughout the story human presence is minimal; people are 
disconnected shadows isolated both from others and seemingly 
from any integral connection to the story itself, and, when 
encountered, are disquieting, even grotesque: A woman engaged 
to do housework is "almost featureless," sweaty, panting and 
covered with dust; her brother Eli is "a man of great power 
and agility, but without forearms....His abnormality had made 
an exile from human society"; the features of the 
grandchildren of the narrator's now deceased landlady are 
"obscured with sorrow"; her son is "a man who...seemed to know 
little of peace, whether of body or of spirit"; and the 
landlady herself, Mrs. Stone, who succumbs to a "frailness" 
she had concealed until "concealment was impossible," is 
perhaps the story's most profound presence as she lies in 
state beneath the narrator's austere room: "Upstairs were the 
dogs and the stove; below was the echoing desolation" (235). 
Augmenting the sparseness of exposition and the isolation 
and angst of the story's characters is a motif of spatial 
disorientation which is also emblematic of visionary 
literature: An enveloping snowstorm causes "confusion." The 
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winter months are characterized by "a sky (that) had no 
identity—there was merely the soft air. The snow merged into 
the air from below with no visible dividing line. Often I 
should not have known whether I was going uphill or down..." 
(228)3. This loss of elemental and spatial distinctions, what 
MacQuarrie calls the perception of "things in the depth of 
their interrelatedness," (244) signals the narrator's growing 
awareness of and potential immersion into the existential 
"ground"—the Nothingness—which, omnipresent yet heretofore 
repressed, has surrounded and given definition to the 
"figures" of everyday life—institutions, rituals, and 
assumptions—which, I would suggest, have until now been the 
focus of his life4. 
Winters' narrator is experiencing, I feel, what Karl 
Jaspers calls a "limit or boundary situation" 
(Grenzsituationen) wherein the individual/visionary confronts 
the impenetrable boundaries or limits of existence. As such, 
no "traditional" plot of cause and effect actions will 
3Cf. Lord Jim, for example: "You couldn't distinguish the 
sea from the sky; there was nothing to see and nothing to 
hear. Not a glimmer, not a shape, not a sound" (114) . 
4This is admittedly making a bit of a leap. We, of 
course, are not privy to what constituted the center of the 
narrator's life prior to the experiences related in the story. 
It is nonetheless reasonable to extrapolate from his 
profession as teacher, his excursions (and consequent 
interaction) with the Stones, and his keeping of pet dogs that 
both his everyday and psychic life were of a more mundane 
nature than that recounted in the narrative; that is, his 
experience of an existential moment is a profound departure 
for the narrator. Always the crux of visionary fictions is 
this ontological evolution. 
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suffice. Rather the story is composed of an unrelenting and 
disorienting (to both reader and character) interiority, a 
chaotic psychic landscape that functions as both theme and 
setting. The catalyst for these experiences will differ for 
each visionary. It may be death as in "The Brink of Darkness"; 
guilt as in Miss Lonelvhearts and "Act of Faith"; a sense of 
the precariousness of identity as in Surfacing and A Passage 
to India; or alienation as in Invisible Man. "Bartleby the 
Scrivener" and "A Hunger Artist"; often it is a combination of 
these realities. But what is clear in all visionary narratives 
is that the visionary is in a situation of extremity, which is 
the occasion for the beginning of his project toward authentic 
being—the choosing/creating of a self unimpeded by 
considerations of personal circumstances or the strictures and 
norms of state, church, or society5. Furthermore, this 
condition of authenticity, once attained, is capable of 
confronting and psychically surmounting these barriers; the 
5This is not meant to suggest an "all is permitted" 
nihilism. Authentic being also includes "conscience"—in the 
sense of a moral commitment that compels the individual to act 
against the normative standards and assumptions of quotidian 
society—as a prime component. American anti-war protesters 
during the Vietnam War (that is those who protested before 
protesting attained fashionability) would be an example. A 
much better one, though, is offered by Vietnamese Buddhist 
monks who publicly immolated themselves during the war years 
in protest against the killing. They, in effect, answered both 
of this study's frame questions simultaneously. The type of 
choice involved in these situations is integral to what is 
meant by "the anguish of freedom." The imperative to choose, 
as Camus pointed out, is fraught with fear. Thus those 
Americans or Vietnamese who declined military service as an 
act of conscience were decidedly more courageous than those 
who served because their respective governments demanded it. 
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acknowledgement of death (Jim at the conclusion of Lord Jim 
would be perhaps the best example), to name the most potent of 
these limits, endows the existent with courage and integrity 
in that he or she now perceives the structure of reality in 
its totality, both figure and ground, and is able to formulate 
his or being upon that perception. When, for example, another 
nameless visionary narrator surfaces from her limit situation, 
an encounter with her primal self, she is authentic and self-
made, but it is an identity which rests on her precarious 
understanding of a world which asks and gives "nothing" 
(Atwood, 231) . 
A limit situation, then, implies a prohibition, and it is 
the overcoming of prohibitions which is Kierkegaard's6 
catapult to human freedom. He utilizes the story of Adam and 
Eve to illustrate the point: 
6In this study I will rely more on the work of 
Kierkegaard than on that of any other philosopher generally 
recognized as an "existentialist," not only because of the 
cogency of his insights but also because Kierkegaard is one of 
the great examples in the western intellectual tradition of an 
individual who lived his ideas, which is one of the chief 
values I embrace in chapter one. Nor do I feel any 
contradiction between Kierkegaard's Christian existentialism 
and my positing of a Godless universe. My contention in this 
chapter particularly is that acknowledgement of the void is a 
key to authentic being and, as I develop the point in 
subsequent chapters, literary and philosophical texts afford 
us various strategies for coping with that emptiness and 
achieving wholeness. Kierkegaard's so-called "leap of faith" 
is but one way of dealing with that void, a strategy adopted 
by Miss Lonelyhearts. Moreover, Kierkegaard's affinity with 
the visionary ethic is reflected by the general disdain in 
which he was held during his lifetime by the citizens of 
Copenhagen who saw his ideas and his way of being as a 
distinct "threat to the order they loved as final" (Hubben, 
11). 
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The prohibition (to not eat the forbidden fruit) 
induces in (Adam) anxiety, for the prohibition 
awakens in him freedom's possibility. What passes 
by innocence as the nothing of anxiety has now 
entered into Adam, and here again it is nothing— 
the anxious possibility of being able. He has no 
conception of what he is able to do...only the 
possibility of being able is present as a higher 
form of ignorance, as a higher expression of 
anxiety, because in a higher sense it both is and 
is not, because in a higher sense he both loves it 
and flees from it (CD, 44-5). 
Kierkegaard's illustration reminds us that limit situations 
both destroy (Jaspers speaks of existence "foundering" and 
"shattering" in these situations) and transcend; Adam and Eve, 
in choosing a way of being distinct from that ready-made for 
them and therein exposing their nakedness to the destructive 
element of God's wrath, transcend the boundaries of their 
given existence, embracing in their felix culpa the 
possibility of both the suffering and the joy of existing in 
full existential awareness of and responsibility for their 
being in the world7. "Man's freedom," writes Jaspers, "is 
inseparable from his consciousness of his finite nature" (64). 
"The coming-to-be of the individual begins where the 
acceptance of the ready-made ends..." (Heller, 20)8. Herein 
perhaps we begin to understand, too, the nature of Stein's 
7Implicit in this situation is the same question which 
any reading of King Lear, another patriarch who confronts a 
limit situation, must evoke: whether the endurance of 
suffering to obtain self-knowledge is preferable to sailing 
safely through existence. 
8Cf. Sartre's disdain for those who would accept "ready-
made" values and ways of being in "Portrait of an anti-Semite" 
quoted in chapter one. 
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enigmatic advice to Marlow about the importance of submitting 
to the "destructive element" and making "the deep, deep sea 
keep you up" (214). 
These limit situations, however, do not themselves signal 
the attainment of freedom and authenticity; they only create 
the awareness of freedom's possibility. As such, they preface 
the visionary's existential moment, the defining 
characteristic of visionary experience. A "crossing over" or 
threshold experience, the existential moment implies 
alternative ways of being. It is the vehicle through which 
Winters' narrator and all visionaries experience the 
ontological insight that reveals their total situation: 
During the three nights that Mrs. Stone had lain 
below me in the hall, my sensitivity to death, to 
the obscure and the irrelevant, had been augmented. 
I felt that I saw farther and farther into the 
events about me, that I perceived a new region of 
significance, even of sensation, extending a short 
distance behind that of which I had always been 
aware, suggesting the existence of far more than 
was even now perceptible. This might have unnerved 
me had it not been for the firmness of the woman in 
the coffin. In her were united the familiar and the 
inchoate. The certainty of her expression gave me 
pause. She was like a friend bidding me be quiet 
with a raised hand, a friend whose bidding I could 
trust to be authoritative. But with her departure 
there remained only the demonic silence which she 
had introduced, and to which for three nights she 
had given coherence and meaning (235). 
This experience of a sudden and profound awareness of 
one's condition in the world is significant as both sign and 
process. It is most immediately a verbal designation of 
vision; indeed, it was repeated encounters with characters who 
"saw further and deeper" that first suggested to me the 
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potential harmony of this body of disparate texts. More 
importantly, however, the existential moment posits through 
the character's seeing of that which had been heretofore 
hidden—"I perceived a new region of significance, even of 
sensation, extending a short distance behind that of which I 
had always been aware"—the experience of disillusionment: an 
awakening to the purpose of the ordering structures and 
systems of human society which, in the observation of William 
James "divert our attention from disease and death..., and the 
slaughterhouses and indecencies without end upon which our 
life is founded are huddled out of sight and never mentioned 
so that the world we recognize officially in literature and in 
society is a poetic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and 
better than the world that really is" (90)9. 
The process of the visionary's "crossing over" from the 
quotidian to the visionary mode of being may be more readily 
apprehended by employing the already alluded to idea of 
figure-ground dichotomies10, of which Winters' narrator's 
perception of the unity of "the familiar and the inchoate" in 
the corpse of Mrs. Stone is an example. He is confronting here 
90ne of the most powerful manifestations of this 
dichotomy between the realms of order and chaos occurs in 
Hermann Hesse's Demian (1919) and Steppenwolf (1927). The 
human tendency to repress the realities of disease and death 
is emblematized in "The Brink of Darkness" by the coffin of 
the narrator's student, which was "kept closed, from respect 
for the disease" (238-39). 
10For a discussion of one of the most salient examples of 
this metaphor in twentieth century fiction see the discussion 
of "The Blue Hotel" in Appendix "A". 
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the facticity of death, an awakening to which his landlady's 
once familiar body acts as mute guide: "The skin was 
preternaturally and evenly white, and in the wrinkles there 
seemed a trace as of an underlying darkness, even and 
impenetrable" (234)11. Once her body is removed he must choose 
how to be in relation to the "demonic silence" her death has 
revealed. 
This trope is augmented—and lent a certain 
universality—by the presence of the complementary ancient 
Chinese concept of the Yin-Yang, a concept that has affected 
virtually every aspect of Chinese thought. Of particular 
relevance here is its suggestion of a connection between the 
natural world and human events. At the story's opening, the 
narrator mentions that mice that would venture out upon the 
stark winter landscape would be pounced upon and killed by his 
dogs, "leaving a small spot of blood suspended in grayness" 
(228) ; later, in what is essentially the story's climax, the 
narrator works in the grayness afforded by poor lighting on 
one of those dogs whose head and mouth are lacerated with 
porcupine quills. The removal of each quill is followed "by 
a gush of blood" (239). The encroaching "demonic silence" 
evoked by the figure-ground image and the inchoate grayness 
and blood of the Yin-Yang delineate the existential frame for 
Winters' tale. As Comito observes: "Brightness and shadow, 
"Cf. the black storm cloud which almost surreptitiously 
envelopes the Patna in Lord Jim. 
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hardness and softness, are continually juxtaposed. They define 
not so much stages of a cycle as complementary aspects of a 
single intuition" (18, my emphasis). That intuition is of a 
universe whose essential nature is violent and dark. Indeed, 
a character in Beckett's Murphy observes that "All life is 
figure and ground(4)"; that is, existence is perceived 
(incorrectly, I will argue) as an unacknowledged dichotomy 
between those elements a person chooses to acknowledge as real 
or important or valuable and everything else, which often is 
designated the "other" or simply the concern of alienists12. 
It is helpful, then, to understand the visionary's power as 
dialectical or a "single intuition." He or she is able to 
synthesize the nature and interdependence of both the chaotic, 
12Philosophically, the figure-ground metaphor suggests the 
distinction between the two most predominant western ways of 
thinking about the human condition in the twentieth century: 
positivism, which takes science as the arbiter of human life 
and "dwells in the tiny island of light composed of what 
(positivist man) finds scientifically 'meaningful,'" (Barrett, 
21) and existentialism, which seeks to address the human 
condition in its totality, emphasizing if anything the 
encompassing Nothingness of our spiritual and physical 
condition. 
Modern art in general and visionary literature in 
particular reflect this awareness of the existential void 
through their flattening out of traditional conceptions of 
time, space, and subject, and their emphasis upon limit 
situations. It is when confronted with situations which are 
"on the far side of what is normal, routine, accepted, 
traditional, or safeguarded"—when through death, disease or 
despair we truly see and feel how contingent and fragile our 
existence is—that the abstract concept of the existential 
void assumes a numbing concreteness: "Our being reveals itself 
as much more porous, much less substantial than we had thought 
it" (Barrett, 62) . Moreover, the facile phrase the "tragic 
condition of humankind" assumes palpability when it is 
understood that we can only claim our selfhood, our identity 
and freedom through immersion in these realities. 
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existential "ground," (which, in his visionary incarnation, 
can now be "seen"), and that which it surrounds and defines: 
the "figures" of "norms, requirements, and conventions" 
(Heller, 26) , which constitute our everyday life and whose 
function is, in fact, the suppression of that very ground13. 
This "synthesis" is essential to understanding the nature 
and power of visionaries. In Everyday Life Agnes Heller 
distinguishes between two modes of being: "particularity" and 
"individuality." "Particularity" is characterized as the 
process of accommodating the self to the requirements of "the 
ready-made world," a world in which the "order of priorities, 
the scale of values...is largely taken over ready-made" (15); 
such a way of being emphasizes "self-preservation and 
subordinates everything else to this self-preservation;" that 
is, it is a way of being which perceives only the figures 
which will facilitate the person's preservation (20, emphasis 
mine). As Heller notes (and experience reminds us) we are all 
13Even a cursory survey of the stuff of everyday life 
reveals the validity of this assertion. That civilization is 
a record of humankind's battle/holding action against the 
entropy of nature is revealed in everything from cryogenics to 
the lane markers on highways. Possibly the apotheosis of this 
struggle, though, is to be seen in the rise of bureaucracy, 
whose effects were most potently dramatized in art by Kafka, 
and in the real world by the Nazis for whom bureaucracy, 
perhaps not all that ironically, was the sine qua non of the 
Holocaust: "The light shed by the Holocaust on our knowledge 
of bureaucratic rationality is at its most dazzling once we 
realize the extent to which the very idea of the Endlosung 
(Final Solution) was an outcome of the bureaucratic culture" 
(Bauman, 15). 
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subject to the claims of particularity14; yet the fruits of 
particularity as a sole or even primary way of being are 
illustrated graphically and darkly by the choices based upon 
preservation of self made by the men of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101, choices based primarily, it will be recalled, 
upon the maintenance of their standing in their unit and their 
future place in the perceived "society" to which they planned 
to return. Choices, that is, which regarded only the "figures" 
of a ready-made mode of being while assiduously ignoring and 
thus perpetrating the existential darkness and chaos that 
enshrouded and permeated those figures. 
Opposed to this, "individuality," according to Heller, 
is "a development; it is the coming-to-be of an individual," 
a state in which "the individual does not necessarily wish to 
preserve himself 'in all circumstances' and 'in any way 
uHeller also notes that "in history up to the present, 
particularity has been the subject of everyday life in the 
great majority of social orders and social relations. All the 
material wealth of the world has arisen from the activity of 
those who 'took things as they come'" (27). In light of the 
discussion of the Holocaust in chapter one, it is revealing to 
note the contrast between the United States' massive reaction 
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in which Saddam Hussein was 
characterized as being "worse than Hitler" and its passivity 
toward the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. 
This would seem, given the economic stakes of each case, a 
particularly cogent example of Heller's contention. It might 
finally be noted that neither of these tragedies approaches 
the on-going human suffering occurring today on the African 
continent, a situation which seem to befuddle attempts at 
meaningful action by the rest of the world. Indeed, Somalia's 
devastating famine is the direct result of the withdrawal of 
American economic support following the demise of Russian 
communism. Herein lies an incarnation of the existential 
concept of "absurdity." 
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possible'" (20). In other words, faced with a morally 
unacceptable way of being, the individual will may choose not 
to be, as in the cases of Bartleby, the Hunger Artist, Edna 
Pontellier, Mrs. Moore, and Septimus Smith. Heller's 
"individuality" is a cognate of existentialism's 
"authenticity," of a self constructed from the individual's 
personal and conscious choice15. Clearly the myriad choices we 
make "every day" constitute a perpetual morality play that 
leads us toward or away from our selves. 
In visionary literature the blurring of figure-ground 
distinctions functions as a sign of movement toward 
authenticity and individuality and as a prelude to vision: 
boundaries are dissolving; barriers disappearing. In "The 
Brink of Darkness," it is almost as if the narrator were 
undergoing a form of ontological ripening, a movement from the 
phenomenal to the noumenal world, which will allow him to see 
things as they are, not as he had assumed them to be. Each 
season he mentions includes a reference to a blurring of 
15We may better understand what is at stake here by noting 
a "universal" example: the glaring incongruity between the 
persona of Elvis Presley as rock and roll/rhythm and blues 
icon, and the "plastic" Elvis seen in his movies, where the 
very rawness and danger of his identity and—inseparably—his 
talent have been eviscerated and buried beneath inane, "safe" 
lyrics; a vapid, inauthentic persona; and insipid production 
values. The question of "What really happened to Elvis" is in 
this light quite obvious: having relinquished his identity— 
his way of being—to economically-minded handlers (what Heller 
would label "particularity"), he realized implicitly that he 
no longer wanted to be and committed what was tantamount to 
suicide in the process of obliterating his consciousness to 
his renunciation of that identity. 
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figure and ground contours: the fall sees his pet dogs 
described as "dark vortices, blurred and shapeless"; the 
summer reveals trees as "black voids growing shadowy and 
visible at the edges" while two white goats are "trembling 
watery blotches, barely discernable." A young woman, briefly 
encountered, is "almost featureless"; a sky appears 
"unvaulted.. .without distance or dimension"; mice which emerge 
from behind his bedroom walls are "shadowy little creatures." 
The darker it grows, the more he sees the animate and 
inanimate, the human and nonhuman, figure and ground, in their 
interrelatedness. 
The significance of this dissolution is adumbrated in 
the narrator's encounter with a pen of yearling coyotes, "the 
only sign of life amid four hours of snow." The animals, 
captured to be slaughtered for their fur, "were about ready 
for killing." They seem, however, wholly oblivious to their 
fate or condition: 
It was strange that they never broke through so 
slight a fence, yet there they were; young dogs 
would have torn through it with scarcely a pause, 
scarcely a sense of an obstacle. But these 
creatures were innocent and delicate, spirits 
impeded by a spell, puffs of smoke precise at the 
tips. 
The timid, caged coyotes (by nature an intelligent, radically 
independent and free breed) form the keystone to a complex of 
animal-human relationships in the story16. Their "innocence" 
16In addition to the coyotes, dogs, mice, goats, horses, 
and a porcupine are mentioned. Perhaps more significantly, the 
character of Eli, born without forearms and consequently "an 
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recalls Kierkegaard's equation of that state with "ignorance" 
in speaking of the Garden of Eden. As with our mythical 
parents, these creatures are in a dreamstate, a "spell"; they 
are inauthentic, not themselves (mere "puffs of smoke") for, 
as Kierkegaard says of Adam and Eve, they have nothing to 
strive against save Nothingness itself17, yet this they disdain 
or ignore. 
Comito's analysis, which describes this incident as one 
of the story's "most evocatively mysterious episodes," places 
the coyotes in a favorable ontological light: 
What the narrator finds appealing about them is the 
freshness and insubstantiality of their suddenly 
flaring identities....They are "innocent" not in 
any sentimentalist primitive sense but in their 
vulnerability and fleetingness, without past or 
future. (21) 
exile from human society," develops in compensation "an 
unusual sympathy for horses and mules, with whom he could 
accomplish extraordinary things, and that part of his nature 
which was not satisfied by this companionship had turned to 
religion" (233). The alienation that Eli experiences is 
paralleled by the narrator whose anguish is also mitigated by 
his observation of housemice and his ministrations to his 
dogs. However, aside from the solace animals offer in this 
tale, their plenitude also suggests the ontological proximity 
of their complementary world, which almost literally is 
gnawing at the edges of human identity. 
17
"Nothingness" was a (non)state which filled Miguel de 
Unamuno with a particular dread: "For myself, I can say as a 
youth and even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown the 
most moving pictures of hell, for even then nothing seemed to 
me quite so horrible as nothingness itself" (9) . 
Existentialist writers, ironically I suppose, write a great 
deal on the subject of Nothingness, but essentially what they 
are responding to is the anguish or contingency of being; the 
anguish that results "whenever the thought comes to us that 
Nothingness was and still is just as possible as being, 
whenever we ask ourselves how it is that there is something 
rather than nothing" (Olson, 31). 
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While I agree the incident is a key to understanding the 
story, its significance seems to me quite different from that 
suggested by Comito18. Indeed I would argue the coyotes' 
condition to be one of despair and intended to foreshadow the 
narrator's own failure of authenticity; like the coyotes, he 
will choose to deny his freedom and not become himself by 
retreating into the safety of the "limits of my old 
identity"19. The self, Kierkegaard teaches us, the individual 
180ne might be curious, first of all, how an "identity" 
can be simultaneously "insubstantial" and "flaring." Moreover, 
to be "without past or future" is to be the ontological 
equivalent of the prelapsarian Adam and Eve, which is to say 
to lack will, freedom, identity itself, none of which can be 
attained without the breaking of prohibitive psycho-social 
barriers. 
19This type of boundary-drawing, cited by Bauman as a 
"universal cultural activity," is one of the chief strategies 
individuals and societies have of maintaining an ersatz sense 
of order. Surely the prime historical example of its almost 
metaphysical power is found in the endurance of anti-Semitism, 
a timeless tragedy made up on the one hand of the Jews' fierce 
refusal to relinquish their identity as Jews and the diaspora 
which forced Jews across countless geographical boundaries, 
and on the other of those native to those boundaries, 
primarily Christians, whose "self-identity was, in fact, 
estrangement from the Jews." Their identity, then, was 
dependent on the other, not on their own choices and actions: 
It was born of the rejection by the Jews. It drew 
its continuous vitality from the rejection of the 
Jews. Christianity could theorize its own existence 
only by an on-going opposition to the Jews. 
Continuing Jewish stubbornness bore evidence that 
the Christian mission remained as yet unfinished. 
Moreover, what Bauman terms the "conceptual Jew" of Christian 
imagination became the visualization of the 
...horrifying consequences of boundary-
transgression, of not remaining fully in the fold, 
of any conduct short of unconditional loyalty and 
unambiguous choice; he was the prototype and arch-
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whom through our actions and decisions we create, is freedom. 
To renounce that freedom, to refuse to become ourselves, is 
the kind of despair that 
allows itself to be, so to speak, cheated of its 
self by the "others." By seeing the multitude of 
people around it, by being busied with all sorts of 
worldly affairs, by being wise to the ways of the 
world, such a person forgets himself, in a divine 
sense forgets his own name; dares not believe in 
himself, finds being himself too risky, finds it 
much easier and safer being like the others, to 
become a copy, a number, along with the crowd, 
(emphasis mine) 
This situation, Kierkegaard wryly observes, "goes practically 
unnoticed in the world. Precisely by losing himself in this 
way, such a person gains all that is required for a flawless 
performance in everyday life: 
Far from anyone thinking him to be in despair, he 
is just what a human being ought to be. Naturally 
the world has no understanding of what is truly 
horrifying. The despair that not only does not 
cause any inconvenience in life, but makes life 
convenient and comfortable, is naturally enough in 
no way regarded as despair. (SD, 63-4) 
In Kierkekaard's view, such individuals "lack primitiveness." 
It is a suggestive phrase, for a key element in "The Brink of 
pattern of all nonconformity, heterodoxy, anomaly 
and aberration....The conceptual Jew carried a 
message: alternative to this order here and now is 
not another order, but chaos and devastation. 
(Bauman, 38-9) 
The irony of this, as I hope to make clear, is that chaos is 
the result of the erasure of artificial and irrational 
boundaries, but it is only through immersion in that chaos 
that true salvation—by which I mean the achievement of 
authenticity—can be realized. The danger of both Jew and 
visionary to quotidian reality lies in their ability to expose 
the inauthenticity of identities which rely on the 
artificiality of boundaries. 
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Darkness," as with most other visionary texts20, is just such 
a rediscovery of the primitive, an immersion into Stein's 
"destructive element." In the same way that The Sickness Unto 
Death is an anatomy of despair, the caged coyotes are to be 
seen as an evolutionarily distinct breed from the narrator's 
dogs21 ("young dogs would have torn through [that fence] with 
scarcely a pause") who, later in the story, bolt into the 
wilderness for several days only to return from their 
encounter with the destructive element "emaciated and 
limping," their heads and throats covered in porcupine quills. 
The narrator's ministrations to the dogs are graphic and 
horrible; in effect a blood rite whose very concreteness (Cf. 
the coyotes being likened to "puffs of smoke") reconnects him 
to something visceral and (Kierkegaard's term) "primitive" to 
his humanness. The scene emblematizes the palpable danger of 
the destructive element, and acts as a paradigm for the 
possibility of the narrator's own achievement of authenticity. 
"I was prepared for this kind of return," the narrator 
says of his dogs' reappearance, and an essential part of that 
preparation is a second existential moment, which reveals not 
the world but himself. The world for the narrator—as it was 
20Cf. "Act of Faith"'s emphasis on an almost primordial 
sea of mud that engulfs the army camp or the equally ancient 
Marabar Caves in A Passage to India; Miss Lonelyheart's trip 
to the country; the jungle settings of The Voyage Out. Lord 
Jim, and Lord of the Flies or the return to the wilderness in 
Surfacing. 
21Genetically, of course, domestic dogs and coyotes share 
the same genus; indeed, the coyote is the ancestor of the dog. 
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for Emil Sinclair—has been circumscribed into two realms: 
upstairs, in his actual living quarters where he reads and 
eats and sleeps, are life and comfort, "the dogs and the 
stove," the figures of everyday life; below, where the body of 
his deceased landlady has lain, is "echoing desolation," the 
ground of the existential void. One night he ventures into 
this "demonic" zone for a glass of water. His footsteps 
resound with "great volume...as if I were walking (in my 
room)." In the kitchen he stands before a window, "bright 
emptiness behind (him)": 
I stared at the smooth surface of the snow thus 
suddenly revealed to me, like a new meaning not 
divisible into any terms I knew. Again I had the 
illusion of seeing myself in the empty room, in the 
same light, frozen to my last footprints, cold and 
unmeaning. A slight motion caught my eye, and I 
glanced up at the darkened corner of the window, to 
be fixed with horror. There, standing on the 
outside of the window, translucent, a few lines 
merely, and scarcely visible, was a face, my face, 
the eyes fixed upon my own. I moved on quickly to 
the kitchen; the reflection started and vanished. 
(238) 
The sudden depth of vision ("suddenly revealed to me like a 
new meaning not divisible into any terms I knew") which 
signals the existential moment is again present as he 
perceives the formless ground in the undifferentiated winter 
landscape; the passage's diction—"empty," "frozen," "cold and 
unmeaning"—suggests the emotional and metaphysical despair 
vision encompasses; and the face he encounters—a "figure" of 
"a few lines merely"—recalls that of Mr. Stone, which, upon 
his wife's death, is described as "pale and lifeless, 
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f(a)ll(ing) away in heavy lines" (231). But most indicative of 
this visionary is his characterization of the experience as an 
"illusion" and his retreat to another room, foreshadowing his 
subsequent retreat to Colorado, another "state," a different 
set of "boundaries" within which he can attempt to elude the 
consequences of what he sees. 
Clearly, Winters has carefully qualified the scene; the 
face the narrator perceives is but "a few lines, and scarcely 
visible," and, after all, we must ask, whose face would one 
expect to see reflected in a window but one's own? The 
temptation is thus strong to read this text—largely devoid as 
it is in narrative logic and linear development—as a 
psychological curiosity22, or perhaps one man's exorcism of his 
personal demons. Comito points out that Winters himself was 
"annoyed by naturalistic explanations (17)" of the story. 
Indeed, such a reading is reductive for the themes Winters 
addresses have a resonance not only for other visionary texts 
but much more importantly for our lives beyond the text. "The 
real themes of (the story)," argues Comito, "are moral and 
metaphysical: the precariousness of identity and the ambiguity 
of the universe by which it is threatened" (4). That is, the 
story prompts the reader's confrontation with Augustine's 
question "Who am I," and takes it one step further: how do I 
Z2I first encountered this story in a graduate course on 
"Madness in Literature." 
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survive, much less thrive, in a universe at best indifferent, 
at worst inimical to that identity23? 
It is not surprising then that as a result of his 
experience of vision, the narrator literally asks himself 
Augustine's question: "I sometimes wondered who I was" (235), 
but he falters and finally withdraws before the implications 
of the answer: 
I thought back over the past months, of the manner 
in which I had been disturbed, uncentered, and 
finally obsessed as by an insidious power. I 
remembered that I had read somewhere of a kind of 
Eastern demon who gains power over one only in 
proportion24 as one recognizes and fears him. I felt 
that I had been the victim of a deliberate and 
malevolent invasion, an invasion utilizing and 
augmenting to appalling and shadowy proportions all 
of the most elusive accidents of my life, my new 
penumbra of perception thus rendering to what would 
otherwise have appeared the contingent the effect 
of coherent and cumulative meaning. Finally through 
some miscalculations on the part of the invader, or 
through some other accident, I had begun to recover 
the limits of my old identity. I had begun this 
recovery at the time of the immersion in the brute 
blood of the bitch. The invading power I could not 
identify, I felt it near me still, but slowly 
receding. (244, emphasis mine). 
The narrator's "reading" of his experience seems a patent 
example of what Sartre terms "bad faith" or "self-deception"; 
23In an author's footnote to an edition of this story, 
Winters wrote "that this story is a study of the hypothetical 
possibility of a hostile supernatural world, and of the effect 
on the perceptions of a consideration of this possibility" 
(Powell, 45). 
24Cf. the refrain of "proportion" and "reasonableness," 
which is urged upon Rachel Vinrace in The Voyage Out. In the 
quotidian view, to maintain one's sense of proportion is to 
effectively obviate the possibility of confronting one's 
"demons." 
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it is a choice of how to be which represses if not outright 
denies the narrator's knowledge of his fragility and 
contingency within the gray indifference of his universe; in 
making that choice, he denies his freedom and becomes 
inauthentic. His retreat into the "limits" of his former self 
is an ontological circling of the wagons, an action similar in 
kind analogically to the coyotes and intertextually to Charlie 
Marlow's in Heart of Darkness in that, confronted by the 
implications of the darkness, both men lie25. The narrator 
stands before the brink of the abyss as his students had stood 
before their deceased classmate, "looking curiously young and 
helpless" and in so doing he betrays his psychic immaturity. 
The objectifying of the narrator's "problem" by the reference 
to an "insidious force" and the tenuous attribution of his 
"recovery" to the demon's "miscalculations...or through some 
other accident..." is a species of dissembling, a repression 
which Kierkegaard sees as ultimately damning: "...learning to 
know dread is an adventure which every man has to confront if 
he would not go to perdition either by not having known dread 
or by sinking under it. He therefore who has learned rightly 
to be in dread has learned the most important thing" ("Dread," 
252) . 
25Clearly there is a considerable difference in degree 
between Marlow's (who travels to the very heart of darkness) 
and the narrator's experience of vision. Marlow receives "just 
a glimpse" while Winters' narrator is, as it were, fully 
immersed in the destructive element of existential awareness. 
Nonetheless their respective reactions to the darkness are 
essentially similar. 
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To read the conclusion of "Brink of Darkness" in this way 
is to subvert what seems to be occurring. The narrator, after 
all, does recover the "figure" of his old self, a recovery 
whose inception lies in his care of his badly hurt animals, an 
action palpably human and humane. But the vocabulary of 
visionary literature is singular: when he notes, in speaking 
of the disorder of his room, "I was busy and very tired and 
slowly lost the habit of noticing" (240) , one might recall 
Marlow's observation that he, too, did not go ashore for "a 
howl and a dance" because, with the myriad tasks of his boat, 
"(He) had no time....neither that fireman nor I had any time 
to peer into our creepy thoughts" (HD, 106-07). The work of 
the quotidian world becomes a means of deflecting vision and 
alienating us from understanding our condition and ourselves. 
Indeed, Winter's concluding image of a plow—"a tiny iron 
thing crawling rapidly in straight lines across the hills"— 
resonates with Marlow's image of his "little begrimed 
steamboat, like a sluggish beetle crawling on the floor of a 
lofty portico" toward an impenetrable darkness (104) . The plow 
is driven by Eli, and Terry Comito sees in the deformed man's 
" 'strange movements' the agency of a resourcefulness (the 
narrator) will himself need in the continuing struggle he 
foresees. For a moment at least he feels the sunshine" (16). 
But the illusory nature of both the narrator's claim to 
"recovery" and of even Comito's guarded optimism is made 
unequivocal earlier in the story's final paragraph where the 
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figure-ground dichotomy is again manifested: "I could not 
blink my eyes without being conscious of the darkness....It 
was as if there was darkness underlying the brightness of the 
air, underlying everything, as if I might slip into it at any 
instant, and as if I held myself where I was by an act of will 
from moment to moment" (242). The narrator's removal to 
Colorado from which he "would never return" is an act of 
"particularity," of self-preservation. Unlike Yeats' visionary 
in "The Second Coming," Winters' narrator emerges from his 
vision willfully empty-handed; unlike Leda, who also 
experienced the "brute blood," he has put on no knowledge. 
I would suggest, however, that we have been prepared for 
the narrator's act of bad faith by his uses of reading, always 
a key component of visionary texts. The narrator mentions, in 
a most offhanded way, that he is a teacher, which is to say 
that by definition he is a reader. There is, moreover, a 
single reference to the narrator's actually reading: "While 
the dogs were gone, I spent as much of my nights as I could in 
reading" (237) . Because Winter's tale is cut not from the 
"figures" of everyday life but instead from the enveloping 
existential "ground," these are two of the few facts of an 
expository or mundane nature offered in the story and as such 
accrue to themselves a special significance. The narrator 
wishes to remain awake because of his concern over his dogs' 
venture into the countryside, and reading, rather than 
inculcating a moral consciousness, becomes merely a means of 
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maintaining a physiological state much in the manner of the 
initial voice in The Wasteland, who "read(s) much of the 
night, and go(es) south in the winter"; that is, reading is a 
way of denying the darkness rather than a means of 
apprehending it. 
What is particularly interesting in this regard is the 
narrator's reference to the "insidious power's" use "of all 
the most elusive accidents of (his) life...thus rendering to 
what would otherwise have appeared the contingent the effect 
of coherent and cumulative meaning." I believe that what seems 
to be a reference to the protagonist's life (of which we know 
next to nothing) is, in fact, a commentary on the reader's 
experience of the story itself. As suggested earlier, "The 
Brink of Darkness" is essentially a series of impressionistic 
details ("elusive accidents") held together, I would argue, by 
the reader's own "penumbra of perception"; that is, the 
ability of a virtually structureless story to achieve not only 
coherence and meaning but indeed power is "contingent" only on 
my now awakened sense of a narrative logic which transcends 
traditional "limits." When I am aware of this story as an 
example of visionary literature, I perceive the causal 
relationship among the protagonist's formerly disparate 
impressions. "The Brink of Darkness" "uncenters" my sense of 
what a fiction should be and do and in the process teaches me 
to see a narrative and myself in a new and possibly truer way. 
To use E.M. Forster's distinction, what had been a story, a 
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mere amalgamation of events, becomes a plot, a group of 
interrelated occurrences. I maintain that the reader-oriented 
structures and existential themes of visionary fictions are in 
fact moral exercises which prompt us to reexamine the 
narrative logic of our own lives, to discover their "plots," 
to construct meaning from what may only seem to be "elusive 
accidents." 
Through their insistence upon the kind of engaged reading 
I mentioned in chapter one, visionary fictions and their first 
cousins, epiphanic fictions, foster this kind of moral 
exercising. Indeed, the epiphanic fictions of Dubliners are 
some of the great examples in modern literature of art's 
ability to enhance our moral vision. Mirroring the experience 
of visionary awakening, Dubliners7 stories, which frequently 
end in medias res. consistently subvert the reader's 
accustomed and comfortable expectations, even insistence, of 
discovering meaning in all the old familiar places. In 
cumulative effect, Joyce's willful non-endings teach the 
reader to transform the grammar of meaning from the arena of 
the "figure," (the actual black-charactered words upon the 
white page) where complication leads to climax and reassuring 
resolution, to that of the decidedly more unstable "ground," 
(the whiteness of the page: the gaps between words extending 
to the very margins of the page and beyond, perhaps, to our 
daily lives) where "meaning" as such becomes a much more 
problematical (and personal) entity. 
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The moral thrust of Dubliner's stories extends, of 
course, far beyond the provincialism of Dublin society. In 
"Counterparts," Joyce relates the ontological death of 
Farrington, a law copyist paralyzed between his unarticulated 
dreams and his submergence into alcoholic stupor, which, along 
with his wife's reliance upon religion, form Joyce's Scylla 
and Charbydis of Irish paralysis. But the numerous references 
to Farrington as the generic "man" alert us to the universal 
implications of this story, extending its connections beyond 
father and son to text and reader until the full and main 
intent of its title hits the reader with the delayed epiphanic 
impact of Eliot's (via Baudelaire) "You hypocrite lectuer!" We 
as readers are surely part of the "race" whose conscience 
Stephen/Joyce seeks to create, in part, through circumventing 
ways of being like Farrington's. 
Robert Scholes suggests as much in noting that in our 
encounters with "Counterparts," "we develop and refine our 
consciences" (emphasis mine) and compares the experience of 
reading Dubliners as a whole with reading Saint Ignatius's 
Spiritual Exercises: 
The evaluation of motive and responsibility in 
these stories...must inevitably lead the reader 
beyond any easy orthodoxy. These case histories 
encourage us to exercise our spirits, develop our 
consciences: to accept the view that morality is a 
matter of individual responses to particular 
situations rather than an automatic invocation of 
religious or ethical rules of thumb. (382, emphasis 
mine) 
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In "Counterparts" meaning evolves from meaninglessness; 
in effect—like Scholes' valorization of individual choice and 
responsibility over unreflecting "ethical rules of thumb26"—an 
existential exercise. Farrington is identified both by others 
and himself as knowing nothing: 
— I know nothing about any two letters, (Farrington) said 
stupidly. 
—You—know—nothing. Of course you know nothing, said 
Mr. Alleyne. Tell me, he added...do you take me for a 
fool? Do you take me for an utter fool? 
The twin questions of "how/whether to be" are made 
central here through the story's implicit connections with two 
works which are visionary archetypes: first, the above 
passage's repetitions of "Nothing" and "fool" echo King Lear27 
as Farrington's relinquishing of moral authority to alcohol 
and (through his wife) the church recalls Lear's own 
abrogation of moral responsibility. All this is prelude to 
Farrington's Lear-like descent into the maelstrom of wrath, 
personal oblivion, fear and loathing. But as is characteristic 
of much of the literature of the high modernist era and in 
26Cf. "ready-made" ways of being. 
27See note 6. Lear's existential moments occur, I would 
suggest, on the heath in his vision of human suffering and in 
his shocks of recognition regarding the true natures of both 
Goneril and Regan, who possess the "figures" of women but are 
"beneath...all the fiend's" (IV, vi, 128). Again, the key is 
that these awakenings reveal an existential universe along the 
lines I defined in chapter one. Of course, Lear, like Winters' 
narrator and Bartleby, is more often than not labeled as mad. 
I am reminded, however, of Nietzsche's saying "all worthwhile 
thought risks madness" and also of McCall's citing Melville's 
frequent observation that "seeing the world for the monstrous 
place it is, is what drives one mad" (51). 
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particular that of Joyce himself, the heroic and tragic have 
been eviscerated and enervated: There will be neither 
spiritual renewal nor self-knowledge for the likes of 
Farrington who remains benighted, his eyes perpetually "heavy" 
and "dirty," virtually an anti-visionary state; indeed, 
Farrington is even denied the physical conquest granted the 
eighty year old Lear over Cordelia's slayer: in his abiding 
rage he only "gauges the fragility" of his employer's 
"polished skull"; he does not act. Rather his physical prowess 
is reduced to a child's test of arm-wrestling with a drinking 
companion, a match he loses ignominiously. 
"Counterparts" concludes with one of the stark images of 
circularity which conjure Irish paralysis in Dubliners: 
Farrington's son kneels before him proffering a "Hail Mary" if 
his father will refrain from beating him. Like several of 
Dubliners's stories, this seems a non-ending, devoid of the 
moral symmetry and catharsis of a Lear. However, the epiphany 
(perhaps deferred until the collection's final story or even 
until the completion of multiple readings) is the reader's: 
the elements which—in Joyce's view—constitute Ireland's 
moral paralysis—alcohol and religion—are revealed here as 
incipient and insidious in the next generation. There is, we 
sense, no other way to be in the prisonhouse of Dublin. 
However, the most powerful visionary connection offered 
in "Counterparts" is precipitated by Farrington's absorption— 
indeed, his revery—with a line he is copying, an "incomplete 
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phrase: in no case shall the said Bernard Bodley be..."(90). 
Farrington's position as a law office copyist and Joyce's 
penchant for wordplay might suggest "Bernard Bodley" as an 
anagram for Bartleby, Melville's nineteenth century 
scrivener28, whose own name suggests a hindrance to being, 
whose drama plays out in a setting—Wall Street—which 
connotes a prison, and whose death occurs in a literal prison. 
As Farrington is defined by "nothingness" and foolishness, 
Bartleby is defined by phrases which name his prescience: "I 
know you" (i.e. the tale's narrator and, by extension, the 
reader) and "I know where I am." Moreover, Bartleby knows that 
which he needs for spiritual survival: a pattern or way—a 
copy—of being: upon his hiring, Bartleby falls to his task as 
if "long famished for something to copy." But such spiritual 
food as his milieu provides him proves, as it does for a 
visionary like Kafka's hunger artist, thin gruel indeed. Thus 
do both Bartleby29 and Kafka's fantastic artist starve to death 
amidst an abundance of food. 
Both Melville's and Joyce's short stories may also be 
read as fables about learning to read and as cautionary tales 
"Although the resuscitation of Moby Dick's reputation did 
not begin until 1917, knowledge and admiration of the book 
were evident among members of Joyce's Parisian circle during 
the time the author was completing Dubliners. Whether Joyce 
had actually read "Bartleby," however, I have been unable to 
ascertain. 
29Several commentators on the story have noted its 
preponderance of eating imagery. See McCall (pages 40-4) for 
a good summary. 
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about the inherent pitfalls in the gaps any reader will 
encounter within and between words. It is within those gaps— 
the blank spaces that surround the words' characters—that the 
ground of literary and, by extension, ontological inquiry 
resides30. Farrington simply never cracks the code. His first 
encounter with the "incomplete phrase: In no case shall the 
said Bernard Bodley be..." inaugurates his day's drinking, a 
patent form of ontological retreat (his way of going to 
"Colorado"); his second attempt leads to a rhetorical 
analysis—" (he) thought how strange it was that the last three 
words began with the same letter"—but he is never able to 
apprehend or willing to confront the significance of the 
phrase's content. Farrington, in the simplest terms, is a poor 
reader, in effect disappearing among the phrase's gaps, never 
to resurface unless in the form of a son tragically intent on 
copying the patterns his parents present him. Within those 
gaps is the "nothingness" which Farrington claims to know. And 
he does, on a quotidian level of humiliation and insult, know 
the searing scourge of nothingness. But on the visionary level 
of actually seeing into, embracing and surmounting that 
nothingness, Farrington is profoundly blind and impotent, 
incapable of articulating or interpreting what he reads. 
Bartleby, however, embodies the "postal principle"; the 
dead letters he at onetime processed deliver their grim 
30I will incorporate Iser's theory of reading into my 
later chapters. 
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message; he knows where he is and his dead wall reveries—his 
limit situation—only serve as objective correlatives to his 
spiritual desolation. The story's frequent references to 
Bartleby's deteriorating eyesight—his "eyestrain"—attest to 
the diligence of his "reading" of his world31. Bartleby, too, 
disappears into the gaps of his "text," albeit his plunge into 
the destructive element, as has been suggested, is taken in 
full and tragic consciousness of a desire (a "preference") to 
no longer be. 
Bartleby7s character may be distinguished by three 
qualities: his isolation ("...he seemed alone, absolutely 
alone in the universe") , his silence, and his dignity. His 
silence—as both cause and effect of the unnamed "incurable 
disorder" from which he suffers—is one of literature's most 
eloquent and darkest pronouncements. As McCall puts it, "the 
repeated answer to our question (of what is wrong with 
Bartleby), and the profoundest, is silence" (58). But most 
significant, I would argue, is Bartleby's unyielding dignity 
in the face of his knowledge of that silence and aloneness32. 
In his refusal to compromise himself through immersion, like 
31What Bartleby literally reads, of course, are legal 
documents, a bulwark, if you will, of the quotidian life in 
general and of boundary-drawing in particular. The fragility 
of such structures is amply demonstrated by the havoc 
engendered by one recalcitrant scrivener. 
32McCall quotes John Haig, an actor who played Bartleby 
in a movie version of the story, that listing "the most 
important qualities of the character as I came to him...I 
think I would commence with Dignity. Bartleby's personal 
dignity never falters before the world" (57) . 
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Farrington, in a life of dissolution and wrath or through 
accepting the lawyer's offer of material succor or through 
retreating—like Winters' narrator—from the implications of 
his vision, Bartleby emerges as an existential archetype of 
Camus' question—one who knows himself, his condition and, in 
his authenticity, shows us one response to the universe's 
silence. The remaining chapters will explore the dynamics—the 
ways of being—of four visionary heroes who choose a 
"condemnation to freedom" and a pursuit of authenticity over 
suicide and bad faith. 
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CHAPTER III 
FIGURING THE GROUNDS OF EXISTENTIAL BEING: 
FAITH IN TWO VISIONARY FICTIONS 
The lustre of the present hour is always borrowed from 
the background of possibilities it goes with. Let our 
common experiences be enveloped in an eternal moral 
order; let our suffering have an immortal significance; 
let heaven smile upon the earth, and deities pay their 
visits; let faith and hope be the atmosphere which man 
breathes in;—and his days pass by with zest; they stir 
with prospects, they thrill with remoter values. Place 
round them on the contrary the curdling cold and gloom 
and absence of all permanent meaning which for pure 
naturalism and the popular science evolutionism of our 
time are all that is visible ultimately, and the thrill 
stops short, or turns rather to an anxious trembling. 
(William James) 
All life is figure and ground. (Samuel Beckett) 
Art is a way out. (Miss Lonelyhearts) 
The "dead letters" which Melville's narrator speculates as the 
cause of Bartleby's fatal melancholia are made flesh in both 
Nathanael Wests's Miss Lonelyhearts and Irwin Shaw's "Act of 
Faith." Both of the latter works turn on their visionary 
protagonists' reading of letters, which are simultaneously 
narratives of despair—raw, authentic pleas for spiritual help 
and ontological direction—and revelatory documents which 
inspire faith in both their fictional and ideal readers. For 
Miss Lonelyhearts and Seeger, the visionary hero of "Act of 
Faith," letters mark an immersion into the destructive element 
of existential awareness and the subsequent struggle toward 
selfhood and identity, which define visionary experience; 
their reading mirrors our own reading of visionary fictions in 
which we see the visionary grow toward selfhood, and 
experience the enhancement of our own vision, of our own 
possibilities for being. 
While Miss Lonelyhearts is one of the masterworks of 
twentieth century American fiction1, Shaw's "Act of Faith" 
enjoys—justifiably—a much more modest reputation. Yet I hope 
to show that when viewed within the framework of visionary 
fiction, it, too, acquires a narrative dynamism. The complex 
1Stanley Edgar Hyman calls the book "one of the three 
finest American novels of our century" (27). Harold Bloom 
contends that except for the greatest Faulkner, no other 
American fiction writer in this century "can be said to have 
surpassed Miss Lonelyhearts" (1) . It is noteworthy that West's 
critical reputation parallels Melville's, both having suffered 
years of critical neglect (West's reputation wasn't revived 
until the mid fifties). For an intriguing Westian allusion to 
"Bartleby," see p.98. 
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of characteristics which define visionary works is manifest 
throughout both works. As is characteristic of the interiority 
and subjectiveness of visionary fictions, the plots of these 
works are sparse2; Victor Comerchero observes that "within two 
pages after the novel begins...Miss Lonelyhearts' problem is 
quite clear: how does he answer the letters (he receives as an 
advice columnist) when the letters are "no longer funny'?" 
(74) . This is indeed the quotidian manifestation of Miss 
Lonelyhearts' conflict3—with a slight but I think significant 
visionary alteration: as I will demonstrate below, Miss 
Lonelyhearts7 problem is clear in the book's first paragraph: 
how does he respond to the letters when he perceives them to 
be authentic manifestations of the human condition, of his own 
condition? To no longer be amused by the letters does not 
necessarily imply action, but to see them as reflections of 
one's condition in the world demands a response. Miss 
Lonelyhearts turns on the anxiety inherent in that response. 
Similarly, in "Act of Faith," Shaw utilizes a faux plot of 
American soldiers at the end of World War II trying to gather 
funds for a weekend in Paris to prepare the reader 
psychologically to experience Seeger's existential moment upon 
2A distinction should be made here between fictions which 
contain visionary characters like Mrs. Moore in A Passage to 
India and those (the majority) whose protagonists are 
visionaries. 
3A truer sense of the book's conflict would be to say 
that it is the problem of becoming a Kierkegaardian Knight of 
Faith; that is, of making the absurdity of faith keep one 
afloat in the existential void. 
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receipt of his father's letter. With that moment the story 
moves from the objective world of events to the subjective 
experience of Seeger's vision and again turns on his profound 
anxiety before the necessity of choosing how to be. Each story 
offers a leap of faith as answer to the existential drama of 
discovering meaning in meaninglessness. As exemplars of that 
chaos each setting is a holocaust: that of the Nazis in Europe 
and that of the human spirit in West's nihilistic vision of 
America. Again, the letters reflect and resonate with those 
tragedies. Finally each story employs a motif to illustrate 
the process of vision: in Miss Lonelvhearts. figure-ground 
dichotomies; in "Act of Faith," Plato's "Allegory of the 
Cave." 
By far the greatest depth of darkness revealed in these 
stories is of the human heart itself. Augustine has written, 
"If by 'abyss' we understand a great depth, is not man's heart 
an abyss? For what is there more profound than that abyss? Men 
may speak, may be seen by the operation of their members, may 
be heard speaking; but whose thought is penetrated, whose 
heart is seen into?...Do not you believe that there is in man 
a deep so profound as to be hidden even from him in who it 
is?" (Przywara, 421). Augustine describes here a condition of 
despair, in which, manifestly, all visionaries share. But 
Kierkegaard teaches us that all people are in despair and that 
we are differentiated only by our consciousness of and 
response to that despair. It is this consciousness or 
84 
awareness or vision and the choices for one's being contingent 
upon it that constitute the significance of visionary 
experience for us as readers. 
It is, then, against and within this profound depth of 
darkness that each visionary must struggle to fathom his or 
her own heart; to establish an identity; to become oneself; 
which, Kierkegaard argues, is the fundamental responsibility 
of each individual. That self, as I indicated earlier, is not 
encoded in a genetic blueprint nor is it anything as universal 
as "human nature"; rather, it is a moral choice—an act of 
will—made by the individual to transcend one's merely natural 
self; to choose a self capable of attaining wholeness and 
coherence and to live up to the fulfillment of that choice. 
The ways in which that end may be realized through either 
divine grace or human autonomy is the object of the two 
visionary stories I have chosen to examine in this chapter. 
For the visionaries in "Bartleby, " Miss Lonelyhearts and 
"Act of Faith," the process of becoming oneself begins with 
the reading of letters. Whereas in Melville's treatment, the 
"stillborn errands of life" had been abstractions borne of the 
narrator's need to find meaning in Bartleby's fate, Miss 
Lonelyhearts' letters are rendered in lurid detail: 
Dear Miss Lonelyhearts— 
I am sixteen years old now and I dont 
know what to do and would appreciate it 
if you could tell me what to do. When I 
was a little girl it was not so bad 
because I got used to the kids on the 
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block making fun of me, but now I would 
like to have boy friends like the other 
girls and go out on Saturday nites, but 
no boy will take me because I was born 
without a nose—although I am a good 
dancer and have a nice shape and my 
father buys me pretty clothes. 
I sit and look at myself all day and 
cry. I have a big hole in the middle of 
my face that scares people even myself so 
I cant blame the boys for not wanting to 
take me out. My mother loves me, but she 
crys terrible when she looks at me. 
What did I do to deserve such a 
terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some 
bad things I didnt do any before I was a 
year old and I was born this way. I asked 
Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that 
maybe I did something in the other world 
before I was born or that maybe I was 
punished for his sins. I dont believe 
that because he is a very nice man. Ought 
I commit suicide? 
Sincerely Yours, 
Desperate 
The reader will immediately recognize Camus' "one truly 
serious philosophical problem" which "Desperate" instinctively 
understands to be a possible response to her original question 
of "how to be" and to her pervading, insistent, unfulfilled 
desire to attach some pattern of meaning to her condition4. 
These questions form a refrain throughout the letters, 
becoming an almost formulaic plea for guidance: "I don't know 
what to do...Tell me what to do...What would you do?"5 It is 
the cumulative effect of their repetition that triggers Miss 
Lonelyhearts' existential moment and subsequent conversion 
AThis is the same ontological need that drove Melville's 
narrator to speculate on Bartleby's career in the dead letter 
office. 
5Precisely this refrain will reappear in Lord Jim. 
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from living in the quotidian plane to the visionary, an 
evolution he tries to explain to his fiance, Betty: 
A man is hired to give advice to the readers of a 
newspaper. The job is a circulation stunt and the 
whole staff considers it a joke. He welcomes the 
job, for it might lead to a gossip column, and 
anyway he's tired of being a leg man. He too 
considers the job a joke, but after several months 
at it, the joke begins to escape him. He sees that 
the majority of the letters are profoundly humble 
pleas for moral and spiritual advice, that they are 
inarticulate expressions of genuine suffering. He 
also discovers that his correspondents take him 
seriously. For the first time in his life, he is 
forced to examine the values by which he lives. 
This examination shows him that he is the victim of 
the joke and not its perpetrator. (32) 
Miss Lonelyhearts' "examined life"6 signifies his conversion 
from an existence confined to and sheltered by the concerns 
and rhythms of everyday life to one defined by an awareness of 
existence as enveloped by existential darkness. The profundity 
of this conversion cannot be overstated. It is perhaps 
tempting to dismiss one's proclamation of an "examination of 
life" as trite or facile, but I would point out that, first, 
by this point in the work nothing approaches ease for West's 
bewildered protagonist; second, as a visionary work, West's 
book is structured upon the very principle of "seeing"—and an 
'implicit here, of course, is Socrates' dictum that the 
unexamined life is not worth living. Perhaps the obviousness 
of this allusion explains its absence from critical commentary 
on the book, yet the centrality of this idea to Miss 
Lonelyhearts and visionary fictions in general cannot be 
overstated. While West's acknowledged debt to James' The 
Varieties of Religious Experience has attracted considerable 
and warranted commentary, the real genealogy here is 
Kiergegaard by way of Socrates. Kierkegaard's dictum "become 
oneself" is, in essence, his translation of Socrates' "know 
thyself." 
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examination is, of course, a way of seeing; and third, and 
most significantly, a merely ironic if not cynical response to 
Miss Lonelyhearts' spiritual quest7 repeats the cycle of 
sterility represented by Shrike, a cycle from which the 
visionary paradigm is capable of freeing us. 
Moreover, Miss Lonelyhearts carries a significant history 
of having in the past denied the implications of his visions: 
As a boy in his father's church, he discovered 
that something stirred in him when he shouted the 
name of Christ, something secret and enormously 
powerful. He had played with this thing, but had 
never allowed it to come alive. 
He names this force "hysteria" and images it as "a snake whose 
scales are tiny mirrors in which the dead world takes on a 
semblance of life." Staring at his crucifix, he again begins 
to chant Christ's name, "but the moment the snake started to 
uncoil in his brain, he became frightened and closed his eyes" 
(8-9) . This is an instance of what Kierkegaard would label the 
awakening of "possibility," which is the force capable of 
taking the individual beyond "necessity" (the force opposite 
possibility, and located in the world8) and beyond himself and 
out of despair. For Kierkegaard possibility is incarnated in 
God: "The decisive thing is: for God everything is possible." 
7Comerchero explores the influence of Jessie Weston's 
work on the Grail Legend on Miss Lonelyhearts; see pp. 86-92. 
At one point a character asks Miss Lonelyhearts for "the 
nature of (his) quest" (17). 
8,1
 Becoming oneself is a movement one makes just where one 
is. Becoming is a movement from some place, but becoming 
oneself is a movement at that place" (SUP, 66). 
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The question for the individual "is whether he will believe 
that for God everything is possible, that is, whether he will 
have faith" (SUP.68). It is faith that we come to understand 
through Kierkegaard to be the sine quo non that keeps the 
individual afloat in Stein's destructive element: 
Whether the person who thus contends goes under 
depends entirely on whether he gets hold of a 
possibility, that is to say, on whether he will 
have faith....This is what is dialectical in having 
faith. In general all a person knows is that this 
and that, as he hopes and expects, etc., is not 
going to happen to him. If it does, he goes under. 
The foolhardy person throws himself deliberately 
into danger, where the possibility may also be this 
and that; and if it happens, he despairs and goes 
under. The believer sees and understands his 
undoing (in what has befallen him and what he 
risks) in human terms, but he has faith. Therefore 
he does not go under. The manner in which he is 
able to be helped he leaves wholly to God, but he 
believes for God everything is possible. To believe 
in his own undoing is impossible. To grasp that 
humanly it is his undoing and yet believe in 
possibility is to have faith. (SUP, 69) 
It is particularly important to understand that for 
Kierkegaard as well as for the visionaries in this study 
"personhood is a synthesis of possibility and necessity"; that 
is, the ways of being the individual can imagine are only 
valuable in so far as he can bring them to fruition in the 
world (necessity) . One must live one's possibilities. This 
raises an important point as well in understanding what I 
have termed the "quotidian". The quotidian mode of being is 
not defined by actions but by attitude. It is to live, as 
Kierkegaard says of those who lack possibility, "devoid of 
imagination...within a certain orbit of trivial experience as 
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to how things come about, what is possible, what usually 
happens, no matter whether (one) is a tapster or a prime 
minister" (SUP, 71). It is, in contradistinction to vision, a 
way of blindness. The goal of realizing personhood, then, in 
my own terms, is to live one's daily life in vision (of a 
violent but indifferent universe) kept afloat through the 
infusion of a secular or divine grace. The visionary and 
everyday worlds must be made one. 
The terrifying vision Miss Lonelyhearts closes his eyes 
to above is an instance of the denial of possibility, a flight 
from freedom, which is to be in despair. But without question 
this instance of vision has strong affinities with madness. 
Kierkegaard defines faith as "the formula for losing one's 
mind; to have faith is precisely to lose one's mind so as to 
win God" (68) . Indeed, the leap of faith is based upon an 
absurd assumption and is therefore especially susceptible to 
denial. The snake with which West images Miss Lonelyhearts' 
incipient vision is a powerful and ambiguous symbol 
suggesting, perhaps, madness or sexual energy but, most 
potently, evil. Now clearly evil seems an incongruous result 
to his invocation of Christ9. However, it is precisely Miss 
'Carroll Schoenewolf argues that West sees the religious 
experience itself as "at best meaningless...at worst, evil." 
In addition to the snake image, he cites Miss Lonelyhearts' 
characterization of his experience as "hysteria" and its being 
"an accomplice to homicide." Certainly meaninglessness and 
evil are a cogent presence in this work; however, they are a 
part of the existential fabric of West's vision of the human 
condition, not an outgrowth of his protagonist's religious 
experience. The snake image is a manifestation of Miss 
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Lonelyhearts' acute perception of evil that is the genesis of 
his troubles; that is, his sense of Christ as "the answer" is 
inseparable from his vision of the universe as predatory in 
the same way that one's faith is contingent upon the 
maintenance of doubt. Regardless of his lineage as the "son of 
a Baptist minister," the relentlessness of his Christ 
obsession is directly proportional to his deepening vision of 
and impotence before his existential situation10. 
What is equally clear is that his vision is revivified 
through his correspondents' suffering as manifested in their 
letters, the reading of which again accentuates his own 
spiritual longing; repeatedly he is seen seeking on a 
Lonelyhearts' consciousness of evil; it is not a conflation of 
evil with Christ. While Miss Lonelyhearts' belief that "Christ 
is the answer" may, indeed, prove ineffectual in effecting 
happiness for him or his correspondents, it remains an act of 
authenticity, a becoming of Miss Lonelyhearts true self, which 
he had heretofore repressed. 
10The visionary's courage in facing the abyss is 
characteristic of his ontological status. Conversely, James 
argues that "if a creed makes a man feel happy, he almost 
inevitably adopts it. Such a belief ought to be true; 
therefore it is true—such, rightly or wrongly, is one of the 
immediate 'inferences' of the religious logic used by ordinary 
men" (78-9). The question of Miss Lonelyhearts' Christ 
obsession as a case of "bad faith" also needs attention; that 
is, is his conjuring of Christ imagery in response to his 
vision of the human condition as tragic and permeated by 
suffering merely a defence against the void, a positing of the 
inauthentic? I think not for two reasons: first, the text 
makes it clear that the idea of Christ has been a palpable and 
personal presence for Miss Lonelyhearts since his boyhood; 
indeed, his denial of his spiritual impulses strikes me as the 
true instance of the inauthentic. Second, as Camus points out, 
one must answer, which is to say each of us must discover an 
authentic stance with which to face the void. For Miss 
Lonelyhearts, as for Kierkegaard, that stance is Christian. 
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quotidian level the answer to "what to do?"11 Miss Lonelyhearts 
can not only see but also can empathize with the chaos that 
laps at the borders of everyday life. Alienated by his vision, 
he is no longer at home in the world, which cannot supply him 
with the spiritual sustenance he so desperately needs. Thus 
his "examination of values" marks an existential threshold 
that once crossed, denies him the sanctuary of blindness. Both 
Betty, Miss Lonelyhearts' fiance, and Shrike, his diabolical 
editor, name avenues of escape from his enveloping despair. 
Betty even suggests a career in advertising, an industry whose 
raison d'etre is the warping of truth through the manufacture 
of an ersatz and sanitized reality. But there is no escape or 
return to a habitual way of being: "I can't quit," Miss 
Lonelyhearts replies. "And even if I were able to quit, it 
wouldn't make any difference. I wouldn't be able to forget the 
letters no matter what I did" (31-2). 
But what is the power that these letters harbor? 
Consider the psychological, emotional, and moral consequences 
of a committed reading of and response to the epistolary 
narratives Miss Lonelyhearts receives, a reading, that is, 
which views these stories and the lives they recount as 
11
 "Unable to think of anything else to do, he now repeated 
the gesture" (12). "In the street, Miss Lonelyhearts wondered 
what to do next" (13). "Made sad by the pause between playing 
and eating, he had gone to the piano and had begun a piece by 
Mozart" (15). "Although he had tried hot water, whisky, 
coffee, exercise, he had completely forgotten sex" (19) . 
"...out of desperation, (he) went to the telephone to call 
Mary" (20). 
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authentic reflections of the human condition. In "Bartleby" 
the narrator speculates on the effect of "continually handling 
those dead letters (which arrive) by the cartload." One is 
struck by the emphasis on time and mass, by the spiritual 
consequences he intuits of exposure to the timeless repetition 
of these symbols of human futility. How long would anyone 
faced with such evidence maintain a faith in a teleological 
universe? Moreover, this weight is carried by "a man by nature 
and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness" (41). William 
James has categorized such individuals as "sick souls," those 
who are "persua(ded) that the evil aspects of our life are of 
its very essence, and that the world's meaning most comes home 
to us when we lay them most to heart" (131)12. And, indeed, 
what would one expect of those whose life in the world was the 
"unpleasant task of hearing what the sick souls...have to say 
of the secrets of their prison-house, their own peculiar form 
of consciousness"? (James, 135) This vision or consciousness 
of chaos and disorder, and consequent recognition of the 
vulnerability of life lies at the core of the visionary's 
nature. But how is one to be in the face of such a vision? How 
does one respond to having been condemned to such freedom? 
12In "Some Notes on Miss L" set down shortly after the 
publication of the book, West noted his indebtedness to James' 
book: "Miss Lonelyhearts became a portrait of a priest of our 
time who has a religious experience. His case is classical and 
is built on all the cases in James' Varieties of Religious 
Experience and Starbuck's Psychology of Religion. The 
psychology is theirs, not mine. The imagery is mine" (Wisker, 
158) . For discussions of James' influence on West, see 
Schoenewolf and Lorch. 
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Not surprisingly, the desire for escape from the anxiety 
and despair inherent in ontological choice is tenacious; the 
illusion of comfort and assurance offered by the rhythms of 
quotidian life, narcotic. Miss Lonelyhearts develops "an 
almost insane sensitiveness to order. Everything had to form 
a pattern: the shoes under the bed, the ties in the holder, 
the pencils on the table. When he looked out of a window, he 
composed the skyline by balancing one building against 
another. If a bird flew across this arrangement, he closed his 
eyes angrily until it was gone" (10) . In the throes of a 
fever, he envisions himself in a pawnshop where he forms 
figures from the "paraphernalia of suffering": phalluses, 
hearts, diamonds, circles, triangles, squares, swastikas. "But 
nothing proved definitive and he began to make a gigantic 
cross" (30-1). He recalls a transcendent moment from his 
childhood when, as he played a Mozart piece, his sister 
spontaneously danced. As he reflects on the memory, he 
envisions all children, everywhere, dancing: "square replacing 
oblong and being replaced by circle" (15) in a formal ritual 
of innocence and order. When his frenzied attempts to 
establish a geometrical order inevitably break down, he seeks 
out Betty, who, in straightening his tie, gave Miss 
Lonelyhearts the sense that "she straightened much more. And 
he had once thought that if her world were larger, were the 
world, she might order it as finely as the objects on her 
dressing table." 
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The deep spiritual wounds Miss Lonelyhearts suffers 
through his column are diagnosed by Betty as "city troubles," 
to be ministered to by removal to the country. Betty is West's 
personification of James' conception of the healthy-minded 
individual, those who "take good as the essential and 
universal aspect of being (and) deliberately exclude evil from 
(the) field of vision" (88) . But Betty's (and Miss 
Lonelyhearts') character is considerably more complex than an 
element in a Manichean abstraction between the forces of light 
and darkness. Her goal is to be happy, but it is a happiness 
compounded of bringing happiness to others (specifically Miss 
Lonelyhearts' febrile existence) and maintaining a sense of 
order in everyday life13. 
James notes that we should all ideally know someone 
"whose affinities are rather with flowers and birds and all 
enchanting innocencies than with dark human passions" (80). 
This is realized in Miss Lonelyhearts and Betty's return to a 
pastoral and more primitive setting, a motif seen repeatedly 
in visionary literature. Predictably, Betty's ministrations 
are to Miss Lonelyhearts' body, not his spirit. He realizes 
that the physical manifestations of his illness were "merely 
13The distinction between Miss Lonelyhearts' and Betty's 
ways of being may be understood in the book's climactic scene. 
He rushes to embrace Doyle; she arrives to nurse Miss 
Lonelyhearts. The boundaries of Betty's existence—of her 
consciousness—simply do not include the Peter Doyles of the 
world. Of course, the most telling aspect of the scene is the 
abject, darkly ironic failure of both their efforts to effect 
happiness. 
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a trick by his body to relieve one more profound." Betty's 
course of treatment is one of perpetual denial: "Whenever he 
mentioned the letters or Christ, she changed the subject to 
tell long stories about life on the farm. She seemed to think 
that if he never talked about these things, his body would get 
well" (36). 
But facing Betty, he comes to "self-consciousness"; that 
is, he realizes the futility of escaping from despair through 
something as facile as changing one's environment14, that his 
condition requires something decidedly more radical, interior 
and encompassing. Indeed his despair has become precious to 
him, a sign of his emerging selfhood. As they return to the 
city, and he realizes Betty's "cure" hasn't altered his 
vision, "he felt better.. .because he had begun to think 
himself a faker and a fool" (38). His reaction is an object 
lesson in existential authenticity, a lesson the narrator of 
"The Brink of Darkness" fails to learn in his removal to 
Colorado, but one Bartleby implicitly masters in his final 
words: "I know where I am." 
The opposition between the visionary and the mundane 
mind—between the sick soul and the healthy-minded—is one 
defined by borders. "(Betty's) world was not the world and 
uOne is inevitably reminded of Satan's "Myself am Hell." 
William James terms such remedies as Betty's and Miss 
Lonelyhearts' pastoral idyll "reliefs, momentary escapes from 
evil" and distinguishes them from true religious happiness, 
which is contingent upon the individual's very immersion in 
the destructive element he had so desperately sought to avoid. 
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could never include the readers of his column. Her sureness 
was based on the power to limit experience arbitrarily. 
Moreover, his confusion was significant, while her order was 
not" (11). Miss Lonelyhearts' perspective encompasses the 
most ragged edges of his world while Betty possesses the 
"power" (suggesting, perhaps, a kind of trick or learned 
response, like "keeping one's balance") to exclude that which 
is disconcerting to or challenging of her "sureness." As James 
points out, "happiness, like every other emotional state, has 
blindness and insensibility to opposing facts given it as its 
instinctive weapon for self-protection against disturbance" 
(88) . Not surprisingly, visionaries—with the ethical friction 
they generate through their disenchantment with everyday 
life—are labeled as at best unreasonable, at worst perverse, 
if not downright mad. 
Miss Lonelyhearts and Shrike, by using their education 
and glibness to satirize the correspondents' pleas for help 
and guidance, utilize language as an escape, intellectualizing 
their responses and maintaining an aesthetic distance from—a 
blindness to—the human suffering that simultaneously 
surrounds and inhabits them. Shrike, Miss Lonelyhearts 
recalls, had taught him "to handle his one escape, Christ, 
with a thick glove of words" (33) ; that is, he taught him to 
use the infinite play of language to deconstruct the reality 
Miss Lonelyhearts perceived and live in bad faith: "Shrike 
had...made a sane view of this Christ business impossible" 
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(8). Thus does his "Christ dream" become perverted into its 
antithesis—a source of mockery and contempt for those who 
seek succor. But as with Bartleby, Miss Lonelyhearts' daily 
practice of reading ("He could not go on finding the same joke 
funny thirty times a day for months on end. And on most days 
he received more than thirty letters, all of them alike....") 
teaches him to read/see in a new way; the psychic torque 
produced by the sheer weight of the emotional pain he 
confronts through the letters ultimately lays waste to every 
intellectual defense he can muster to distance himself from 
that pain. 
Ironically, then, where Shrike cynically labels art as "a 
way out," an escape from despair, art functions in the form of 
the letters as an immersion into despair, which, to double the 
irony, is a way, perhaps the only way, out of despair. An 
explanation is in order. First, in what sense are the letters 
Miss Lonelyhearts receives "art"? Setting aside for the moment 
the obvious points that they are narrative in form as well as 
components of an artistic object, let us consider the 
implications of Shrike's "theory" of art. Shrike, who plays 
tempter to Miss Lonelyhearts' Christ-figure, catalogues for 
his antagonist the possible avenues of escape from a life 
which has become, Shrike correctly analyzes, "a desert empty 
of comfort." Shrike is a brilliant polemicist and a consummate 
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nihilist15. He cites—indeed, explores, in many cases—nature, 
primitivism, hedonism, drugs, and suicide as "escapes" from 
the existential dread that is devouring Miss Lonelyhearts' 
soul. He groups art among these which, with his acerbic wit, 
he outlines for his nemesis: 
Tell them that you know your shoes are broken and 
that there are pimples on your face, yes, and that 
you have buck teeth and a club foot, but that you 
don't care, for to-morrow they are playing 
Beethoven's last quartets in Carnegie Hall and at 
home you have Shakespeare's plays in one volume. 
(34-5) 
Shrike is mocking aesthetics here ("When you are cold, warm 
yourself before the flaming tints of Titian....") and the idea 
that the object of beauty can somehow sustain the individual— 
physically or spiritually—allowing one to escape quotidian 
necessity on the one hand, while supplying spiritual 
sustenance on the other. But Shrike's conception of art is a 
conventionally narrow one both in his citation of examples 
and, more importantly, in his implicit assumption that art 
can, should or aims to allow the individual to transcend the 
quotidian rather than to live meaningfully within it. 
"Harold Bloom connects Shrike's character to Jewish 
Gnosticism, particularly the work of Gershom Scholem, whose 
essay, "Redemption Through Sin" in The Messianic Idea in 
Judaism Bloom considers to be "the best commentary I know on 
Miss Lonelvhearts." According to Scholem, the nihilistic 
philosophy means "to free oneself of all laws, conventions, 
and religions, to adapt every conceivable attitude and reject 
it, and to follow one's leader step for step into the abyss" 
(Bloom, 7). This distinctly defines what Shrike is about in 
his systematic rejection of escapes or "ways of being." Just 
as clearly, Shrike acts as a moral counterpoint to Miss 
Lonelyhearts'idealization of Christ; thus Shrike's implicit 
"leader" may be said to inhabit the most abysmal of abysses. 
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An existentialist thinker like Kierkegaard offers a much 
more encompassing idea in Fear and Trembling, a mediatation on 
faith, which is discussed through the lens of the narrative of 
Abraham's consenting to sacrifice his son Isaac. Now Miss 
Lonelyhearts has a problem with faith: "If he could only 
believe in Christ, then adultery would be a sin, then 
everything would be simple and the letters extremely easy to 
answer" (26) . Moreover, his reading of Dostoyevsky16 has taught 
him the corollary to his doubt—"All is permitted,"—and it is 
precisely this vision of chaos that gnaws incessantly at his 
soul. Yet it is with a contradiction worthy of Kierkegaard 
that Miss Lonelyhearts' faith is created. In Fear and 
Trembling Kierkegaard seeks to have his reader empathize with 
Abraham as the "father of faith" confronts the horror of God's 
command. This empathy is essential in Kierkegaard's view lest 
we trivialize the quotidian, chronological, and existential 
element of Abraham's experience through conveniently labeling 
it a "test" or "trial": 
One mounts a winged horse, that very instant one is 
on the mountain in Moriah, the same instant one 
sees the ram. One forgets that Abraham rode on an 
ass, which can keep up no more than a leisurely 
pace, that he had a three day journey, that he 
needed time to chop the firewood, bind Isaac, and 
sharpen the knife. (80) 
The situation Kierkegaard outlines here is analogous to 
Miss Lonelyhearts' originally thinking of the letters as 
"jokes." The more letters he reads and the more he immerses 
16See page 118. 
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himself in their details, the more profound is his anguish 
before his realization that they represent an instance of 
significant form having been given to the quotidian and 
existential reality of his correspondents' lives; the letters 
possess—demonstrably in Miss Lonelyhearts' case—the power to 
change one's perception, to make visible what had been 
repressed or lost to the habitual. In this these narratives 
surely attain the status of art. But most remarkably, it is 
these letters themselves which create Miss Lonelyhearts' 
faith. Shrike asks: 
"Come tell us, brother, how it was that you first 
came to believe. Was it music in a church, or the 
death of a loved one, or, mayhap, some wise old 
priest....Ah, how stupid of me," Shrike continued. 
"It was the letters, of course. Did I myself not 
say that the Miss Lonelyhearts are the priests of 
twentieth-century America?" (44) 
In the same manner, the suffering of the visionary is 
capable of creating faith in others. It is the narrator who, 
under the influence of Bartleby's despair, perceives the 
possibility and implications of that despair. In other words, 
Bartleby, in the course of the events of the story, has taught 
him (and perhaps the reader) to see in this new way, to shift 
the weight of his world view from the camp of the "healthy-
minded" to that of the "sick souls"17. Thus the narrator's 
"Exactly the same point is made at the conclusion of 
Conrad's "The Secret Sharer" and "Heart of Darkness." In "SS" 
Leggatt fosters the nameless captain's realization of his 
selfhood and then, in true existential fashion, embarks "a 
free man" on a "new destiny;" that is, he strikes out to go 
beyond his own self, to exist in a continual state of 
becoming. In "HD" Marlow conducts the nameless frame 
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concluding, seemingly melodramatic "Ah, Bartleby! Ah 
humanity!" when viewed through the visionary lens is seen to 
in fact signal his perception of Bartleby's experience as 
emblematic of the condition of humanity—the figure (Bartleby) 
is understood to be organically connected to and intrinsically 
part of the ground (humanity) from which he so eloquently 
projects. 
It is not surprising, then, that when Miss Lonelyhearts 
describes the city as a wasteland that can only be resurrected 
through the tears of his correspondents, he concludes "Ah, 
humanity..." thereby implicitly connecting himself to 
"Bartleby1" s narrator's perception of Bartleby as an archetype 
of modern visionary experience. This expression, as was the 
conceit of the revivifying effects of the correspondents' 
tears, is offered ironically if not cynically by Miss 
Lonelyhearts, but as a visionary well into the experience of 
conversion, his "joke went into a dying fall (because) he was 
heavy with shadow" (5). The "weight" of those shadows is part 
of the cluster of figure-ground imagery that informs West's 
novella. 
Because it is a technique West strategically employs in 
Miss Lonelyhearts and because it stands as a cogent emblem of 
narrator's initiation. The story concludes with the narrator's 
observation that "the tranquil waterway... seemed to lead into 
the heart of an immense darkness." He has been taught to see 
the existential darkness which envelopes human endeavor. This 
type of pedagogical strategy is inherent in visionary fictions 
and signals their prime value to us as readers. 
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visionary and existential experience18, I would like to briefly 
consider some of the implications of the concept of figure and 
ground. Etymologically, "figure" is derived from the Latin 
"figura" meaning "plastic form," something which is shaped or 
molded. Moreover, Ellman Crasnow19 points out that "figura" 
comes from the same stem as "fingere," from whose participle 
"fictus" we form "fictitious" and "fiction." This clearly 
complicates the relationship between the concept's parts if we 
assume—as in Gestalt psychology—the "figure" to be the more 
privileged of the pair or that upon which we focus our 
attention as, for example, in focusing upon the words on a 
printed page rather than the page itself. Simply stated, if 
the figure-ground concept may be posited as an emblem of human 
experience with its "figure" the life the individual shapes in 
the world among others and its "ground" his or her underlying 
and often unexamined values, ideology, and world view, what 
are the existential implications of the figure's no longer 
being privileged? Moreover, if meaning is taken as immanent in 
the figure, how are we to consider the ground? With the 
18The aptness of figure-ground images lies in the 
relationship of their components; that is, that part which is 
designated the "figure" in effect cancels out the being of the 
part designated the "ground." If the designation of the 
components is reversed then what had been the "figure" becomes 
"extinguished." Thus we have an emblem for the anguish of 
being, which, one could argue, is the result of the anxiety of 
nothingness, that nothing is just as possible as being—and 
just as contingent on the inscrutable vagaries of the 
universe. 
19I am indebted here to Crasnow's research on this subject 
as is he to Erich Auerbach's. 
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validity, truth or centrality of the figure called into 
question—and this type of questioning is central to visionary 
experience (hence its danger) —one must then turn to the 
neglected element of "ground," a source of stability or 
orientation, as the privileged component. "Ground" in this 
sense suggests a fundamental principle, that which creates the 
conditions upon which the figure can declare itself. Ellman 
offers the example of "grounds of an argument," which suggests 
a set of conditions which is accepted but—as with the 
"ground" in any figure-ground pairing—perhaps not directly or 
openly acknowledged. The Oxford English Dictionary further 
defines ground in the sense of "that on which a system, work, 
institution, art, or condition of things is founded" (emphasis 
mine). Thus when Miss Lonelyhearts speaks of "examin(ing) the 
values by which he lives," he is reflecting upon the "grounds" 
of his life—the essential tenets of his existence. The 
ontological implications of such an examination are profound 
in that one is calling into question the philosophical 
foundation and assumptions which support one's existence in 
the everyday world. What seems clear is that while the figure 
is dependent upon the ground for its very existence (ideally 
being shaped or formed upon the principles of its ground), 
this dependency is not mutual: the ground is the essential, 
primary, ur component; I would further suggest that the 
ground's very amorphous, opaque and enveloping nature suggests 
its affinity with the silence of the universe against which 
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human beings must seek to define themselves; that is, the 
grounds of visionary being lie in the visionary's knowledge of 
the abyss, and in the discovery that no ground exists to 
support or give meaning to his or her being in the universe.20 
West illustrates this by having Miss Lonelyhearts' 
immersion into this existential consciousness imaged through 
three figure-ground pairings which open the novella and 
represent in turn the mind in relation to the text, the spirit 
in relation to the self, and the body in relation to the 
world. Each image is embedded in a text: Shrike's prayer, Miss 
Lonelyhearts' abortive reply to a correspondent, and the 
letters themselves. Indeed, the first action in which we see 
Miss Lonelyhearts engaged is reading: "...(he) stared at a 
piece of white cardboard. On it a prayer had been printed by 
Shrike...." The prayer is a satire of "Soul of Christ" from 
Saint Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises21. and the particular 
problem for Miss Lonelyhearts (and the reader) is to decide 
whether to read this text ironically or naively, whether its 
essential message is salvageable and still capable of saving 
20The OED's first (of six pages) definition of "ground" 
is "the bottom; the lowest part or downward limit of 
anything," which is to say that the linguistic nature of 
"ground" harbors the idea of the abyss. 
21The reader will recall my citation in chapter two of 
Robert Scholes' comparison of Dubliners to Spiritual Exercises 
in the ability of Joyce's stories to develop the reader's 
"conscience, to accept the view that morality is a matter of 
individual responses... rather than an invocation of religious 
or ethical rules of thumb." Roquentin in Nausea also mentions 
reading Loyola's work. 
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or whether verbal irony is to be the last bastion of the 
damned. The implications of his textual analysis are therefore 
profound in that his mind is "searching for some clue to a 
sincere answer" to the panoply of human suffering which 
permeates his existence as the white cardboard permeates the 
text of Shrike's prayer. I am suggesting here that Miss 
Lonelyhearts "reads," perceives, becomes aware of the 
existential implications of "ground"—the white cardboard 
which surrounds the "figure" of the prayer—and understands 
how it reflects his condition. The cardboard is the named 
object of his "staring," and its valorization is further 
evident in the subordination of the "figure" through the 
prayer's placement in the passive voice. His deepening vision 
of the omnipresence of the abyss is, like the "unescapable" 
Shrike, a reality he can no longer ignore. 
The second figure-ground dichotomy—of a white flame 
against an enveloping dark altar—suggests a reverse image of 
the white ground and dark figure of the first, a kind of Yang-
Yin: 
Although the deadline was less than a quarter of an 
hour away, he was still working on his leader. He 
had gone as far as: "Life is worth while, for it is 
full of dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy, 
and faith that burns like a clear white flame on a 
grim dark altar." 
While the intended tone of this aborted response to one of his 
correspondents is ironic, it is nonetheless a statement of 
ideology, of the spiritual "grounds" Miss Lonelyhearts' has 
chosen for his existence: namely, that life is innately 
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meaningful and good. Yet as figure-ground dichotomies, both of 
these messages may be read as their antitheses; that is, 
Shrike's prayer is clearly relevant to a world emptied of its 
symbols and sources of spiritual refuge. Miss Lonelyhearts is, 
as Shrike notes, the modern guide for the perplexed. 
Similarly, Miss Lonelyhearts' answer simultaneously 
articulates the grounds of his being but belies the reality of 
his experience of being in the world, which would then have 
his answer read: "Life is meaningless, for it is full of 
nightmares and violence, sadism22 and despair, and disbelief 
that envelopes all." 
The final figure-ground pairing focuses on the physical 
reality of the suffering that is manifested in the letters, 
which are imaged as "stamped from the dough of suffering with 
a heart-shaped cookie knife" (1) . The image intriguingly 
anticipates Sartre's idea of the "being-in-itself" (or simply 
the "in-itself"), his term for the noumenal world or that upon 
which the human mind has not imposed its systems of artificial 
order. In Nausea he images the in-itself as a shapeless, 
doughy mass, a malignant presence capable of engulfing us at 
any moment. What I have termed the "existential moment" is a 
prime instance of the breakdown of the phenomenal world (or 
what Sartre called simply "the world") of imposed order (even 
22Miss Lonelyhearts commits numerous instances of sadism 
in the book involving people, animals and himself: "Turning 
back to his desk, he picked up a bulky letter in a dirty 
envelope. He read it for the same reason that an animal tears 
at a wounded foot: to hurt the pain" (39). 
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time and space would fit into this category) and the breaking 
through of the in-itself. This offers an interesting gloss on 
West's returning us to the idea of text in the final figure-
ground image. The letters may be seen as "figura," things 
which are shaped into (significant) form from the encompassing 
mass of the in-itself to stand as mute testimony to human 
experience in a ruthless universe. 
These introductory images are complemented by a series of 
four other figure-ground images which, in effect, adumbrate 
Miss Lonelyhearts' visionary progression. First, his room is 
described as "full of shadows." It is an ascetic's room, 
containing a bed, table and two chairs23. The walls, too, are 
bare save for "an ivory Christ that hung opposite the foot of 
the bed. He had removed the figure from the cross to which it 
had been fastened and had nailed it to the wall with large 
spikes" (8) . Miss Lonelyhearts' deliberate, idiosyncratic 
nailing of the Christ figure to his blank wall, a wall which 
encompasses an area of shadow, emblematizes his response to 
his existential dilemma of discovering meaning and goodness 
amid desolation and despair. He knows, too, that the price of 
that answer is a sickness, which I take to be the 
metamorphosis of vision: "Christ was the answer, but, if he 
did not want to get sick, he had to stay away from the Christ 
business" (3). 
"Cf. Marlow's room in Lord Jim where Jim commits to a 
pursuit of authentic being. 
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The third image of this series is couched within the 
alternative answer to a crucified, suffering Christ—the 
philosophy of healthy-mindedness—in the form of Betty's 
retreat to nature. The couple occupy an abandoned house owned 
by Betty's aunt. Working, cleaning, scouring, they bring a 
semblance of order to the ramshackle dwelling. However, the 
futility of their idyll, presented within an Edenic motif 
replete with apple and guilt over Betty's sexuality, is 
revealed as they essentially walk into the heart of darkness, 
the ground against which they had sought to define their 
spiritual well-being: "...after eating, they went for a walk 
in the woods. It was very sad under the trees. Although spring 
was well advanced, in the deep shade there was nothing but 
death—rotten leaves, gray and white fungi, and over 
everything a funereal hush" (38) . This is the image of the 
macrocosm of nature, which Miss Lonelyhearts has earlier 
envisioned: "Man has a tropism for order. Keys in one pocket, 
change in another. Mandolins are tuned G D A E. The physical 
world has a tropism for disorder, entropy. Man against 
Nature...the battle of the centuries. Keys yearn to mix with 
change. Mandolins strive to get out of tune. Every order has 
within it the germ of its own destruction. All order is 
doomed, yet the battle is worthwhile" (30-1) . This is an 
existential vision which sees beyond the observable 
regularities of nature into its essential chaos. But even this 
understanding or knowledge per se is without value to the 
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visionary, who chooses to live, to make his ontological stand, 
in the everyday world. It is a battle he chooses to see—in 
light of his understanding of its ultimate futility—as 
"worthwhile."24 
The final figure-ground images occur in the novella's 
climax, again set in Miss Lonelyhearts' room where he is 
consumed with fever: 
He fastened his eyes on the Christ that hung on the 
wall opposite his bed. As he stared at it, it 
became a bright fly, spinning with quick grace on a 
background of blood velvet sprinkled with tiny 
nerve stars. 
Everything else in the room was dead—chairs, 
table, pencils, clothes, books. He thought of this 
black world of things as a fish. And he was right, 
for it suddenly rose to the bright bait on the 
wall. It rose with a splash of music and he saw its 
shining silver belly. (56-7) 
These concluding figure-ground images join the quotidian and 
visionary worlds. Christ, whose teachings were traditionally 
symbolized by a fish, here emerges from a dynamic background 
as a lure, which in turn attracts the objects of the "black 
world of things," which themselves metamorphose into the fish, 
rising to the divine bait. The "shining silver belly" of the 
fish recalls the snake's scales being imaged as "tiny mirrors" 
in his earlier "hysterical" vision. But where that reflection 
had generated only "a semblance of life (in) the dead world," 
this vision produces music, light, grace, and life: "(Miss 
"Camus's treatment of the Sisyphus myth offers the best 
gloss on this situation. 
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Lonelyhearts') heart was a rose and in his skull another rose 
bloomed. The room was full of grace: 
He was conscious of two rhythms that were slowly 
becoming one. When they became one, his 
identification with God was complete. His heart was 
the one heart, the heart of God. And his brain was 
likewise God's. 
God said, "Will you accept it, now?" 
And he replied, "I accept, I accept." (57) 
The antecedent of "it" in God's question contains an 
intriguing and revealing ambiguity. Textually, it could refer 
to either God himself as symbolized by the lure or it could 
suggest the everyday world as symbolized by the fish. It seems 
clear to me that West intended this confusion25; that, indeed, 
the confusion over the antecedent's being divine or secular is 
the point. That one can only live meaningfully in the world in 
a condition of faith which is an outgrowth of vision. James 
speaks of religion's role in helping us to face the universe: 
"At bottom the whole concern of both morality and religion is 
with the manner of our acceptance of the universe. Shall our 
protests against certain things in it be radical and 
unforgiving, or shall we think that, even with evil, there are 
ways of living that must lead to good?" (41) . Discovering 
those "ways of living" is the essence of visionary fictions. 
James is careful to differentiate between "the more 
commonplace happinesses" or "reliefs" which are "occasioned by 
"Comerchero points out that "apparently casual responses 
are far from casual. The richness of the novel resides in 
symbolic or archetypal dimension residing in almost every 
detail" (94). 
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our momentary escapes from evils either experienced or 
threatened" and true religious experience, which "cares no 
longer for escape (but) consents to the evil outwardly as a 
form of sacrifice—inwardly it knows it to be permanently 
overcome." Clearly the former are in the nature of the 
"escapes" catalogued by Shrike; as Shrike concludes, "God 
alone is our escape." 
But what does this Christ-like demeanor mean in terms of 
one's everyday life? Again James lays down the philosophy, 
which West illustrates through his art. James seeks to define 
the pathology of suffering through isolating the 
characteristic element of religious experience. His 
methodology is to examine religious experience in extremis in 
that its essence "will be most prominent and easy to notice in 
(those cases) which are most one-sided, exaggerated, and 
intense" (45)26. We experience the same strategy, of course, 
in the unrelieved suffering of Miss Lonelyhearts' 
correspondents. James further focuses on religious essence 
through comparing and contrasting "the mind of an abstractly 
conceived Christian with that of a moralist similarly 
conceived." The moralist, James argues, may live a life 
"manly, stoical, moral or philosophical...in proportion as it 
is less swayed by paltry personal considerations and more by 
objective ends that call for energy, even though that energy 
bring personal loss and pain." Such a man is a "high-hearted 
z6Cf. Jasper's concept of the "limit situation." 
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freeman and no pining slave. And yet he lacks something which 
the Christian par excellence, the mystic and ascetic saint, 
for example, has in abundant measure, and which makes of him 
a human being of an altogether different denomination" 
(emphasis mine). Agreeing that both the moralist and the 
Christian "spurn the pinched and mumping sick-room attitude," 
(that is, that they maintain a militant stance in facing the 
silence of the universe), James sees this differentia of 
religion as constituted of two ineffable factors: first, the 
replacement of the moralist's "volition" with a "higher kind 
of emotion" by the Christian; and second, a "state of mind, 
known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to 
assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a 
willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the 
floods and waterspouts of God. In this state of mind, what we 
most dreaded has become the habitation of our safety, and the 
hour of our moral death has turned into our spiritual 
birthday" (45-47, emphases mine). This correlates almost 
exactly with Kierkegaard's belief that despair can only be 
surmounted through experiencing despair. 
West illustrates this distinction in two scenes between 
Miss Lonelyhearts and the abject cripple, Peter Doyle27. The 
first is their initial meeting. Mrs. Doyle, with whom Miss 
27Harold Bloom has pointed out that West took the name 
Peter Doyle from Whitman's pathetic Civil War friend. Whitman, 
of course,stands at the opposite end of the psychological 
spectrum from West's dark nihilism. 
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Lonelyhearts has committed adultery, has sent her husband to 
invite the columnist to dinner. They meet in a bar and are at 
first joined by Shrike. Doyle's entering hobble is accompanied 
by "many waste motions, like those of a partially destroyed 
insect." As Shrike spots Doyle, he winks at Miss Lonelyhearts 
and raises a toast to "humanity." Again, when Doyle attempts 
a bawdy innuendo about his job as a meter reader, Shrike 
replies, " You can know nothing about humanity; you are 
humanity," and leaves the two alone. Seated at a table, Miss 
Lonelyhearts studies Doyle's "strange face," which fails to 
balance, looking "like one of those composite photographs used 
by screen magazines in guessing contests." West is clearly 
utilizing the rhetoric of exaggeration here: Everyman as 
insect, cuckold, cripple. The two stare wordlessly at each 
other, a process "that began to excite them both." Finally 
Doyle labors into speech, but his words are unintelligible to 
Miss Lonelyhearts; in fact, they are pure poetry, a 
spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion in which he "giv(es) 
birth to groups of words that lived inside of him as things, 
a jumble of the retorts he had meant to make when insulted and 
the private curses against fate that experience had taught him 
to swallow." Doyle's language is accompanied by the 
"pictorial" play of his hands, which, like a primordial 
dumbshow, desperately attempt to interpret the ecstasy of his 
emotion. 
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Before this outpouring, Miss Lonelyhearts is described 
"like a priest, (who) turned his face slightly away." This is 
only one of numerous "confessions" which Miss Lonelyhearts 
hears. In addition to his correspondents, virtually every 
character, including Shrike, confesses him or herself to him. 
One of the most significant instances is the confession of 
Shrike's wife, Mary, with whom Miss Lonelyhearts also carries 
on an adulterous affair. Over drinks, she relates her mother's 
death from cancer and her father's cruelty to his wife. "He 
was," she recalls, "a portrait painter, a man of genius...." 
This triggers in Miss Lonelyhearts' mind an understanding of 
the human need for transcendence through narrative: 
Parents are also part of the business of 
dreams. My father was a Russian prince, 
my father was a Piute Indian chief, my 
father was an Australian sheep baron, my 
father lost all his money in Wall Street, 
my father was a portrait painter. People 
like Mary were unable to do without such 
tales. They told them because they wanted 
to talk about something besides clothing 
or business or the movies, because they 
wanted to talk about something poetic. 
(23) 
Such confessions are the oral counterparts of the letters Miss 
Lonelyhearts receives and as such demonstrate the narrative 
nature of those letters, of the human need to first, tell 
one's story—to articulate one's presence against the silence 
of the universe—and, second, of the power of narratives to 
effect transcendence, to allow an individual to go beyond her 
or himself, to create alternative and, ultimately, authentic 
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lives28. Significantly, when Doyle grows more (conventionally) 
articulate in his first meeting with Miss Lonelyhearts, he 
does not tell his story but rather produces a narrative, a 
letter, which he "forces" upon him. Doyle's letter is, in 
essence, a philosophical document, an examination of his life 
prompted by an existential crisis: "I have never let myself 
get blue until lately when I have been feeling lousy all the 
time on account of not getting anywhere and asking myself what 
is it all for." Doyle's "blueness," his crisis of despair, 
corresponds to Miss Lonelyhearts' condition characterized 
above by Shrike as "feeling like hell." Seven times in the 
course of his letter, Doyle redefines and reiterates his 
primal question, as if its very starkness was insufficient to 
bear its gravity. 
Doyle's faith in Miss Lonelyhearts as a spiritual 
confessor cum guide is based on two factors: first, the 
latter's reply to "Disillusioned," whose pseudonym might stand 
as an eponymous antecedent to the entire process of vision; 
second, Miss Lonelyhearts' experience as a reader: "I figured 
maybe you no something about it because you have read a lot of 
books...." Again, the antecedent of "it" in Doyle's sentence 
is the question, "What is it (life) all for?" As I suggested 
Z8In Survival in Auschwitz Primo Levi speaks of how the 
need for survivors "to tell our story to 'the rest,' to make 
'the rest' participate in it, had taken on for us, before our 
liberation and after, the character of an immediate and 
violent impulse, to the point of competing with our other 
elementary needs" (5-6). 
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in my first chapter, such questions leave all of us, for a 
variety of reasons, uncomfortable. Radically subjective, 
darkly opaque and eternally elusive, they lie like beached 
whales threatening to befoul our happy outings to the seashore 
because, once posed, they are impossible to ignore. Indeed, 
West took a tremendous artistic risk in placing such a stark 
question explicitly at the thematic center of his work, but he 
adroitly implies the kernel of an answer in the question 
itself through Doyle's persistent conflation of the 
existential "no" with "knowing"29. Doyle has implicit faith in 
reading as the vehicle which can teach one to reply to the 
"Everlasting No" which dogs his days. 
Miss Lonelyhearts' evolution as reader of both literary 
and social texts describes a curious antithesis to the 
increasing levels of sophistication and intellectualization 
that might be assumed of a trained literary critic. One could 
even argue the professional critic becomes increasingly 
removed from the text as a living document—which is to say as 
a document which can help us to live on a 
visionary/existential level—the more she becomes immersed in 
the professional concerns of that text, concerns which will, 
presumably, facilitate living on a quotidian plane30. Initially 
290ne might well recall the encyclopedic knowledge of the 
whale displayed in Melville's cytology chapters in Moby Dick. 
That great existential symbol, when rendered, was reduced to 
nothing. 
30Implicit here is that the intellectual journey of 
professional readers begins in the joy of the discovery of 
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these are Miss Lonelyhearts' stated concerns, too: job and 
advancement. He begins, it might be said, in sophistication, 
originally seeing the letters (and their implications) as 
"jokes" to be criticized/responded to in a tone of 
condescension. But through the very naivete of their reading 
of Miss Lonelyhearts7 facile replies, his correspondents teach 
him to appreciate the latent possibilities for being inherent 
in his own satire; their credulity and commitment as readers— 
they "take (his responses) seriously"—infuse him with the 
courage to live what he writes, to, as the aphorism to this 
study suggests, drink from his own well. 
It is instructive, then, that the reading of Miss 
Lonelyhearts we are made privy to beyond his correspondents' 
letters is The Brothers Karamazov; indeed, one of the 
characters refers to him as "Dostoyevski," and mockingly urges 
him to stop "pulling the Russian by recommending suicide" (25-
6). Dostoyevski's major works are, of course, "riddled" with 
the themes and questions of visionary literature, and both 
Dostoyevski and Tolstoy were major influences on West. But no 
single work more fully captures the existential dilemma of 
facing the universe's silence than does The Brothers 
Karamazov. Specifically, West quotes from the lectures of 
Father Zossima, a Christlike monk who mentors Alyosha, the 
novel's spiritual center. Zossima speaks of the power of an 
meaning in texts. As a graduate school colleague once observed 
to me, "I stop (work) every once in a while to remind myself 
that I used to like this stuff." 
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all-encompassing love which will reveal "the divine mystery in 
things. Once you perceive it, you will begin to comprehend it 
better every day." For him, seeing is understanding, but that 
vision is contingent upon universal, non-judgmental love, even 
of man "in his sin" (8) or of man in his decrepitude. Thus as 
the redemption of Coleridge's Mariner is contingent on his 
learning to love (learning to see in a new way) the water 
snakes he loathed, so too, does Miss Lonelyhearts first jerk 
his hand away when he feels Doyle's "damp hand accidently 
touch his under the table....but he "drove his hand back and 
forced it to clasp the cripple's. After finishing (Doyle's) 
letter, he did not let go, but pressed it firmly with all the 
love he could manage." Clearly this is the "volitional" love 
of James' moralist, that in which the individual must "hold 
his breath and keep his muscles tense...before the diseased 
conditions of the body" (46). 
But Miss Lonelyhearts' final encounter with Doyle is 
infused with "the excitement of a higher kind of emotion," 
which for James denotes the authentic religious experience31. 
Miss Lonelyhearts awakens from a fever during which he has a 
Christ vision to hear his door bell. It is Doyle, ascending 
the stairs with a gun wrapped symbolically in newspaper, bent 
on avenging his cuckolding. James speaks of the religious 
feeling imbuing one with "a new sphere of power. When the 
31West entitles the chapter of this encounter "Miss 
Lonelyhearts Has a Religious Experience." 
119 
outward battle is lost, and the outer world disowns him, it 
redeems and vivifies an interior world which otherwise would 
be an empty waste" (48). Thus does Miss Lonelyhearts, with his 
quotidian world in shambles, interpret Doyle's presence as a 
"sign. He would embrace the cripple and the cripple would be 
made whole again, even as he, a spiritual cripple, had been 
made whole" (57) . He rushes toward Doyle "with his arms spread 
for the miracle." This is a state of authentic "religious 
happiness" in which escape is neither an option nor a desire: 
In its most characteristic embodiments, religious 
happiness is no mere feeling of escape. It cares no 
longer for escape. It consents to the evil 
outwardly as a form of sacrifice—inwardly it knows 
it to be permanently overcome. (49) 
Ironically, in the rapture of his religious ecstasy, Miss 
Lonelyhearts again does not understand Doyle when the latter 
shouts out a warning. Doyle fires and the two, entwined, 
tumble down the stairs in a slapstick burlesque of sacrifice, 
love, and redemption. 
Given the ludicrousness of the novella's ending, West's 
attitude toward religious experience as a means of personal 
salvation would seem problematical. Thomas Lorch argues, 
correctly I feel, that both James and West accepted the death 
of God. Indeed, James, quoting Professor Leuba, contends that 
gods have always been a construct of the (subconscious) human 
mind, conceived to fill a human need: 
God is not known, he is not understood; he is used-
-sometimes as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral 
support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an 
object of love. If he proves useful, the religious 
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consciousness asks for no more than that. Does God 
really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so 
many irrelevant questions. 
It is with this utility of the conception of God that I 
believe West is concerned. As a visionary, Miss Lonelyhearts 
requires a framework within which he can give meaning to what 
he has seen. Religion, specifically the idea of Christ, is a 
receptacle for his expression of faith, and faith, as is 
existentialism itself, is an attitude, a way of facing the 
universe. What is essential in visionary terms about this 
story is not that Miss Lonelyhearts7 end can be viewed as an 
instance of psychosis or that his small corner of the world is 
decidedly more miserable at his death than when he first 
stared at Shrike's satiric prayer. Rather it is that Miss 
Lonelyhearts confronts his dark vision of existence, 
constructs an attitude of faith in relation to it, and lives 
up to that vision, which is to say that he becomes himself. 
Where his eyes had been closed in his boyhood reveries of 
Christ, both they and his arms are now open in his death. He 
lives what he knows to be true. 
There is a striking irony in the theme of authenticity's 
presence in Miss Lonelyhearts. West was born a Jew; his given 
name, Nathan Weinstein. But his Jewishness was an aspect of 
himself that he abhorred, and he, in effect, became a Jewish 
anti-Semite throughout his life32. There is but a single 
32Bloom notes West's propensity for referring to Jewish 
women as "bagels"; he apparently assiduously avoided dating 
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reference to Judaism in Miss Lonelyhearts. During his country 
retreat with Betty, Miss Lonelyhearts goes to a store for 
supplies and mentions to the clerk that he and Betty have 
observed a deer: "The man said that there was still plenty of 
deer at the pond because no yids ever went there. He said it 
wasn't the hunters who drove out the deer, but the yids" (38) . 
It is a curious reference. Certainly its racism may be viewed 
as part of the panorama of human degradation that informs the 
work,33 and it fits, too, as the human counterpart of the 
natural corruption Miss Lonelyhearts sees as inherent even in 
the seemingly pristine countryside. But most potently it 
suggests to me the idea posited in chapter one of the 
visionary as Jew, the archetypal outsider who, in naming our 
condition and maintaining fidelity to the self, defines his or 
her status as outsider. 
In Irwin Shaw's "Act of Faith," Seeger (read 
"Seer/Seeker"), the story's visionary protagonist, must also 
grapple with his Jewish heritage, which is to say his 
identity, a struggle which is presented in terms of visionary 
awakening34. As veterans of some of the fiercest fighting 
Jewish women. 
33In one of the most offensive passages in the novella, 
a group of Miss Lonelyhearts' colleagues discuss the gang 
rapes of women reporters in retaliation for their going 
"literary" and attempting to further their careers. One of the 
incidents concludes, "On the last day they sold tickets to 
niggers..." (14). 
34Shaw's fiction, while certainly competent, doesn't 
approach the complexity or depth of West's although his 
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following the Normandy invasion, Seeger and his two comrades, 
Welch and Olson, are "like brothers," and now face the problem 
of entertaining themselves as they await rotation home 
following the Allied victory. They have passes for Paris but, 
due to logistical problems, no money. Their one option is for 
Seeger to sell a German luger he seized after killing its 
owner, an SS major. 
This external conflict takes up nearly half the story and 
is part of Shaw's narrative strategy to prepare the reader, 
through creating certain narrative expectations, to share 
vicariously in Seeger's existential moment and interior 
literary output far surpasses West's. Shaw has written 12 
novels, 10 plays, three works of non-fiction and countless 
short stories. Readers may well be familiar with dramatized 
versions of his novels Beggarman. Thief and Rich Man. Poor 
Man, which attained considerable popularity when televised. 
Shaw's reputation lies firmly, I believe, in his achievement 
in the short story. "The Girls in Their Summer Dresses," "The 
Eighty Yard Run," and "Main Currents of American Thought," 
among others, are frequently anthologized. Critical reaction 
to Shaw's work has tended toward charges of its being 
superficial. Leslie Fiedler termed it a "half-art," a view 
which Giles contends became widely accepted in academic 
circles. Perhaps the most telling comment on Shaw's critical 
reputation is to be gleaned from the dust jacket of the Modern 
Library edition of his selected stories. The quote is from 
Lionel Trilling: 
He always does observe and always does feel, and 
even when he is facile in observation and sentiment 
he is not insincere.... He has established himself 
in a position which guarantees at least the 
sociological or cultural interests of whatever he 
writes. 
While Giles cites this same passage as proof of Shaw's being 
taken seriously by serious critics, it seems to me faint 
praise indeed. I have been able to find no exegesis at all on 
"Act of Faith." 
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conflict, which are presented through the agency of his 
father's chilling letter. This strategy of misdirection is 
also extended to Shaw's limited treatment of his secondary 
characters, each of whom is seen in terms of appearance and 
reality. Olson, for example, is "just the type who is killed 
off early and predictably and sadly in motion pictures about 
the war, but he had gone through four campaigns and six major 
battles without a scratch" (195) ; the captain from whom Seeger 
attempts to borrow money had been "a natural soldier, 
tireless, fanatic about detail, aggressive, severely anxious 
to kill Germans. But in the past few months Seeger had seen 
him relapsing gradually and pleasantly into a small-town 
wholesale hardware merchant, which he had been before the 
war..." (196); similarly, Welch is described with a 
"belligerent stance, (and a) harsh stare through the steel-
rimmed GI glasses, which had nothing to do with the way Welch 
really was" (199). 
Seeger, however, who had been wounded and returned to his 
unit "unchanged," lacks this surface ambiguity. He is 
described as "cheerful and dependable." His professionalism as 
a soldier is emphasized: "(He) had broken in five or six 
second lieutenants who had been killed or wounded..." (195). 
Nothing, one might gather from these few details, can alter 
Seeger's comfortable sense of self. But that identity is 
projected against a topographical and historical background 
that further suggests the Satrean "in-itself," the destructive 
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element which is always capable of poking through the thin 
veneer of meaning and order human beings impose. In "Act of 
Faith" the setting of the camp is a "bleak, wasted land" 
engulfed in a sea of primordial mud. Fittingly, the 
primitiveness of this setting is placed within the historical 
context of the Nazi holocaust. 
The implications of Seeger's Jewishness in general and of 
the holocaust in particular are issues, prior to his 
existential moment, remote from Seeger's consciousness and 
sense of self. He was not like the Jews "whose every waking 
moment is ridden by the knowledge of Jewishness, who see signs 
against the Jews in every smile on a streetcar....People of 
all kinds had seemed to like him all his life, in the army and 
out." Even the horror of the Holocaust seemed psychologically 
and ontologically distant: 
In America, especially, what was going on in Europe 
had seemed remote, unreal, unrelated to him. The 
chanting, bearded old men burning in the Nazi 
furnaces, and the dark-eyed women screaming prayers 
in Polish and Russian and German as they were 
pushed naked into the gas chambers had seemed as 
shadows and almost as unrelated to him as he 
trotted out onto the Stadium field for a football 
game, as they must have been to the men named 
O'Dwyer and Wickersham and Poole who played in the 
line beside him. 
The remote "shadows" of the Nazi's victims are part of an 
image motif based upon Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," which 
traces Seeger's visionary awakening35. The story opens with 
35This motif will be seen again in chapter four's 
discussion of The Voyage Out. 
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Olson's plea to "present (their request for money) in a 
pitiful light" and the bulk of its actions occur in tents, 
simulcra of Plato's cave36. When Seeger returns to his own 
tent, Welch is waiting, prisoner-like, peering "short-
sightedly" out at the rain. It is here that the story and 
Seeger's existence turns. Olson has picked up a letter for 
Seeger, who "goes toward the tent opening to read the letter 
in the light." Like Plato's freed prisoner, he is about to 
experience a second type of knowledge, one which transcends 
the boundaries of an everyday sense of the order of things. 
The letter from Seeger's father is a remarkable document. 
Like those received by Miss Lonelyhearts, it is a plea for 
help and guidance, based, as was Peter Doyle's letter, upon 
the writer's perception of his correspondent's wider realm of 
experience. Seeger senses something wrong merely from the 
envelope's ragged handwriting, "so different from his father's 
usual steady, handsome, professorial script"37. "Blink(ing) his 
eyes," Seeger moves toward the entrance of the tent, "in the 
wan rainy light." The letter tells Seeger of the plight of his 
brother Jacob, who ostensibly had been discharged from the 
service due to a leg wound. The father now realizes something 
much more profound is amiss, that Jacob is suffering from 
36The captain's tent is illuminated by a single "gloomy 
light" (198). 
37The fact that Seeger's father is a university professor 
serves with the largely semi-literate letters seen in Miss 
Lonelyhearts to create a certain comprehensiveness of human 
need for the direction visionary experience can offer. 
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combat fatigue and "is subject to fits of depression and 
hallucinations." Socrates taught that the experience of 
reality is only possible through escaping the cave, that if 
the prisoner approached the fire (or even more radically, the 
sun), he would perceive things in a different way, experience 
a brand of knowledge distinct from that revealed through the 
senses. What the father labels "hallucinations" are, in fact, 
a vision of reality in the same way as is Seeger's reference 
to the holocaust victims as "shadowy." Jacob has approached 
the fire. The father tells of coming upon Jacob crouched in 
their Ohio living room, peering watchfully through a window 
for the mobs who will be "coming for the Jews" and of his 
propensity for devour(ing) all the concentration camp reports, 
an activity which frequently leaves him in tears. 
The effect of Jacob's behavior on his father reflects the 
effects of the father's letter on Seeger: 
The terrible thing is, Norman, that I find myself 
coming to believe that it is not neurotic for a Jew 
to behave like this today. Perhaps Jacob is the 
normal one, and I, going about my business, 
teaching economics in a quiet classroom, pretending 
to understand that the world is comprehensible and 
orderly, am really the mad one....But it is 
crowding me, too. I do not see rockets and bombs, 
but I see other things. (204) 
What Seeger's father "sees" is the universality of anti-
Semitism, memories of outrageous anti-Semitic incidents, and 
his chilling ostracism by men he had thought his friends. His 
observation as to whether he or Jacob is "normal" is, in light 
of the fact of the holocaust, understatement. Robert Nozick 
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speaks of the holocaust as "a massive cataclysm that distorts 
everything around it: 
Physicists sometimes speak of gravitational masses 
as twistings and distortions of the even geometry 
of the surrounding physical space; the greater the 
mass, the larger the distortion. The holocaust is a 
massive and continuing distortion of the human 
space...its vortices and gnarled twistings will 
extend very far. (242) 
Jacob's "hallucinations" and Seeger's "shadows" are the result 
of that massive displacement. While Seeger's father can see 
these forces, he lacks the visionary's will to act upon them. 
He reveals his reluctance to espouse liberal writers or 
actions in his classes and his dis-ease over seeing Jewish 
names signed in protest of abuses: "Somehow, even in a country 
where my family has lived a hundred years, the enemy has won 
this subtle victory over me—he has made me disenfranchise 
myself from honest causes...." His solace is to discover 
Jewish names in the casualty lists, a list which once listed 
the death of a third son. This is a matter of authenticity. 
The father lacks it in that he allows his actions to be 
defined by the external pressures of what he perceives to be 
public sentiment. It is a flight from freedom. Thus in the 
conclusion of his letter does he turn to his visionary son: "I 
need some help... .Maybe you understand things that I don't 
understand. Maybe you see some hope somewhere. Help me." 
The course of Seeger's reading of the letter is 
punctuated by his blinking his eyes and now, at its end, he 
cannot see because "his eyes (were) full and dark." It is his 
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existential moment; he looks out over a "bleak, wasted land." 
His reaction parallels the anger Miss Lonelyhearts had 
exhibited toward the weak and suffering as well as West's 
protagonist's examination of values: 
Now, he thought, now I have to think about it. He 
felt a slight, unreasonable twinge of anger at his 
father for presenting him with the necessity of 
thinking about it. The army was good about serious 
problems. While you were fighting, you were too 
busy and frightened and weary to think about 
anything, and at other times you were relaxing, 
putting your brain on a shelf, postponing 
everything to that impossible time of clarity and 
beauty after the war. Well, now, here was the 
impossible, clear, beautiful time, and here was his 
father, demanding that he think. (206-07)38 
In his reflections Seeger recalls numerous instances of 
his being stopped by the civilians in towns liberated by the 
Allies and asked, "Are you a Jew?" The repeated question 
confuses him since "they never demanded anything from him." 
When it is asked again by a "little bent old man and a small, 
shapeless women," they are transformed, smiling "like 
children," at his reply. 
"Look," the old man had said to his wife. "A young 
American soldier. A Jew. And so large and strong." 
He touched Seeger's arm reverently with the tips of 
his fingers, then had touched the Garand he was 
carrying. "And such a beautiful rifle—" (207-08). 
Seeger, who was "not particularly sensitive," here receives 
"an inkling" of the significance of the inquiry. He was "a 
symbol of continuing life...blood of their blood, but not in 
38Marlow voices the same sentiment regarding the 
relationship between work and reflection in "Heart of 
Darkness." 
129 
hiding, not quivering in fear and helplessness, but striding 
secure and victorious down the street, armed and capable of 
inflicting terrible destruction on his enemies." 
But the elderly couple's vision of Seeger as an agent of 
messianic vengeance fails to perceive his deep desire to deny 
that role and to instead live easily in the quotidian mode. 
His memories of personal affronts suffered and of the myriad 
stories of the indignities suffered by other Jews had been 
truths he had "made an almost conscious effort to 
forget....Now, holding his father's letter in his hand, he 
remembered them all" (210) . That text serves to illuminate the 
darkness that has, unacknowledged, enveloped Seeger's 
existence; he "stares unseeingly," as might be expected of one 
so recently emerged from the cave, contemplating Camus' 
philosophical imperative: "Maybe it would've been better to 
have been killed in the war, like Leonard. Simpler....Leonard 
would not have to collect these hideous, fascinating little 
stories that made of every Jew a stranger in any town, on any 
field, on the face of the earth." 
The nearly overwhelming alienation, fear, and despair 
that Seeger feels at this point parallels that felt by Miss 
Lonelyhearts faced with his letters. Both experience their 
existential moment—the vision of a chaotic, ruthless and 
indifferent universe—through these encounters with epistolary 
texts. And both, in response, make an act of faith; that is, 
in the face of all rational evidence that would suggest the 
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futility of human action, they choose an authentic existence 
based on reflection and vision which carries them beyond 
themselves toward recognition of and commitment to others. 
Seeger responds with ridicule and shame to his suicidal 
thoughts: "At the age of twenty-one, death was not an answer" 
(210)39. Standing in an open field, Seeger is approached by his 
two comrades, who, sensing his despondency, have come to offer 
their support of whatever Seeger's decision regarding the 
lugar might be. The three walk "aimlessly" further away from 
the camp/cave as Seeger silently recalls incidents in which 
Olson and Welch had saved him from imminent death in combat. 
Spontaneously, he asks what they "think of the Jews." Their 
ironic response—"What are Jews?"—is partly based on their 
intuitive sense of the contents of the letter Seeger still 
holds in his hand, but it also, in the context of visionary 
literature, asks a larger question about identity and purpose. 
Plato's allegory posits a distinction between what the 
mind perceives and the true nature of the universe. As 
Socrates argues the case, true knowledge of the order of 
things is possible only for those who escape the cave. If that 
cave is a metaphor for the human mind, his question asks how 
it is possible to know anything beyond our minds. How do we 
transcend the borders of our own subjectivity? As with other 
fields of inquiry which posit "second worlds" (supernatural 
religious hierarchies and the study of particle physics come 
39Cf. Jim's identical response in chapter five. 
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immediately to mind), Plato is suggesting the limitations to 
and of the "truths" available to the quotidian or pragmatic 
mind. 
But for the existential or visionary mind, the only 
knowledge of value is the understanding of the human 
condition, by which is meant the contigency and 
meaninglessness of human existence: we do not know why we are 
nor can we hope to attain that knowledge. While the 
limitations the pragmatic mind chooses to place upon itself 
define Kierkegaard's despair that does not know it is despair 
and a flight from freedom, the visionary is immersed in the 
anguish and passion of freedom and the imperative of choosing 
how to be, which an understanding of the human condition 
entails. The individual can only become himself and transcend 
the nothingness of his predicament by perceiving and embracing 
the essential emptiness of his state. 
In "Act of Faith" the tension between these competing 
visions of reality is presented in the form of narratives 
about Jews and their respective quotidian and visionary 
analyses. On the one hand is the pragmatic equation of the Jew 
with chaos and evil. Utilized as a scapegoat figure, the Jew 
ironically supplies a causal, "rational" relationship to the 
malevolence of the human landscape. Thus does Seeger recall 
blatant acts of anti-Semitism occurring in moments of the 
direst physical danger ("In the fogs and the cold, swelling 
Arctic seas off the Aleutians, on a small boat, subject to 
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sudden, mortal attack at any moment....") or in complete 
contradistinction to facts (On the day of FDR's death, someone 
yelling, "Finally, they got the Jew out of the White House.") 
On the other hand, Jews themselves collect these same 
narratives "Like a special, lunatic kind of miser," (209) as 
if, instinctively, they perceive the very facticity of the 
confusion, ignorance, and irrationality the stories represent 
to be essential components of reality, of the human condition. 
In effect, they make the destructive element those narratives 
represent hold them up. 
Always the key is how one chooses to be in the face of 
the existential vision. Seeger confronts a choice between 
violence toward and faith in other human beings. Originally 
the lugar had represented a "vague, half-understood sign to 
himself that justice had once been done and that he had been 
its instrument" (208). Existentialist thinkers often speak of 
such a precognitive state in which the individual already 
intuitively knows what is not fully revealed until one is 
deeply involved in the experience of anguish. Where Seeger had 
originally intended to return to America with the weapon's 
barrel plugged, now in the light of his father's narrative, in 
the full passion of his anguish and vision, he perceives the 
necessity of returning with it loaded. His sole option, the 
one he chooses, is to rely on his comrades40 in the crucible 
40The various states from which Olson, Welch, and Seeger 
hail are mentioned, implying, I think, their universality. As 
with Miss Lonelyhearts' spiritual faith, the wisdom and 
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of everyday life as he had in warfare. In the totality of his 
vision of the malevolence of humankind, this is profoundly an 
act of faith. 
Like existentialism itself, faith projects an attitude, 
a way of being, which is constitutive of the entire person. In 
Abbagnano's analysis, faith reflects not just an intellectual 
act or a sentiment or a practical activity because it is all 
these activities, "a fundamental mode of being in which all 
man's expressions can take root and from which all can deduce 
their own specific significance" (61). As the figure is 
inseparable from the ground from which it projects, faith can 
only be realized in connection with doubt: "The possibility of 
doubt is...the possibility of faith itself" (62). Doubt along 
with its constituents disorder, dissonance, and confusion is 
the destructive element within which the visionary mind must 
learn to swim. Conversely and paradoxically, to not doubt is 
to be incapable of escaping confusion. Such an individual 
"mistakes the fleeting moments of his daily life, the false 
comforts, complacence and ignorance for a secure possession 
and he fools himself into believing that he is docked in a 
port toward which he never set out" (64). This is certainly 
authenticity of Seeger's choice here may be questioned; that 
is, is his disavowal of a militant stance in response to the 
perceived malevolence surrounding him an instance of bad 
faith? Seeger's experience in the war attests to his will to 
confront physical brutality and chaos. Based on this we must 
assume, I think, that Seeger's daily life will be conducted in 
full visionary knowledge of and existential readiness toward 
other manifestations of brutality and chaos he will encounter. 
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Seeger's ("People of all kinds had seemed to like him all his 
life") and Miss Lonelyhearts' (He hopes his advice column 
might lead to a gossip column) ontological state prior to 
receiving their respective letters. 
For both Miss Lonelyhearts and Seeger the letters are 
documents which create faith, a religious faith in the former 
case; a secular one in the latter. Miss Lonelyhearts fervid 
and deadly embrace of Doyle is a microcosm of his attitude 
toward the world, a Christ-like stance taken in the face of 
overpowering evidence of, at best, God's disinterest in the 
human enterprise; at worst, his total abdication of his divine 
responsibilities. Similarly, Seeger's embracing of life is 
undertaken in the face of the historical facticity of the 
holocaust and of his father's (accurate) assessment of how 
widespread the "poison" of anti-Semitism had become. 
These acts are paradigms of courage and faith. As 
readers, we, too, must make our individual acts of faith in 
the belief that, much evidence to the contrary, literature can 
help us to make meaning of our condition. I believe that these 
two visionary fictions, divergent as they are in their 
intrinsic literary merits, help us toward that faith. 
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CHAPTER IV 
READING IN THE CAVE: 
VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE DRAMA OF BECOMING VISIONARY 
"Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm." 
Sartre 
"Nothing is more real than nothing." Samuel Beckett 
"When one gave up seeing the beauty that clothed things, this 
was the skeleton underneath." The Voyage Out 
"Books...I wonder what you find in them." The Voyage Out 
The belief in the value of a dynamic and vital connection 
between the reading of literature and the living of life lies 
at the core of this study. Nowhere has that value been more 
cogently articulated and embraced than in the feminist 
literary enterprise of the past twenty-five years. The essays 
of feminist scholars who were in the vanguard of the movement 
are peppered with references both to this value and its 
antithesis, the Anglo-American formalist criticism, which 
denied this connection1. "Without stories," writes Carol 
Christ, "a woman is lost when she comes to make the important 
decisions of her life... .Without stories she cannot understand 
1Fraya Katz-Stoker refers to formalism as "that great 
block of aesthetic ice" (315). Certainly I am aware here of 
the reductive (and therefore inadequate) nature of my own 
comment about New Critical theory. It is, however, a revealing 
irony—and one seemingly often forgotten—that the New Critics 
"aesthetic iciness" was an attempt to discover in the "verbal 
icon" a source of order and meaning that had disappeared in 
the chaos and breakdown of modern society and the Yeatsian 
"fury and mire of human veins." As Iser makes the point, the 
New Critics had "called off the search for meaning" and 
focused instead on "the elements of the work and their 
interaction... .The value of the work is measured by the 
harmony of its elements" (15). The critic's task became the 
clarification of the text's ambiguities. Therein did critics' 
essential skill become ingeniousness rather than insight. In 
effect, then, New Criticism offers another example of the 
figure-ground paradigm that informs visionary experience: it 
was an attempt to objectify and isolate the literary work/form 
through denying or ignoring the surrounding chaos from which 
it emerged. Feminist theory, conversely, seeks to utilize 
stories to "give shape to lives"; that is, its object is to 
plunge into the "ground" of lived experience—the destructive 
element—and create meaning there. Where the patriarchal 
enterprise is characterized by isolation, feminist thought is 
defined by connection. Schweikart argues that a "principle 
tenet of feminist criticism (is that) a literary work cannot 
be understood apart from the social, historical, and cultural 
context within which it was written" (46). 
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herself....Stories give shape to lives" (1). Florence Howe 
believes that "the classroom should function in response to 
real needs and questions of students and teachers; and on the 
other hand that out of the classroom should flow some lively 
literary and aesthetic debate rooted in the lives and 
understanding of women" (260). Nancy Burr Evans recalls being 
"betrayed" by the "tight-fisted influence of my traditional 
English major upbringing; I was self-conscious about doing 
what I thought should be most basic and natural: relating 
literature to life" (309). Indeed, the image of a "tight fist" 
is taken to its political extreme by Fraya Katz-Stoker who 
sees as "suspicious" that the rise of the New Criticism 
coincided with "American and English businessmen...arming 
Hitler as 'a bulwark against communism'", and that the New 
Critics replaced "an extraordinarily vigorous sociological 
approach which...dominated the middle 30's" (322). 
The immediacy and vigor of feminist critical concerns 
have run unabated through the present day, and their stress 
continues on ways in which the experience of literature can 
affect lives and effect change. Patrocinio Schweickart 
emphasizes feminist criticism as a "mode of praxis. The point 
is not merely to interpret literature in various ways; the 
point is to change the world" (39). Sharon O'Brien reflects 
eloquently on her experience of writing a biography of Willa 
Cather, of how it "shaped" her own life, allowing her to 
reconcile her personal experiences of other powerful women 
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(not men) "who tried to erase me without ever seeing who I 
was." O'Brien recognizes, too, her indebtedness to the 
feminist scholars who preceded her: "For the questions we can 
ask of and about our subjects are shaped...by the critical 
conversations available to us at the time" (24) . I would 
suggest that the questions being asked by feminist critics are 
marked by an authenticity, vitality and passion transcending 
the arguments of other literary schools because the feminists' 
goals are finally ontological rather than the "simply" 
professional and intellectual stakes traditional to the 
academy; feminism is a mode of thought "alive" in Heinemann's 
sense of that which might elucidate our position or offer 
solutions to our problems; in existential terms, it is a 
criticism conducted in Sartrean "good faith," and as such 
offers a powerful venue for the playing out of visionary 
fictions2. 
Christ's analysis, in particular, speaks to some of the 
core issues of visionary experience. She cites the "sacred 
dimension" present in the ability of some stories to orient 
the reader to what Stephen Crites' elsewhere calls "the great 
powers that establish the reality of (the reader's) world." 
These writers are not speaking "merely" of deities here, but 
2In speaking of the evolution of reader-response 
criticism, for example, Schweickart cites "the relative 
tranquility of tone" of various strands of that school which 
"overlook issues of race, class, and sex, and give no hint of 
the conflicts, sufferings, and passions that attend these 
sufferings" (35). 
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more of the existential forces against which a person must 
contend and upon which she must grow in the battle for 
selfhood: "They may ground a person in powers of being that 
enable her to challenge conventional values or expected roles" 
(3). 
But the core of the feminist critique is the reaction 
against unauthentic stories a patriarchal culture supplies (or 
imposes upon) a woman, stories which "do not validate what she 
thinks or feels" (5). Denied authentic stories, Christ argues, 
there is a sense in which a woman is "not alive. Continually 
trying to fit her possibilities into stories where her reality 
is not acknowledged, a woman experiences nothingness, and 
perhaps even contemplates suicide..." (6-7). 
Clearly, a major aspect of an individual's realizing her 
authentic self is in the existential choice of a story to 
fulfill. Schweikart observes that what the feminist reader 
reads is of equal consequence with the how of any theoretical 
stance she might assume. Indeed, the forces that would 
pressure a woman toward traditional and therefore crippling 
ways of being were omnipresent in the pre-feminist 
"institutional narratives" supplied by family, culture, 
education, religion, and art—not to mention the myriad 
permutations within these categories3. Moreover, each of these 
3For example, in The Voyage Out Helen Ambrose offers 
Rachel Vinrace "Defoe, Maupassant, or some spacious chronicle 
of family life" as an inducement "to think" and as a way of 
lessening Rachel's immersion in music. As my analysis of the 
novel will demonstrate, Rachel is defined by her propensity 
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institutions often works against the "stories" offered by the 
others. For men, the experiences of formal education and thus 
of literature have traditionally (perhaps ideally) functioned 
as critiques of the narrative patterns imposed by culture, 
family and religion. For women, the struggle to canonize texts 
which would critique and shape their experiences beyond the 
academy has formed the feminist drama of the past quarter 
century. For Michael Novak, any individual—man or woman—who 
lives devoid of a structuring story experiences, as Christ 
says of women, "nothingness: the primal formlessness of human 
life below the threshold of narrative structuring. Why become 
anything at all? Does anything make any difference? Why not 
simply die?...Or drift: which is a death-in-life" (Ascent. 
52). These are, of course, reiterations of the ineffable and 
dangerous core questions underlying this study—"how to be" 
and "whether to be"—questions Novak labels "religious" in 
nature. Such questions, I have tried to show, are at the heart 
of all visionary fictions; most importantly, I contend that 
these stories—in an age of cultural fragmentation, 
for question and analysis; Helen, however, is responding to a 
different paradigm regarding what constitutes "thought." 
Woolf, who was meticulous in her choice of literary allusions, 
would seem to be here alluding to three historic paths imposed 
on women: the use of wit and feminine charm as a means of 
survival, an idealized romanticism, or absorption into "family 
life." Annette Kolodny reminds us that "Insofar as we are 
taught to read, what we engage are not texts, but 
paradigms..." (10). Significantly, then, Rachel declines 
Helen's selections and chooses instead "modern books" (124). 
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intellectual confusion and spiritual malaise—provide the 
structuring narratives for us all4. 
In Christ's feminist analysis of the role of stories, the 
most powerful are those which delineate the spiritual quest of 
women: "Her awakening to the depths of her soul and her 
position in the universe: 
A woman's spiritual quest includes moments of 
solitary contemplation, but it is strengthened by 
being shared. It involves asking basic questions: 
Who am I? Why am I here? What is my place in the 
universe? (8) 
Again, these ur-questions challenge the foundations of 
accepted reality; that is, the stories of (patriarchal) 
culture and family, and (organized) religion that have 
heretofore defined reality and the woman's place within it. 
The stories by women which oppose these traditional narratives 
possess, for Christ, "both a spiritual and a social dimension" 
wherein the process of women's spiritual quest moves from the 
experience of nothingness, to awakening, to renaming, and 
culminates in a reemergence in the world. 
It begins in an experience of nothingness. Women 
experience emptiness in their own lives—in self-
hatred, in self-negation, and in being a victim; in 
relationships with men; and in the values that have 
shaped their lives. Experiencing nothingness, women 
reject conventional solutions and question the 
meaning of their lives, thus opening themselves to 
the revelation of deeper sources of power and 
value. The experience of nothingness often precedes 
an awakening, similar to a conversion experience, 
in which the powers of being are revealed. A 
woman's awakening to new powers grounds her in a 
*Cf. my comments on the ending of "The Brink of 
Darkness." 
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new sense of self and a new orientation in the 
world. (13) (emphases mine) 
Certainly the experience of nothingness—of the 
recognition that the self is a culturally imposed entity—is 
not gender specific. Men are perhaps even more susceptible to 
culturally imposed roles and perceptions of reality and 
morality than are women. The distinction, of course, has 
always been in the relative breadth of men's choices within a 
particular culture and in the power inherent in those 
possibilities. But the experience of the female visionary 
extends this commonplace, reminding us that prior to the 
feminist movement of the last quarter of this century, it was 
only men who could discover solace and some level of meaning 
in the rhythms and structures of daily life—regardless of how 
tenuousness or illusory that order might be. And while 
historically the legal status of women had begun to change 
substantially by the time Virginia Woolf began writing her 
first novel in 1908, Woolf could still have a male character 
ask of a female: 
"I've often walked along the streets where people 
live in a row, and one house is exactly like 
another house, and wondered what on earth the women 
were doing inside... .Doesn't it make your blood 
boil?...I'm sure if I were a woman I'd blow 
someone's brains out." (VO, 215)5 
5It is perhaps illuminating that when Woolf has a male 
project himself into a woman's position, his frustration will 
result in his shooting someone else; however, in A Room Of 
One"s Own she notes that "any woman born with a great gift in 
the sixteenth century would certainly have gone crazed, shot 
herself, or ended her days in a lonely cottage outside the 
village... feared and mocked at" (51). 
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For the enlightened woman, then, there really existed little 
choice for creating a self—except perhaps through literature, 
a point Woolf makes eloquently in A Room of One/s Own. Indeed, 
despite Woolfs reservations in that book that women had not 
yet developed a truly feminist art, the narratives of 
Victorian female characters must surely have offered women 
readers the first ontological maps for selfhood. 
Christ sees patriarchal hegemony as the lie from which 
women must continue to awaken and the root of their spiritual 
quest. Novak, as noted above, perceives the experience much 
more radically as one of "primal formlessness of human life 
below the threshold of narrative structuring" (emphasis mine) . 
But in addition to their focus upon the primacy of the 
experience of nothingness, Novak and Christ also share the 
discovery of the roots of that experience in the "deepest 
recesses of human consciousness, in its irrepressible tendency 
to ask questions" (Experience, 14). In visionary experience 
the concepts of questioning and nothingness are inextricably 
linked because the visionary's ultimate questions are met with 
a universal silence: 
When I perceive the drive to question in its 
purity, apart from the products to which it leads 
me, I perceive the ambiguity of my own conscious 
life. I recognize the formlessness, the 
aimlessness, and the disunity implicit in my own 
insignificance, my mortality, my ultimate 
dissolution. I peer into madness, chaos, and death. 
These insights are true insights. Not to experience 
them is to evade the character of one's own 
consciousness. It is to live a lie. The experience 
of nothingness bears the taste of honesty. (Novak, 
Experience. 15) 
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As I have suggested, an interrogative posture is indicative of 
the visionary consciousness. Implicitly or explicitly, the 
visionary is an unrelenting, even ruthless questioner of all 
the values—including the very nature of reality itself—which 
form the foundations of quotidian life. Because those values 
and bases have remained unremittingly patriarchal, women offer 
some of the most cogent critiques of the culture which 
produced them. 
It is not surprising, then, that Rachel Vinrace, the 
protagonist of The Voyage Out, is defined by her propensity 
for radical questioning, a drive which frees her from her 
perception of her life as a "creeping, hedged-in thing," 
confronts her with the experience of nothingness, and plunges 
her into existential awareness. The outline of Woolf's first 
novel is straightforward enough: At the age of twenty-four, 
Rachel, who has been more isolated than raised by maiden aunts 
in England6, accompanies her father, Willoughby, aboard his 
ship, the Euphrosvne, bound for South America. Joining them 
are Rachel's deceased mother's sister, Helen, and her husband, 
'Woolf acutely traces Rachel's epistemological isolation: 
"Her mind was in the state of an intelligent man's in the 
beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth; she would believe 
practically anything she was told, invent reasons for anything 
she said....She was of course brought up with excessive care, 
which as a child was for her health; as a girl and a young 
woman for what it seems almost crude to call her morals. Until 
quite lately she had been completely ignorant that for women 
such things existed. She groped for knowledge in old books, 
and found it in repulsive chunks...." (34-5). Woolf's interest 
in how individuals learn and manifest knowledge is most richly 
realized in To the Lighthouse in the characters of Mr. and 
Mrs. Ramsay. 
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Ridley. Simultaneously appalled and fascinated by the 
narrowness of Rachel's experience, Helen suggests that Rachel 
remain with them among the (largely eccentric) English 
community on the small island of Santa Marina while Willoughby 
journeys down the Amazon. During her stay, Rachel falls in 
love with a young Englishman and aspiring novelist, Terence 
Hewet, who has travelled out with his effete friend, St. John 
Hirst. The pair plans marriage, but during a river excursion 
of their own, Rachel contracts a fever and dies. The novel 
concludes in images which frame the response of the community 
to Rachel's passing. 
Not surprisingly, the critical heritage of The Voyage Out 
has evolved much more slowly than those of the novels of 
Woolf's artistic maturity, but I would suggest that the lack 
of unity many critics cite as a weakness of The Voyage Out to 
be one of its strengths. The book's numerous thematic concerns 
and its utilization of an array of imperfectly realized 
characters in fact reflect the realities that life is unified 
by nothing but its fragmentation, and the apparent 
impossibility of knowing anyone—even ourselves—with anything 
approaching certitude. Life, despite humankind's devout 
efforts, is most assuredly not a row of gig lamps 
symmetrically arranged. 
The roots of Rachel's radical questioning transcend her 
naivete and ignorance, the fruits of her cloistered youth in 
England, and lie instead in her visionary consciousness, which 
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in effect compels her to see and question what others choose 
to ignore or passively accept. Rachel's nature is 
interrogative—not simply inquisitive or precocious—but 
radically interrogative. Novak reminds us that the drive to 
question is innate and preverbal; that is, it is a way of 
being, which, on the one hand, allows the individual to "keep 
altering his views of world and self... (and) to direct his own 
evolution" while, on the other, raising the uniquely human 
specter of anxiety and its attendant realizations of 
loneliness and mortality: 
For by his endless drive to question a man sooner 
or later may perceive that all his supports offered 
by his culture, his social position, and his 
achievements do not remove the fundamental law of 
consciousness: he stands alone in a darkness and 
must die. (Nothingness, 48). 
Richard Dalloway's kissing of Rachel during the outward 
voyage is often cited as the symbolic awakening of her 
consciousness, one which is fraught with nightmare images7. As 
Novak suggests, the emotional and psychic crisis that Rachel 
experiences here occurs within a wholly indifferent universe 
("Far out between the waves little black and white sea birds 
were riding. Rising and falling with smooth and graceful 
movements in the hallows of the waves they seemed singularly 
detached and unconcerned") and anticipates her credo that life 
"seemed to hold infinite possibilities she had never guessed 
7The nightmare precipitated by Dalloway's advance 
contains a narrative coherence and specificity that suggests 
its basis in Woolf's own experience. 
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at," possibilities which carry with them the harrowing price 
of seeing "beneath the beauty that clothed things"8. Hence, 
when she next sees Dalloway, Rachel feels "uncomfortable, as 
if she and Richard had seen something together which is hidden 
in ordinary life, so that they did not like to look at each 
other" (76-7). 
Rachel's unblinking questioning of the ideologies of the 
people and ideas she encounters allows her to experience both 
ends of Novak's ontological spectrum: she assumes control and 
responsibility for her own growth, an evolution which leads 
ineluctably to her perception of her isolation and her 
confrontation with death. With these thematic bases in mind, 
Rachel's customary discourse—"What I want to know is this: 
What is the truth? What is the truth of it all" or "And life, 
what was that?" (123, 125) becomes integral, not pretentious. 
This is evident in Rachel's memory of her childhood and 
adolescence in England, a period in which the poverty of her 
formal education ironically left her "abundant time for 
thinking" (35) . Much of that reflection, not surprisingly, was 
bestowed upon the aunts who essentially defined reality for 
Rachel: "Why did they do the things they did, and what did 
they feel, and what was it all about?" She finds "unspeakably 
8Cf. Dalloway following a violent storm at sea. As the 
storm subsides, "the ordinary world slipped into his mind, and 
by the time he was dressed he was an English gentleman again" 
(73) . The same dichotomy between the appearance of civility 
and institutions, and the reality of mendacity and chaos is 
present in Dalloway's assault upon Rachel. See below, p. 142. 
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odd" the "whole system in which they lived" and questions 
Helen (in the present) as to whether she is "fond" of the 
aunts. "My dear child, what questions you do ask!" Helen 
responds9. 
This same pattern is repeated in Rachel's first shipboard 
encounter with Richard Dalloway, a former Member of 
Parliament, who, with his wife Clarissa, shares a portion of 
the outward journey. The fairly lengthy scene (pp.63-9) is 
fueled by Rachel's numerous questions and by her tenacious 
insistence on lucid answers. Rachel feels a genuine warmth and 
attraction for Dalloway, and he in turn is flattered by even 
a socially naive young girl's obvious interest in his tepid 
accomplishments and shopworn ideas. But what is fascinating in 
the exchange is the manner in which Rachel's honest and 
incisive questions lay bare Dalloway's insidious nature; more 
than through his respectable misogyny (women do not possess 
the "political instinct.. .It's far better that you should know 
9In her ability to be struck by a kind of wonder or awe 
by the life choices of others, Rachel's vision possesses a 
distinctly Romantic flavor. The isolation of her upbringing 
and her interrogative habits of mind join to make strange and 
fresh to her the world and its inhabitants. As with her 
reaction to her aunts'lives, we see Rachel emerging from her 
Uncle Ridley's study, "lost in wonder at her uncle, and his 
books, and his neglect of dances, and his queer, utterly 
inexplicable, but apparently satisfactory view of life" (172). 
Later, on a solitary walk, she encounters a tree: "It was an 
ordinary tree, but to her it appeared so strange that it might 
have been the only tree in the world.. .Having seen a sight 
that would last her for a lifetime, and for a lifetime would 
preserve that second, the tree once more sank into the 
ordinary ranks of trees..." (174). 
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nothing")10 Dalloway defines himself as a member of the 
political establishment: "I can conceive of no more exalted 
aim," he asserts, "(than) to be the citizen of the Empire." 
Yet the brutality and violence that lie beneath the 
institutionalized order of empire remain unacknowledged save 
for Dalloway's ironic metaphor of the state as "a complicated 
machine" whose efficiency is imperilled "if the meanest screw 
fails its task" and in Woolf's trenchant conclusion of the 
interview through the appearance on the horizon of English 
warships11. Subtlely, he is exposed as akin to Rachel's father: 
a component of the insidious male machine that seeks to keep 
her life "a creeping, hedged-in thing." 
Rachel's innocence of the codes of social intercourse 
offers other (non-visionary) characters a convenient way to 
deflect the implications of her queries. She becomes, in 
effect, benignly objectified as "child," "puppy" or 
"eccentric"—and thereby marginalized. Helen, for example, 
describes Rachel's propensity for questioning as "brave and 
foolish"12 and compares her to "a puppy that brings one's 
10Cf. Woolf's letter in response to a Desmond MacCarthy 
review of Arnold Bennett's Our Women in the New Statesman. The 
intellectual inferiority of women to men, wrote MacCarthy, 
"stares him in the face" (Barrett, M. 55). 
11
 It was Conrad who would document the underbelly of 
colonialism. 
12The attribution of this phrase to Helen is not entirely 
accurate. The passage actually reads "Again Helen laughed at 
her, benignantly strewing her with handfuls of the long 
tasseled grass, for she was so brave and so foolish." This is 
characteristic of what might be termed the luminous quality of 
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underclothes down into the hall" (145). It is particularly 
important to understand that those who inhabit the quotidian 
consciousness are equally aware of the insistent presence of 
questions. Christ speaks of her preference for the term 
"awakening" to "conversion" because the former "suggests that 
the self needs only to notice what is already there.. .that the 
ability to see or to know is within the self, once the 
sleeping draft is refused" (18)13. The essential distinction, 
then, between the visionary and quotidian ways of being lies 
precisely in characters' existential stance before the 
facticity of questions which confront the nature and meaning 
of both our daily lives and spiritual condition. The visionary 
chooses immersion in the potentially destructive element of 
full consciousness of a world defined by its absence of 
answers and establishes his or her being within that 
void/ground; the quotidian mind rejects or ignores that 
emptiness, establishing being against the void by creating 
institutions and systems which supply a sham teleology and 
Woolf's narrative voice, a presence that hovers around and 
often intermingles with the characters' direct thoughts. The 
resulting ambiguity is, in light of Woolf's later fiction, 
clearly intentional and not a case of a young writer 
struggling to find her voice. While clearly this type of 
indirect quotation has a long literary precedence, it is 
nonetheless exceedingly appropriate here given that the 
central problem of The Voyage Out and of Woolf's fiction as a 
whole is the bridging of the ontological gap between 
individuals. For a lucid discussion of this issue see 
Naremore, especially pages 32-42. 
13Recall that the ancient Greek root for "truth" is 
"unhiddenness." Socrates, too, taught that truth resided 
within each individual. 
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tenuous harmony to our daily lives. Both ways of being, of 
course, occupy the same psychic and ontological space. We are 
within the realm of Plato's Cave here, an allusion which I 
will illustrate to be the controlling image of Woolf's first 
novel. 
A scene in which members of the English party ride to 
the top of a scenic summit will serve as a microcosm of this 
dichotomy of being. This is the setting of the first true 
conversation among the novel's four central characters. As a 
way of beginning to know one another—always the central issue 
in Woolf's fiction14—Hirst proposes that each offer an 
autobiographical sketch. Rachel begins, adumbrating her life 
in terms of male facticity15: age, parentage, living 
arrangements: 
uDuring Rachel's encounter with the Dalloways on the 
voyage out, Richard observes, "D'you know, Miss Vinrace, 
you've made me think? How little, after all, one can tell 
anybody about one's life! Here I sit; there you sit; both, I 
doubt not, chock-full of the most interesting experiences, 
ideas, emotions; yet how communicate? I've told you what every 
second person you meet might tell you" (68). 
15The perhaps now too familiar gender distinction between 
male preoccupation with facts and female orientation toward 
emotion is present throughout Woolf's novel. When Hewet strays 
from facticity in his autobiographical sketch and begins to 
offer an impressionistic account of his father's death, Hirst 
scolds him to "keep to the facts" (144) . Later Hewet himself, 
in defense of Hirst, chides Rachel: "But you'll never see 
it...because with all your virtues you don't, and you never 
will, care with every fibre of your being for the pursuit of 
truth! You've no respect for facts, Rachel; you're essentially 
feminine" (295). And Helen muses that Hirst "took her outside 
this little world of love and emotion. He had a grasp of 
facts" (304). 
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Rachel stated that she was twenty-four years of 
age, the daughter of a ship-owner, that she had 
never been properly educated; played the piano, had 
no brothers or sisters, and lived at Richmond with 
her aunts, her mother being dead. (143) 
For all its reticence and brevity, Rachel's self-portrait 
reveals an existence of abject isolation. She lacks both 
mother and siblings, the very relationships by which she 
defines herself; moreover, we know her father to be physically 
and emotionally absent16 and her maiden aunts to be the vehicle 
of her relative ignorance. She is, it would seem, without a 
female model upon whom she might shape her life. 
Rachel's stark self-portrait cogently illustrates— 
partly through its very starkness—the "experience of 
nothingness" which Christ cites as the prelude to female 
awakening. While Rachel identifies herself in terms of the 
dead and the distant, it is Helen who cites the inadequacy of 
their autobiographical sketches17—"But of course we've left 
16This characterization is to give Willoughby the benefit 
of the doubt. The following passage in which he acquiesces to 
Rachel's remaining with Helen in Santa Rosa intimates an 
oblivious selfishness bordering on the insidious: "I want to 
bring her up as her mother would have wished. I don't hold 
with these modern views—any more than you do, eh? She's a 
nice quiet girl, devoted to her music—a little less of that 
would do no harm. Still, it's kept her happy, and we lead a 
very quiet life at Richmond. .. .I'm beginning to realize. . .that 
all this is tending to Parliament....1 should want Rachel to 
be able to take more part in things. A certain amount of 
entertaining would be necessary—dinners, an occasional 
evening party....In all these ways Rachel could be of great 
help to me" (85-6). 
17Cf. Later in the novel, when Helen comes to write 
Rachel's father of his daughter's betrothal to Hewet, it is 
observed that Helen "had dwelt so often upon Mr. Hewet's 
prospects, his profession, his birth, appearance, and 
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out the only questions that matter"—before deflecting the 
intuitive insight of her remark with what I read as an 
insincere, sophisticate's question: "For instance, are we 
Christians?" Precocious rationalists, Hewet and Hirst fall 
over themselves denying faith, while Rachel affirms hers. 
Typically, Hirst tasks her response, and Rachel, in what might 
serve as the visionary's credo, reaffirms her belief with 
something akin to a Kierkegaardian leap of faith: 
"I believe—I believe," Rachel stammered, "I 
believe there are things we don't know about, and 
the world might change in a minute and anything 
appear." 
Again Woolf utilizes Rachel's social naivete—her stuttering 
and statement of an exceedingly vague, apparently jejune 
intuition18—to mask what is in fact the philosophical center 
of her novel: a belief in the inadequacy of everyday 
experience and "common wisdom" (rationality) as a guide to 
reality and, ultimately, meaning. Where rational philosophers 
hold the emotions suspect, the existentialists view them as a 
temperament, that she had almost forgotten what he was really 
like" (304). 
18Leaska observes that each of Woolf s novels poses a 
question "which may appear embarrassingly naive" (4). Indeed, 
one of my strongest original impressions of Woolfs work was 
of the felicity with which she could have characters ask 
questions revolving around "the meaning of life." Furthermore, 
in a review titled, appropriately enough, "Moments of 
Vision," Woolf speaks of a particular author's need to capture 
moments "almost menacing with meaning. Such moments of vision 
are of an unaccountable, ineffable nature; leave them alone 
and they persist for years; try to explain them and they 
disappear; write them down and they die beneath the pen" 
(Essays, v. 2, p. 251). 
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reliable guide to the individual's involvement in and 
reflection upon his or her existential situation. As in the 
emotion evident in her "credo" above, Rachel is continually 
reflected through emotion. Moreover, I would characterize 
Rachel's statement as instinctively existential in its 
suggestion of humankind's need to transcend through perception 
and action its present limits; to, in effect, "uncover" the 
truth hidden by what might be termed a "conspiracy of reason." 
Rachel's integrity—her authenticity—is inherent in her 
stuttering: she is groping after the ineffable. Conversely, 
Helen, Hewet, and Hirst are engaged in an insincere discourse, 
in effect a kind of idle chatter, which, because of its very 
pervasiveness, has abrogated the right to name reality19. The 
distinction here is between the use of language as language 
(or as a way of filling or buffering the existential void) and 
the use of language as a tool to apprehend and confront the 
void's reality. Macquarrie notes: 
...language has been diverted from its true 
function—the words are passed along, but they are 
heard as words. The disclosure does not take place; 
we are not allowed to see or appropriate for 
ourselves the reality that the words are about. So 
the existentialist favors a return to the sources, 
an exposure to the way things are rather than the 
way they are said to be. (148) 
It is worth noting here that in her own life in 
Bloomsbury, Woolf was surrounded by those whose faith upheld 
the absolute primacy of reason; their bible was G.E. Moore's 
19Cf. the uses of language of Susan Warrington and Miss 
Allan cited below. 
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Principia Ethica, whose epigraph is the antithesis of Rachel's 
credo: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing."20 
Clearly, nothing in Woolf's fiction would validate this 
philosophy. Her most insightful—which is to say visionary— 
characters may be defined by their perception of the 
complexity and manifold nature of objects and people and, most 
importantly, of how this understanding leads to one's ultimate 
connection with them. Indeed, just this idea forms the 
conclusion of Woolf's two finest novels: the "connection" of 
Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway, and the 
"reformation" of Mr. Ramsay in the eyes of his estranged 
children in To The Lighthouse. It is in the latter novel, too, 
that Mrs. Ramsay, prompted by the stroke of the lighthouse 
beam, experiences union: "It was odd, she thought, how if one 
was alone, one leant to inanimate things; trees, streams, 
flowers; felt they expressed one, in a sense were one" (97). 
This is particularly interesting given an experience Rachel 
has while walking alone in Santa Marina: 
So she might have walked until she lost all 
knowledge of her way, had it not been for the 
interruption of a tree....It was an ordinary tree, 
but to her it appeared so strange that it might 
have been the only tree in the world. Dark was the 
trunk in the middle, and the branches sprang here 
and there, leaving jagged intervals of light 
between them as distinctly as if it had but that 
second sprang from the ground. Having seen a sight 
that would last her a lifetime, and for a lifetime 
20Indeed, it is surely Moore's work which is identified 
as Helen's "black volume of philosophy" from which she reads 
"a sentence about the Reality of Matter, or the Nature of the 
Good" as she embroiders on the deck of the Euphrosyne (32-3). 
156 
would preserve that second, the tree once more sank 
into the ordinary ranks of trees. 
Rachel continues her walk now conscious that the "flowers and 
even pebbles in the earth had their own life and disposition, 
and brought back the feelings of a child to whom they were 
companions" (174). 
Given this sharp divergence about the nature of reality, 
it is revealing to note that Moore and his work were imbued by 
Leonard Woolf and most of the other (male) Bloomsbury denizens 
with a talismanic power: 
The tremendous influence of Moore and his book upon 
us came from the fact that they suddenly removed 
from our eyes an obscuring accumulation of scales, 
cobwebs, and curtains, revealing for the first time 
to us, so it seemed, the nature of truth and 
reality, of good and evil and character and 
conduct, substituting for the religious and 
philosophical nightmares, delusions, 
hallucinations in which Jehovah, Christ, and St. 
Paul, Plato, Kant, and Hegel had entangled us, the 
fresh air and pure light of plain common sense. 
(93) 
Quentin Bell speaks of "the mute circle of seekers after truth 
who sat puffing their pipes around the discreet shrine of G.E. 
Moore" and who, having "received the Gospel of Principia 
Ethica regarded themselves as the elect" (105 and 184). 
These reminiscences paint a daunting ideological tableau 
even for the rarified air of Bloomsbury and therein serve to 
fix both Virginia's courage in 1909—when she was in the midst 
of composing The Voyage Out—in directly opposing Moore's 
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thought to her friends21 and, later, the integrity of her art, 
which never wavered from the principle annunciated in Rachel's 
"credo." Mark Hussey suggests that Woolf "seems always to be 
seeking to express a perception of the numinous" (59); to 
discover "the things in the world we don't know about." Like 
her contemporary Conrad, Woolf offered no formal aesthetic 
theory, but her most influential essays22 clearly delineate her 
engagement with capturing a reality lying not beyond the grasp 
of mundane experience but imbedded, even hidden within it— 
most famously, perhaps, in her image of life as "a luminous 
halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the 
beginning of consciousness to the end23." 
When Helen laughs at Rachel's profession of faith and 
accuses her of having led an unexamined life—"You're not a 
Christian. You've never thought what you are"—she is badly 
misreading her niece's comment. To be sure, Rachel is not a 
"Christian" in Helen's sense of a member of the 
21
 Bell writes, "In August, when she was at Manorbier, she 
had attacked that work which her Cambridge friends regarded 
practically as the gospel of their time: G.E. Moore's 
Principia Ethica. She had read it with some difficulty and 
great admiration. It is a little surprising that she should 
have so long postponed what was, one imagines, almost 
compulsory reading in Bloomsbury..." (145). 
22I am speaking primarily of "Modern Fiction" and "Mr. 
Bennett and Mrs. Brown" here. 
23Cf. The description in "Heart of Darkness" of the 
meaning of Marlow's tales emerging as "a glow brings out a 
haze, in the likeness of one of those misty haloes that 
sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of 
moonshine." 
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institutionalized Church; more importantly, however, Rachel is 
shown to think of little else but what she and those about her 
are. There is an important distinction implicit here between 
the natures of religion and philosophy. In common usage, 
"religion" implies belief (faith) in and worship of an 
omnipotent but unmanifested universal power. It is, of course, 
the existentialist contention of this study that that 
controlling force is absent; that we as individual men and 
women bear sole responsibility for our own conduct and fate. 
Rachel's thrice stated credo, then, is in the nature of a 
philosophy, which is defined by the need for understanding 
(the goal of questioning). Understanding is not innately an 
aspect of religion, hence "mystery" serves as one of 
religion's cognates. When Rachel's declaration provokes in her 
aunt a sense of the profound interrogative tenor of human 
experience—"And there are lots of other questions"—Helen 
backs away: "though perhaps we can't ask them yet." And Hewet, 
too, recognizes his essential impotence before the question: 
"The important questions, the really interesting ones. I doubt 
that one ever does ask them." What makes the visionary in turn 
distinctive from the philosopher is the manifestation of will: 
the insistence on structuring her existence upon the answers 
she perceives. 
Rachel's visionary nature, then, reveals itself in 
contradistinction to others' reticence: "Slow to accept the 
fact that only a very few things can be said even by people 
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who know each other well, (Rachel) insisted on knowing what 
(Hewet) meant." Like a neophyte Oedipus, Rachel will have out 
the truth whether it leads her into social awkwardness or into 
the grasp of an implacable fate. Woolf, in writing of Plato's 
dialogues, had acknowledged the sheer intellectual stamina 
required of the truth seeker: 
It is an exhausting process; to concentrate 
painfully upon the exact meaning of words; to judge 
what each admission involves; to follow intently, 
yet critically, the dwindling and changing of 
opinion as it hardens and intensifies into truth. 
(McNellie, 32) 
The scene, however, concludes with the intrusion of other 
members of the party (Rachel's question of Hewet thus 
remaining unanswered), an entrance which might recall images 
of Plato's "Allegory of the Cave": "But again the sunny earth 
in front of them was crossed by fantastic wavering figures, 
the shadows of men and women." 
Woolf's novel is rich with Platonic allusions and 
images24, suggesting, I feel, the tension between the two ways 
24While several of the book's key Platonic allusions will 
be incorporated into the main body of my argument, I will cite 
here a few others which illustrate my contention that even in 
her first novel Woolf was concerned with apprehending a 
reality transcending the "plain common sense" most immediately 
personified by Moore and his acolytes. In these passages, 
characters are seen watching a stream of people and objects 
pass before their eyes in a manner reminiscent of the 
prisoners of Plato's metaphorical cave. For example, early in 
the novel, as Helen and Ridley Ambrose are walking toward the 
Euphrosvne. Helen is overcome with emotion at the prospect of 
leaving her children behind. Wiping her eyes, she focuses upon 
the human parade of the opposite bank: "She saw also the 
arches of Waterloo Bridge and the carts moving across them, 
like the line of animals in a shooting gallery. They were seen 
blankly, but to see anything was of course to end her weeping 
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of being which form the conflict of visionary fictions: the 
life of the Cave, centered in an essentially passive and 
unexamined everyday experience; and that of the visionary 
realm of light, which is conducted, however, neither in the 
glow of an abstract "Form of the Good" nor in an Augustinian 
"Mind of God" but rather in the existential silence and shadow 
of a chaotic and indifferent universe. 
and begin to walk." However, Helen's reverie has in fact 
prepared her "to read" her fellow Londoners and perceive the 
void underlying the institutional patterns of civilization: 
the rich, the "bigoted workers," the poor, and tattered old 
men and women: "When one gave up seeing the beauty that 
clothed things, this was the skeleton beneath" (11-2). Again, 
during Rachel's illness, which approximates the experiencing 
of a metaphysical plane, Rachel is said to be "oblivious of 
the world outside, because it needed all her attention to 
follow the hot, red, quick sights which passed incessantly 
before her eyes" (340) . That the onset of her fever is 
associated with a reading of Comus and that the visions 
themselves are of trees, savages, the sea and high towers 
suggests the psychosexual roots of Rachel's illness. Earlier, 
in another scene with strong undertones of sexual frustration, 
Rachel finds "intolerable" the partially deaf Mrs. Paley's 
inability to understand others and flees into a hotel cul-de-
sac where she is confronted with more objects; set among 
Woolfs customary reference to a table and chair are a rusty 
inkstand, an ash-tray, an old French newspaper, and a pen with 
a broken nib, essentially objects of failed communication. For 
Rachel these objects represent "human lives. We're all asleep 
and dreaming," she concludes (257-58). Each of these Platonic 
allusions reveals the ordering structures of everyday life to 
be hiding the existential "beast" below. Helen's leaving of 
her children—no doubt with the best care available—is 
nonetheless associated with society's abandonment of the poor; 
Rachel's illness seems an attempt to elude marriage, perhaps 
civilization's key institution, yet one whose potential 
insidiousness is signaled by the "closet drama" Comus, a work 
whose sophistication "masks" a plot based on sexual bondage. 
Finally, the condition and isolation of the objects 
encountered in the hotel cul-de-sac belie both their 
ostensible purpose and the order and efficiency that a hotel 
should represent. "Things fall apart; the center cannot hold." 
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The most powerful evocation of the Platonic 
underpinnings of The Voyage Out is to be discovered in the 
visionary's signature experience of an existential moment. 
Lying at the thematic heart of the novel, Woolf's treatment of 
Rachel's awakening possesses the ring of autobiographical 
revelation and is a graphic treatment of the visionary 
consciousness' rejection of the passivity of the quotidian. It 
occurs at a Santa Marina church where the members of the 
English colony have gathered for their traditional services. 
Their voices, lifted in prayer, are described as "childlike 
babble": 
They felt themselves pathetically united and well-
disposed towards each other. As if the prayer were 
a torch applied to fuel, a smoke seemed to rise 
automatically and fill the place with the ghosts of 
innumerable services on innumerable Sunday mornings 
at home. Susan Warrington in particular was 
conscious of the sweetest sense of sisterhood, as 
she covered her face with her hands and saw slips 
of bent backs through the chinks between her 
fingers. Her emotions rose calmly and evenly, 
approving of herself and of life at the same time. 
Here Woolf images religion as a source of self-affirmation, 
not self-awareness; passivity, not integration. The emphasis 
is upon the service as a source of tradition, which is to say 
as an institution whose raison d'etre is the imposition of an 
(ersatz) order and teleology on that which is formless and 
without meaning. Thus the diction of "smoke" and "ghosts" 
suggests death, not renewed life. Susan's self-impaired vision 
and the parishioners' bent backs further imply the blindness 
and submissiveness of their ontological state. This is the 
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realm of Sartre's "Les Saluds," the stinkers, those who wallow 
in their self-satisfaction, devoid of even the possibility of 
action or complaint25. And it is the realm, too, of the 
nineteenth century Copenhagen bourgeoisie, whom Kierkegaard 
reviled for their complacency and self-satisfaction, a 
critique which rendered him a virtual outcast and object of 
ridicule for much of his adult life. 
The accuracy of this harsh appraisal is evident when this 
spirit of self-approbation is shattered by the reading of the 
psalm, the actual words of the spiritual text: 
But having created this peaceful atmosphere Mr. Bax 
suddenly turned the page and read a psalm. Though 
he read it with no change of voice the mood was 
broken. 
"Be merciful unto me, 0 God," he read, "for 
man goeth about to devour me: he is daily fighting 
and troubling me....They daily mistake my words: 
all that they imagine is to do me evil. They hold 
all together and hold themselves close....Break 
their teeth, 0 God, in their mouths; smite the jaw-
bones of the lions, 0 Lord; let them fall away like 
water that runneth apace; and when they shoot their 
arrows let them be rooted out." 
The word of God here is the antithesis of the order and 
harmony fabricated by the parishioners. It presents a 
Darwinian nightmare predicated, as Derrida might have it, upon 
the failure of the "postal principle": "they daily mistake my 
words." As if to ironically emphasize his confusion, the 
biblical speaker paradoxically calls upon the Lord for 
25Sartre conceived this category in response to what he 
perceived as the moral decay and ineffectualness of the French 
bourgeoisie in general and the Popular Front government in 
particular in responding to the threatening tide of the 30's. 
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retribution upon his enemies at the same time he invokes 
divine mercy, all in predatory oral images—"devour," "teeth," 
"jaw-bones"—which reduce humankind's distinctive gift for 
language to a predatory rumble. 
Susan Warrington's response to the reading of the 
biblical passage is an acute rendering of the quotidian mind 
confronted with an uncongenial view of reality: 
Nothing in Susan's experience at all corresponded 
with this, and as she had no love of language she 
had ceased to attend to such remarks, although she 
followed them with the same kind of mechanical 
respect with which she heard many of Lear's 
speeches read aloud. Her mind was still serene and 
really occupied with praise of her own nature and 
praise of God—that is of the solemn and 
satisfactory order of the world. 
It is an essentially Augustan view of life: one which praises 
and promotes a self-serving and self-preserving conception of 
order (Cf. Heller's conception of "particularity) and meaning 
that neatly ignores life's encroaching shadows. Indeed, I did 
not use the adjective "Darwinian" above lightly. It will be 
recalled that Darwin's special contribution to our 
understanding of our species and its place in the cosmic 
scheme was not strictly speaking in the realm of evolution, a 
concept that had already gained considerable currency by the 
publication of Origin of the Species, but rather in his 
attribution of that process to the twin forces of "natural 
selection from accidental variations." It was the randomness 
implicit in "accidental variations" that posited the absence 
of teleology, meaning and order. Thus while the biblical 
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passage is sanctioned by the institution of the Church and 
passively if not indifferently accepted by its members as a 
part of God's word, its analysis in fact renders the universe 
as a cosmic crap shoot played out by the bewildered and 
perplexed who in effect seek in their God not a principle of 
universal purpose but instead a bigger gun with which to smash 
the Other—survival of the fittest. 
The repression that Susan Warrington practices is only 
one strategy for escaping the implications of vision. The rest 
of the congregation feels an "inconvenience (at) the sudden 
intrusion of this old savage. They looked more secular and 
critical as they listened to the ravings of the old black man 
with a cloth round his loins cursing with vehement gesture by 
a camp fire in the desert." The strategy here is suppression; 
the visceral faith of a Job or an Abraham is demeaned, reduced 
to caricature through rendering the desert prophet a "savage"; 
his teachings "ravings." He becomes outsider, Other, madman. 
Even the idea of Christ is eviscerated, his passion and 
vehemence rendered vapid: 
Then they returned to the New Testament and the sad 
and beautiful figure of Christ. While Christ spoke 
they made another effort to fit his interpretation 
of life upon the lives they lived, but as they were 
all different, some practical, some ambitious, some 
stupid, some wild and experimental, some in love, 
and some long past any feeling except a feeling of 
comfort, they did very different things with the 
words of Christ. 
What is represented here is nothing so positive as a reader-
response spirituality. Rather than uniting human beings 
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through their common essence, religion ironically reinforces 
their isolated existence. Nor is this a militant, contemptuous 
individuality but rather one marked by intellectual, moral, 
and spiritual torpor and passivity: 
From their faces it seemed that for the most part 
they made no effort at all, and, recumbent as it 
were, accepted the ideas that the words gave as 
representing goodness, in the same way, no doubt, 
as one of those industrious needlewoman had 
accepted the bright ugly pattern on her mat as 
representing beauty. 
Thus are "goodness" and "beauty"—religion and art—also 
effectively eviscerated by the quotidian mind. 
This meaning is evident in Susan's "mechanical" response 
to the reading just as her disinterest in language reflects 
the speaker's own verbal ineffectuality. Religion, art, 
philosophy, anything that might move one toward unfamiliar 
ontological "ground" must be attended to "mechanically," its 
implications for being ignored. Michael Novak associates this 
way of life with the symbol-making capacity of human beings, 
the "poor tools" by which they "break down the flood of 
experience, selecting and distorting even as they make it 
manageable." The world of symbols—among which are numbered 
institutions like the church—represent humankind's "nostalgia 
for order and clarity" (49-50). But nostalgia, while offering 
a pleasant emotional interlude, is incapable of sustaining us 
in the present. 
Opposed to and preceding the need to create symbols, 
which is essentially the realm of the quotidian, is the 
166 
visionary impulse to question, which, in Novak's analysis, 
disrupts the ordering capacity of symbols in two ways: "It 
directs attention to new experience, in unknown and often 
threatening areas, and it directs attention to distortions, 
contradictions, and limitations in our perceptions and our 
theories" (50). The question, Novak suggests, represents the 
"fertile source of the experience of nothingness" (115) and 
therefore of humankind's ontological anxiety as well: 
The source of the experience of nothingness lies in 
the deepest recesses of human consciousness, in its 
irrepressible tendency to ask questions. The 
necessary condition for the experience of 
nothingness is that everything can be questioned. 
Whatever the presuppositions of a culture or a way 
of life, questions can be addressed against them 
and other alternatives can be imagined. Whatever 
the massive solidity of institutions, cultural 
forms, or basic symbols, accurately placed 
questions can shatter their claims upon us. The 
drive to ask questions is the most persistent and 
basic drive of human consciousness. It is the 
principle of the experience of nothingness. By 
exercising that drive, we come to doubt the 
definitions of the real, the true, and the good 
that our culture presents to us. Without this 
drive, cultural change would not be possible. What 
was sacred once would for all time be locked in 
unchanging sacredness. (14) 
With this in mind, I wish to now examine the thematic 
core of The Voyage Out. Rachel's existential moment, which 
culminates her innate drive to question, offers a signature 
example of Platonic enlightenment, and functions as a 
paradoxical experience of alienation and inclusion. As with 
the visionaries we have already considered, Rachel's epiphany 
seems spontaneous, almost a gift of grace: 
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Whatever the reason might be, for the first time in 
her life, instead of slipping at once into some 
curious pleasant cloud of emotion, too familiar to 
be considered, Rachel listened critically to what 
was being said. By the time they had swung in an 
irregular way from prayer to psalm, from psalm to 
history, from history to poetry, and Mr. Bax was 
giving out his text, she was in a state of acute 
discomfort. Such was the discomfort she felt when 
she was forced to sit through an unsatisfactory 
piece of music badly played. Tantalized, enraged by 
the clumsy insensitiveness of the conductor, who 
put the stress on the wrong places, and annoyed by 
the vast flock of the audience tamely praising and 
acquiescing without knowing or caring, so she was 
now tantalized and enraged, only here, with eyes 
half shut and lips pursed together, the atmosphere 
of forced solemnity increased her anger. 
The onset of Rachel's awakening manifests itself in terms of 
critical attention, which is to say "questioning," and 
questioning's end product: discomfort. This, then, is a mirror 
image of the quotidian state of "tame acquiescence" and 
comfort observed among her fellow worshipers. The "story," she 
clearly senses, is not being properly told; the prayers, 
psalms, history and poetry which are paraded before these 
prisoners are perceived by Rachel as mere shadows, shabby 
mock-ups of a profounder truth. Rachel is preparing to leave 
the cave: 
All round her were people pretending to feel what 
they did not feel, while somewhere above her 
floated the idea which they could none of them 
grasp, which they pretended to grasp, always 
escaping out of reach, a beautiful idea, an idea 
like a butterfly. One after another, vast and hard 
and cold, appeared to her the churches all over the 
world where this blundering effort and 
misunderstanding were perpetually going on, great 
buildings, filled with innumerable men and women, 
not seeing clearly, who finally gave up the effort 
to see, and relapsed tamely into praise and 
acquiescence, half-shutting their eyes and pursing 
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their lips. The thought had the same kind of 
physical discomfort that is caused by a film always 
coming between the eyes and the printed page. She 
did her best to brush away the film and to conceive 
something to be worshipped as the service went on, 
but failed, always misled by the voice of Mr. Bax 
saying things which misrepresented the idea, and by 
the patter of having inexpressive human voices 
falling round her like damp leaves. The effort was 
tiring and dispiriting. 
A simple transposition in this passage of "cave" for "church" 
reveals Woolf's philosophical lineage here. These are the 
Platonic "prisoners" united by a Jamesian "healthy-
mindedness"; having surrendered their conscious vigilance, 
they have embraced "passivity, not activity; relaxation, not 
intentness"; and "resign(ed) the care of (their) destiny to 
higher powers" (James, 110). 
The awakening which Rachel experiences is, of course, 
anything but spontaneous. The interrogative habit of mind 
which I have suggested as Rachel's defining characteristic 
renders her epiphany a culmination, but in its disparity 
between cause and effect and in the manifestly spiritual 
affects of the experience, surely it adheres to Baja's 
definition of epiphany26. But, as always, where the epiphany 
offers spiritual sustenance and enlightenment, the existential 
moment reveals the destructive element of nothingness. 
26Beja defines epiphany as "a sudden spiritual 
manifestation whether from some object, scene, event, or 
memorable phase of the mind—the manifestation being out of 
proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance 
of whatever produces it" (18). 
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But I feel that what is most significant about the 
passage is Woolf's metaphorical use of reading as a way of 
distinguishing between vision and blindness; that is, Rachel's 
vision of a universe of Platonic "caves" housing their 
multitudes of passive prisoners is equated with the "physical 
discomfort that is caused by a film always coming between the 
eyes and the printed page." Similarly, the passion and the 
Platonic allusion that distinguish Rachel's "reading" of her 
fellow parishioners/prisoners is present in her encounter with 
literary texts. For example, ensconced in her room in Santa 
Marina, Rachel engages books with precisely the intensity that 
Woolf had noted in the argumentation of Platonic dialogues: 
"Her whole body was constrained by the working of her mind," 
and she reads with "the curious literalness of one to whom 
written sentences are unfamiliar, and handling words as though 
they were made of wood, separately of great importance, and 
possessed of shapes like tables or chairs" (123-4). Rachel, 
that is, is presented as both naive and ideal reader. She 
approaches/sees the text as she approaches/lives her life: 
with an honesty and integrity that grants the actions (ideas, 
utterances, intentions) of others an inherent seriousness 
worthy of both her intellectual and ontological engagement. By 
imaging her way of reading in terms of Platonic ideal forms, 
Woolf simultaneously implies ways of reading, seeing, and, 
especially, being. Rachel shuts her book with "a deep breath, 
expressive of the wonder which always marks the transition 
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from the imaginary world to the real world." But for Rachel 
this obvious line of demarcation is less than impenetrable. 
Her reading matter here, Ibsen, always has the effect of 
rendering Rachel the most vivid thing in her mental landscape; 
moreover, "she acted (his plays) for days at a time, greatly 
to Helen's amusement27. It is Helen who seeks to supply Rachel 
with books as, ironically, a stimulus to thought and a balance 
to her niece's immersion in music. But where Helen "would have 
suggested Defoe, Maupassant, or some spacious chronicle of 
family life, Rachel chose modern books...which were tokens in 
her aunts' eyes of harsh wrangling and disputes about facts 
which had no such importance as the moderns claimed for them" 
(124). 
Clearly, I feel, Woolf is intimating and validating a 
direct link here between how and what we read, and how we 
27While the particular work is unidentified here, an 
earlier draft had, not surprisingly, Rachel reading A Doll's 
House. Rachel's affinity for Ibsen becomes even clearer 
through remarks the playwright made as he was beginning the 
play: 
"...there are two kinds of spiritual law, two kinds 
of conscience, one in man, and another, altogether 
different, in woman. They do not understand each 
other; but in practical life the woman is judged by 
man's law as though she were not a woman but a man. 
The wife in the play ends by having no idea of what 
is right or wrong; natural feeling on the one hand, 
belief in authority on the other, have altogether 
bewildered her. A woman cannot be herself in the 
society of the present day, which is exclusively 
masculine society, with laws framed by men and with 
a judicial system that judges feminine conduct from 
a masculine point of view" (Marden, 8, emphasis 
mine). 
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live. While Helen reacts with "great amusement" to Rachel's 
assuming "for days at a time" the attitudes and views of 
literary heroines, the meticulousness and passion that Rachel 
brings to her interaction with texts carries over to her 
everyday life, allowing her "to come to conclusions, which had 
to be remodelled according to the adventures of the 
day...leaving always a small grain of belief behind them." 
Like Leda ravaged by Zeus, Rachel is able to put on the 
knowledge of every book she wrestles with. She is, as Carol 
Christ observed, seeking out those stories by which she may 
understand and give shape to her life. 
This interaction between reading and being is illustrated 
in the scene following Rachel's closing of the text. "The 
exercise of reading (has) left her mind expanding and 
contracting like the mainspring of a clock." As with her 
reaction to her aunts quoted above and to her reading, the 
commonplace rhythms of everyday life are made strange to 
Rachel: 
...she began to raise her first finger and to let 
it fall on the arm of her chair so as to bring back 
to herself some consciousness of her own existence. 
She was next overcome by the unspeakable queerness 
of the fact that she should be sitting in an arm-
chair, in the morning, in the middle of the world. 
Who were the people moving in the house—moving 
things from one place to another? And life, what 
was that? It was only a light passing over the 
surface and vanishing, as in time she would vanish, 
though the furniture in the room would remain. Her 
dissolution became so complete that she could not 
raise her finger any more, and sat perfectly still, 
listening and looking at the same spot. It became 
stranger and stranger. She was overcome with awe 
that things should exist at all....She forgot that 
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she had any fingers to raise.. .The things that 
existed were so immense and so desolate...She 
continued to be conscious of these vast masses of 
substance for a long stretch of time, the clock 
still ticking in the midst of the universal 
silence. 
In its melding of dread and awe; its anticipation of 
Heideggar's "Why is there something; why is there not 
nothing?"; and its emphasis upon time, space and silence, this 
passage offers a classic example of existential anguish of 
being, whose catalyst is Rachel's reading of the experience, 
awakening and revolution of Nora Helmer28. 
Indeed, I believe that The Voyage Out is a novel about 
books and reading; Woolf's references to various literary 
works are at once legion and integral to her artistic aims. 
Beverly Ann Schlack contends that Woolf's use of literary 
allusion is "an organic part of the growth of her 
characterizations and of the development of the novel's 
thematic structure..."; moreover, it was a strategy which 
"came naturally" and was "a sheer habit of mind" to Woolf 
28There is at least one other important allusion working 
here. In Varieties of Religious Experience James notes, "I 
have no doubt whatever that most people live, whether 
physically, intellectually, or morally, in a very restricted 
circle of their potential being. They make use of a very small 
portion of their possible consciousness, and of their soul's 
resources in general, much like a man who, out of whole bodily 
organism, should get a habit of using and moving only his 
little finger. Great emergencies and crises show us how much 
greater our vital resources are than we had supposed" 
(emphasis mine). While Woolf met (and was alternately amused 
and terrified by) Henry, I have been unable to ascertain 
whether she was familiar with William James's work. In any 
event, the thematic correspondences of the two remain 
striking. 
173 
("The Novelist's Voyage..." 317-18) . More significant than the 
role it plays in revealing character to the reader, I feel, is 
the underlying assumption of Woolf's art of allusion: that the 
self is in no small part created by reading—both by what one 
reads and by how one reads29. 
As if living without reading were inconceivable to 
Woolf, virtually all her characters are readers. Indeed, it is 
through her minor characters that Woolf seeks to reflect some 
uses to which literature is put. This is clear in the 
juxtaposition of the literary habits of Miss Allan, an English 
teacher, and Susan Warrington, who functions as a virtual 
quotidian antithesis of Rachel. The former is seen reading 
Wordsworth's Prelude because "she always read The Prelude 
abroad, and partly because she was engaged in writing a short 
Primer of English Literature—Beowulf to Swinburne—which 
would have a paragraph on Wordsworth" (103). Woolf's focus 
then melds into Susan's adjoining room where, realizing she 
has neglected her diary, Susan leaps from bed and proceeds "to 
write in the square ugly hand of a mature child, as she wrote 
daily year after year, keeping the diaries, though she seldom 
looked at them." Her entries chronicle the rhythms of 
quotidian life: people met, weather, appointments kept, and 
concludes with "Mem. ask about damp sheets" (104-05). 
Both women utilize their reading and writing as a device 
to create a schematic life: to impose a desperate order and 
29Cf. Carol Christ's comment on p. 2. 
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teleology upon lives which are formless and adrift. Like the 
passive parishioners who trigger Rachel's existential moment, 
Susan's diary, nominally a device for reflection, and Miss 
Allan's pursuit of a spiritual autobiography, have devolved 
into habitual, mechanical exercises characterized by reductive 
summary and ordering of experience rather than dynamic 
engagement with it. Theirs is indeed a precarious and 
desperate game: as long as they can sustain the illusion of 
order and meaning both women can retire "contentedly" and 
"comfortably"; yet, we are later told, "the mere glimpse of a 
world where dinner could be disregarded, or the table moved 
one inch from its accustomed place, filled (Miss Allan) with 
fears for her own stability" (129). 
The pervasiveness of what I might dare to call the "wrong 
way" to read—that is the failure to link literature and 
living—is further reflected in the character of Ridley 
Ambrose, a classics scholar. Engaged in editing Pindar's odes, 
Ambrose is imaged as "an idol... deeply encircled by books," a 
device by which he effectively separates himself from being in 
the world while simultaneously imposing an ordering rhythm 
upon the microcosm of his home: "...every one was conscious 
that by observing certain rules, such as punctuality and 
quiet, by cooking well, and performing other small duties, one 
ode after another was satisfactorily restored, and they 
themselves shared the continuity of the scholar's life." But 
Woolf accentuates that the salvaging of the odes produces 
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neither communication nor revelation: "Unfortunately, as age 
puts one barrier between human beings, and learning another, 
and sex a third, Mr. Ambrose in his study was some thousand 
miles distant from the nearest human being, who in this 
household was inevitably a woman." On cue, Rachel enters his 
study, seeking Gibbon's History, which had been recommended by 
Hirst. Once she breaks through her uncle's absorption, Rachel 
is literally led by the arm about the study as Ambrose 
outlines an exclusively patriarchal course of study: 
"Plato...and Jorrocks...Sophocles, Swift...You should read 
Balzac. Then we come to Wordsworth and Coleridge. Pope, 
Johnson, Addison, Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats. One thing leads 
to another." 
Thus, for all his apparent benevolence and intellect, 
Ambrose denies or fails to recognize the efficacy of texts 
which would name and speak to Rachel's condition. He would 
deny her her story. Indeed, for Ambrose the ultimate value of 
literature is restricted to the Greeks: "But what's the use of 
reading if you don't read Greek30?" Woolf shared his 
admiration; it is among the heroes and heroines of Greek 
literature, Woolf observes, that we discover the "original 
human being" (McNeillie, 27). But she knows, too, how 
30Classical Greek culture, of course, was no more 
inclusive of women than most others in the West, largely 
banning them, for example, from attending—much less 
appearing in—the drama competitions at the public 
amphitheaters, which played such a central role in Greek civic 
and cultural life. 
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precarious are our attempts to ascertain the rhythms and 
pronunciation of the language, to grasp its inherent 
ambiguities. But for all that, Woolf sees truth as Rachel had 
stated it in her "credo"—as "various," capable of 
apprehending us in various guises: "it is not with the 
intellect alone that we perceive (truth)" (32). Such literary 
truth "is just on the far side of language. It is the meaning 
which in moments of astonishing excitement and stress we 
perceive in our minds without words" (31). And, as if she were 
commenting directly upon Ambrose, Woolf reminds us that truth 
will not be realized apart from others: "It is not to the 
cloistered disciplinarian mortifying himself in solitude that 
we are to turn, but to the well-sunned nature, the man who 
practices the art of living to the best advantage, so that 
nothing is stunted but some things are permanently more 
valuable than others" (33). 
The balance that Woolf suggests above is perverted 
through the quotidian mind's counsel of proportion and reason, 
which are code words for blindness and withdrawal. Helen sees 
her fostering of Rachel's quotidian growth as one of 
facilitating her becoming "a reasonable person" (83) and 
disabusing her of her "absurd...ideas about life" (97, 
emphasis mine). Faced with Rachel's terror and confusion over 
being kissed by Richard Dalloway during the voyage, Helen 
advises that Rachel not think about the incident, that it is 
"a pity...to get things out of proportion," that one must 
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"take things as they are." Rachel, however, typically insists 
that she will "think about it all day and all night until I 
find out exactly what it does mean." Her insistent questioning 
reveals to her the predatory existence imaged in Mr. Bax's 
sermon: "...she saw her life for the first time as a creeping 
hedged-in thing, driven cautiously between two walls, here 
turned aside, there plunged in darkness, made dull and 
crippled for ever—her life that was the only chance she had— 
the short season between two silences" (80-2). Similarly, 
Terence seeks to persuade her that "there was an order, a 
pattern which made life reasonable...for sometimes it seemed 
possible to understand why things happened as they did." In 
turn, Rachel brings to her relationship with Terence 
"curiosity and sensitiveness of perception"—question and 
vision—gifts against which, Terence realizes, the experience 
which she lacks would only lend a "ridiculous formal balance, 
like that of a drilled dog in the street" (300). 
Indeed, the expression "keeping one's balance," as a 
metaphor for sanity reminds us of how much a learned response 
conventional conceptions of reality and reason are31. Such 
balance is anathema to the visionary. The "common wisdom" 
which characters like Helen and Terence seek to impart to 
Rachel is a form of indoctrination or absorption, a way of 
31Indeed, at the time of the publication of The Voyage 
Out, T.S. Eliot was arguing just this point in his doctoral 
dissertation. His thesis concluded with the observation that 
"reality is a convention," the culmination of a successful 
"theory." 
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preparing her to become like them, which can only be 
accomplished through stripping Rachel of her unique vision. 
That attack comes almost necessarily through the body, the 
instrument of perception. Therefore Richard's kiss, which in 
Adamic fashion he neatly attributes to Rachel's having 
"tempted" him, is a prelude to Terence's desire to possess her 
in marriage in the same manner as the nightmares engendered by 
Dalloway's assault foreshadow the fever—and the same 
recurrent subterranean nightmare32—which paradoxically 
destroys and preserves Rachel's body. In essence, her death 
signifies her refusal to become objectified as the repository 
of male passion. 
Similar to its preoccupation with proportion and balance, 
the quotidian mind, as perhaps best exemplified by Miss Allan 
and Susan Warrington, is concerned with the passage of events, 
their chronology, not their significance or kairos33. "One 
thing follows another" becomes their refrain. We have seen 
this pattern present in the church service which moves 
mechanically from "prayer to psalm, from psalm to history, 
from history to poetry..." as well as in Ambrose's recitation 
of patriarchal authors: "One thing follows another." 
Similarly, Richard Dalloway's conception of English history is 
3ZCf. pp. 77 and 331. 
33The terms "chronos/kairos" are from the Greek and serve 
to delineate the two principal ways of viewing time in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. In so doing, we are again 
reminded of the identic link between visionaries and Jews. 
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characterized by its "continuity": King following King, Prime 
Minister Prime Minister, and Law..." (51)34. Willoughby Vinrace 
whines at the prospect of losing control of his daughter: "We 
go on year after year without talking about these 
things.... But it's better so" (85). The phrase's prominence 
leaves little doubt of the juxtaposition Woolf sought to 
create. Indeed, Rachel herself takes up this same refrain in 
naming the source of her inability to achieve a genuine 
intimacy with others: "The lives of these people...the 
aimlessness, the way they live. One goes from one to another, 
and it's all the same. One never gets what one wants out of 
any of them" (263) . When Arthur Venning declares his affection 
for Susan, he couches his speech in dialectical terms of 
blindness and vision, emptiness and meaning, concluding in a 
Platonic image: 
3ADalloway's "vision of English history"—a kind of 
quotidian epiphany—comes upon him during a conversation with 
Clarissa. He images the line of governmental conservative 
policy as a "lasso that opened and caught things, enormous 
chunks of the habitable world." The predatory image recalls 
the scene discussed earlier between him and Rachel. Clarissa 
responds admiringly to his conception, "You see round, where 
I only see there," but, of course, her awakening to the 
experience of nothingness and subsequent vision will occur in 
a later novel. Her distinction is nonetheless enlightening. 
Where Richard views humanity from afar, abstractly ("That's my 
business"), Clarissa connects with individuals as she does 
tentatively in The Voyage Out with Rachel and more profoundly 
in Mrs. Dalloway with Septimus Smith. The scene concludes 
when, again recalling his kissing of Rachel, Dalloway 
passionately kisses Clarissa, causing her to drop a letter she 
was writing. Dalloway then takes her pen and appropriates her 
text, adding a postscript. The juxtaposition of passion and 
(appropriated) pen offers an intriguing illustration of the 
query which opens The Madwoman in the Attic. 
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"Odd things happen to one," said Arthur. One goes 
along smoothly enough, one thing following another, 
and it's all very jolly and plain sailing, and you 
think you know all about it, and suddenly one 
doesn't know where one is a bit, and everything 
seems different from what it used to seem. Now to-
day, coming up that path, riding behind you, I 
seemed to see everything as if...as if it had a 
kind of meaning....It's because I love you." 
After the couple embraces passionately Arthur "looks as if he 
were trying to put things seen in a dream beside real things" 
(138-39). Indeed, his declaration that "everything seems 
different from what it used to seem" is a cogent illustration 
of Rachel's credo. Yet the meaning with which love has 
presumably imbued Arthur's existence is ironically deflated 
later in the novel during a narrative disquisition upon the 
state of long-term marriages: 
When two people have been married for years, they 
seem to become unconscious of each other's bodily 
presence so that they move as if alone, speak aloud 
things which they do not expect to be answered, and 
in general seem to experience all the comforts of 
solitude without its loneliness. 
Commentators often view this passage positively as reflecting 
the attainment of a certain level of balance and harmony 
between the self and another. However, that Woolf viewed such 
a relationship as a sham is illustrated through a later scene 
between Helen and Ridley. She overhears her husband's solitary 
exclamations in the next room—"'So it goes on year after 
year; I wish, I wish, I wish I could make an end of it,' to 
which she paid no attention" (195). While Venning's epiphany 
reminds us that vision is natural to our nature, the later 
181 
citations demonstrate the ease with which we discard its grace 
and assume a quotidian posture. 
It is further indicative of this quotidian 
perspective that despite the relative isolation and exotic 
nature of Santa Marina, most of its English community have 
mentally and spiritually transformed their hotel into an 
ersatz London and thus a veritable psychic barrier against the 
uncharted possibilities of the South American continent, 
which—like Conrad's jungle in Heart of Darkness—functions as 
the locus of the visionary and necessarily dark territories of 
the human mind. Therefore, even on the infrequent occasions 
when they venture outside their hotel, the English are 
assiduous in distancing themselves from the potentially 
unsettling effects of the experience. For example, when the 
expedition up Monte Rosa takes the travellers "higher and 
higher.. .separating them) from the world," each rider keeps 
"his eyes fixed on the hobbling curved form of the rider and 
donkey in front of him." Once at the summit, they are 
"overcome with wonder at "the immense space...and infinite 
distances of South America... .They felt themselves very small, 
and for some time no one said anything." Faced with tangible 
evidence of the contingency and insignificance of their 
existence, the quotidian pilgrims respond characteristically, 
one with a commonplace "Splendid," and Miss Allan through 
naming the points of the compass, thus exerting a tenuous 
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control over the implacability of nature (129-32) . After 
luncheon, the travellers disperse into groups: 
One of these parties was dominated by Hughling 
Elliot and Mrs. Thornbury, who, having both read 
the same books and considered the same questions, 
were now anxious to name the places beneath them 
and to hang upon them stores of information about 
navies and armies, political parties, natives and 
mineral products... (136). 
One is reminded of the passengers' reaction to the subsiding 
of the storm encountered by the Euphrosyne: "...the mind of 
men, which had been unmoored...once more attached itself to 
the old beliefs....After their view of the strange under-
world, inhabited by phantoms, people began to live among tea-
pots and loaves of bread with greater zest than ever" (72) . In 
the later passage, the complementary homogeneity and 
xenophobia of the quotidian scheme of life serves to reaffirm 
its adherents sense of reality while evading the darker, 
unnerving elements of vision. They, too, have their stories 
(of empire and exploitation), a closed canon which tolerates 
no heresies. 
That assurance and hegemony is shattered, however, when 
Rachel and Terence, Hirst and Helen agree to a second "voyage 
out," accompanying the Flushings on a river expedition to a 
native village. When the party stops enroute along the river, 
only Rachel and Terence penetrate the forest. Helen chides 
them: "There's everything here—everything. What will you gain 
by walking?" And Hirst bids them to "beware of snakes" (270). 
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It is instructive to recall Helen's indifferent attitude 
when the journey was proposed, an ennui that had drawn 
Rachel's wrath. Helen, however, had been reacting to her own 
existential vision, which resonates with Hirst's warning: 
Aimless, trivial, meaningless, oh no—what she had 
seen at tea made it impossible for her to believe 
that. The little jokes, the chatter, the inanities 
of the afternoon had shrivelled up before her eyes. 
Underneath the likings and spites, the coming 
togethers and partings, great things were 
happening—terrible things, because they were so 
great. Her sense of safety was shaken, as if 
beneath twigs and dead leaves she had seen the 
movement of a snake. It seemed to her that a 
moment's respite was allowed, a moment's make-
believe, and then again the profound and reasonless 
law asserted itself, moulding them all to its 
liking, making and destroying. (263) 
Helen, too, has seen but has made an existential choice to 
draw back from the abyss. She will instead watch with a 
mounting horror as Rachel attempts to traverse its rim. 
Clearly, those who remain on the shore represent the 
schematic consciousness. They are defined by their refusal to 
cross boundaries35, and by their fervor to maintain the 
illusory safety of proportion and reason. Naremore sees The 
Voyage Out as a "wavering between two kinds of experience: the 
rational, orderly, mannered world of regular proportions and 
social relationships, and the deeper world of intense feeling 
where individuals lose their sense of separateness and blend 
with nature." He labels this latter world "feminine" and 
35Ironically, Hirst observes of the hotel's guests: "You 
could draw circles round the whole lot of them, and they'd 
never stray outside" (107). 
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suggests, correctly, that, because it is "more real and 
intense than ordinary life," because, moreover, it is "what 
ordinary life is all about" that this is the world which 
attracts Woolf. 
This intensity and reality are not, to be sure, 
reassuring. The forest is a setting, Hirst complains, that 
"makes one awfully queer....These trees get on one's nerves— 
it's all so crazy. God's undoubtedly mad. What sane person 
could have conceived a wilderness like this, and peopled it 
with apes and alligators? I should go mad if I lived here— 
raving mad" (275). Hirst's response is far removed from the 
order and purpose posited in Aquinas's argument from design 
but Hirst's understanding is founded in experience, not 
reason. 
As Rachel and Terence move into the forest, the sounds of 
"the ordinary world" are replaced by those suggesting that 
they are walking "at the bottom of the sea." The primordial 
image prepares us for the visionary's return to the elemental, 
which will culminate in the their arrival at the village and 
Rachel's subsequent death36. As part of that experience, the 
36The numerous manifestations in visionary texts of this 
confrontation with the elemental were outlined in my first 
chapter. Their function is to serve as objective correlatives 
of the futility of humankind's attempts to at once imbue our 
existence with meaning and to separate ourselves from our 
primal—and necessarily destructive—instincts. This 
particular sea image foreshadows Rachel's fatal fever: 
She saw nothing and heard nothing but a faint 
booming sound, which was the sound of the sea 
rolling over her head. While all her tormentors 
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couple must negotiate a critical confrontation between 
emotions and words. Because they live in a world where words 
often function to block emotion, they need to virtually 
recreate the process of truthful communication in order to 
give shape to the reality of their incipient emotion37: 
"Does this frighten you?" Terence asked when 
the sound of fruit falling had completely died 
away. 
"No," she answered. "I like it." 
She repeated "I like it." ...There was another 
pause. 
"You like being with me?" Terence asked. 
"Yes, with you," she replied. 
He was silent for a moment. Silence seemed to 
have fallen upon the world. 
"That is what I have felt ever since I knew 
you," he replied. "We are happy together." He did 
not seem to be speaking, or she to be hearing. 
"Very happy," she answered. 
They continued to walk for some time in 
silence. Their steps unconsciously quickened. 
"We love each other," Terence said. 
"We love each other," she repeated. 
The silence was then broken by their voices 
which joined in tones of strange unfamiliar sound 
which formed no words. (271) 
Naremore suggests that the rhythms of this unusual passage are 
an attempt by Woolf to capture "the tentative conversation of 
lovers as they experience the sexual act," just as its 
"dimness and depth" signal Woolfs "more intense and 
thought that she was dead, she was not dead, but 
curled up at the bottom of the sea. There she lay, 
sometimes seeing darkness, sometimes light, while 
every now and then someone turned her over at the 
bottom of the sea" (341). 
37Naremore observes that in Woolf's treatment of 
experience, "words seem at times superfluous, sometimes even 
false to the experience of something that is nonverbal" (37). 
That "something that is nonverbal," I would suggest, might 
often be labeled as visionary experience. 
186 
meaningful states of feeling" (48-9). That the couple has, in 
fact, consummated their relationship would be consistent with 
the book's increasing emphasis on the crossing of borders. 
However, Rachel's apparently spontaneous "Terrible—terrible" 
reflects her recognition of the elemental terror of the human 
condition and of the fragility—perhaps the futility—of our 
attempts at sexual or verbal communion with one another38, of 
the price one pays for transgressing those borders39. 
When the couple returns to the main party, their 
dialectical sincerity is contrasted with the "little 
meaningless words" spoken by Mr. Flushing, who is "flowing on, 
now about his wife, now about art, now about the future of the 
country...," which is to say, speaking of one thing after 
another (276). Hearing again the cadences of the quotidian 
38Cf. Helen's vision cited above. It is also worth noting 
that Rachel's comment here had been prepared for in chapter 
thirteen where her contemplation of an ur-question—"What is 
it to be in love?"—leaves her "awed by the discovery of a 
terrible possibility in life." The result of her visionary 
reflection upon the implications of love (the quotidian mind 
would trivialize the emotion or eviscerate its darker 
meanings) has "each word (of her question) seem(ing) to shove 
itself out into an unknown sea." Language, as ever, is 
rendered impotent before such questions. 
390ne of the most powerful examples of the wages of such 
"transgression" is accomplished through the juxtaposition of 
two apparently unrelated scenes. The first is Hewet's 
observation that a chicken can be killed by drawing a circle 
around it; the implication, of course, being that the bird is 
too passive to break through the line. Later, Rachel 
experiences "the other side of hotel life" when she 
unexpectedly observes a chicken being chased down in order to 
be killed and prepared for the guests' dinner. (Cf. the 
coyotes in "The Brink of Darkness.") 
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world, Rachel asks of her experience with Terence, "Is it 
true, or is it a dream?" 
The Platonic allusion is carried forward as the boat 
approaches the native village. They pass a clearing that had 
once been the location of the hut of the explorer Mackenzie, 
"the man who went farther inland than anyone's been yet." As 
if in response to his stimulus, Rachel slips into a state of 
pure being, separated not only from the everyday world but 
also, Woolf suggests syntactically, from her own physical 
senses: 
The eyes of Rachel saw nothing. Yellow and green 
shapes did, it is true, pass before them, but she 
only knew that one was large and another small; she 
did not know that they were trees. These directions 
to look here and there irritated her, as 
interruptions irritate a person absorbed in 
thought, although she was not thinking of anything. 
(277) 
Rachel's trance-like state is mirrored during the 
Europeans' arrival at the Indian village whose "soft 
instinctive people" make the visitors feel like "tight-coated 
soldiers." The native women watch with the "motionless 
inexpressive gaze of those removed from each other far, far 
beyond the plunge of speech." The primal quality of the scene 
fills Rachel and Hewet with a sense of insignificance: "'So it 
would go on for ever and ever,' she said, 'those women sitting 
under the trees, the trees and the river'" (285). The trees 
and river function both as symbols of fertility and 
permanence, linking the primordial stream to Rachel's vision 
of the eternal nature of the native women: 
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Since the time of Elizabeth very few people had 
seen the river, and nothing had been done to change 
its appearance from what it was in the eyes of the 
Elizabethan voyagers. The time of Elizabeth was 
distant from the present time by a moment of space 
compared with the ages which had passed since the 
water had run between those banks, and the green 
thickets swarmed there, and the small trees grown 
to huge wrinkled trees in solitude. Changing only 
with the change of the sun and the clouds, the 
waving green mass had stood there for century after 
century, and the water had run between its banks 
ceaselessly, sometimes washing away earth and 
sometimes the branches of trees, while in other 
parts of the world one town had risen upon the 
ruins of another town, and the men in the towns had 
become more and more articulate and unlike each 
other. (264) 
Woolf's comment upon the talk that flies among the Europeans 
in the microcosm of Santa Marina ("Words crossed the darkness 
but, not knowing where they fell, seemed to lack energy and 
substance" 286) perceives language's very sophistication as 
ironically delineating our separateness, isolation, and 
impotence: knowledge reveals nothingness; civilization is 
built upon civilization, thought upon thought, one thing 
follows another, culminating in, most infamously, the most 
civilized nation in history fostering the Nazi holocaust. 
In contrast to this linguistic enervation, Rachel and, to 
a lesser extent, Hewet, are aligned with a transcendent nature 
"beyond the plunge of speech" where they are essentially 
relearning communication; their tentative happiness is tied 
specifically to their willingness to cross into nature's 
domain and generally to their willingness to question the 
tenets of quotidian consciousness. Yet such boldness exacts a 
piercing cost. It is this awareness that prompts Helen's 
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foreboding regarding the river journey. While her companions 
characteristically debate signs of European influence in the 
native jewelry, she chastises them for having come on the 
expedition at all, "for having ventured too far and exposed 
themselves" (286). It is perhaps inevitable that Rachel, 
having "advanced so far in the pursuit of wisdom," must 
undertake a final, all-consuming voyage of fire. 
Daiches has written of the connection between death and 
the revelation of character in Woolf's work: "Death for 
(Woolf) was always the illuminator of and commentator on life, 
so that an adequate insight into any character is only given 
if he is shown not only living but also in some connection 
with death" (12). Therefore, the fatal fever that Rachel 
contracts as (presumably) a result of her river voyage 
functions, like language, as a device to delineate our 
separateness: "...at intervals she made an effort to cross 
over into the ordinary world, but she found that her heat and 
discomfort had put a gulf between her world and the ordinary 
world which she could not bridge" (329) . Woolf's emphasis on 
the impotence of language to ameliorate our condition prepares 
us for the death, the ultimate separation, which Rachel's 
fever anticipates. Moreover, her death functions not as 
culmination to experience but rather as an emblem of the 
arbitrary and pernicious nature of existence. 
This is realized both individually and communally. First, 
Woolf employs the psychic awakening of Terence and Evelyn 
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Murgatroyd to validate Rachel's own visionary experience. That 
is, as Kurtz taught Marlow and Marlow Heart of Darkness's 
primary narrator, so, too, does Rachel effect ontological 
change in those around her and, presumably, in us as readers 
as well. Indeed, Hewet functions as something of a Shelleyan 
epipsyche to Rachel. Confronted by her deepening illness, he 
has revealed to him the malignant underside of life: 
He could not get used to his pain, it was a 
revelation to him. He had never realized before 
that underneath every action, underneath the life 
of every day, pain lies, quiescent, but ready to 
devour; he seemed to be able to see suffering, as 
if it were a fire, curling up over the edges of all 
action, eating away the lives of men and women. 
(344-45) 
Like Rachel, he begins to analyze the meaning and 
implications of words: "He thought for the first time with 
understanding of words which before had seemed to him empty: 
the struggle of life; the hardness of life. Now he knew for 
himself that life is hard and full of suffering." He 
excoriates the blindness of his quotidian existence: "How had 
he dared to live as he had lived, rapidly and carelessly, 
passing from one thing to another, loving Rachel as he had 
loved her? Never again would he feel secure; he would never 
believe in the stability of life, or forget what depths of 
pain lie beneath small happiness and feelings of content and 
safety (emphasis mine)." And finally he immerses himself in an 
elemental, existential vision: 
The light on his candle flickered over the boughs 
of a tree outside his window, and as the branch 
swayed in the darkness there came before his mind a 
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picture of all the world that lay outside his 
window; he thought of the immense river and the 
immense forest, the vast stretches of dry earth and 
the plains of the sea that encircled the earth; 
from the sea the sky rose steep and enormous, and 
the air washed profoundly between the sky and the 
sea. How vast and dark it must be tonight, lying 
exposed to the wind; and in all this great space it 
was curious to think how few the towns were, and 
how like little rings of light they were, scattered 
here and there among the swelling uncultivated 
folds of the world. And in those towns were little 
men and women, tiny men and women. Oh, it was 
absurd when one thought of it, to sit here in this 
little room suffering and caring. What did anything 
matter? The nearness of their bodies in this vast 
universe, and the minuteness of their bodies, 
seemed to him absurd and laughable. Nothing 
mattered, he repeated; they had no power, no hope. 
(344-45) 
One might discern in Terence's reaction to the encroaching, 
palpable presence of death traces of the privileged and the 
pampered, a want of fortitude, an agony of the moment which 
will be assuaged by the passage of time and the pleasures of 
everyday life. Such a reading, Woolf makes clear in the next 
chapter's opening emphasis upon the "empty air...profound 
silence...the little inarticulate cries of children or of the 
very poor, of people who were very weak or in pain," would 
indicate the reader's own failure of vision. For the primary 
intent of visionary fictions—as is reflected through their 
concern with the interrelations of existential awakenings, the 
experience of reading, and metaphysical insight—is always on 
the evolution of and response to our own vision of our 
existential condition. 
These concerns are carried forward in the responses of 
Mrs. Thornbury and Evelyn Murgatroyd to Rachel's death. Mrs. 
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Thornbury, the de facto matriarch of the English colony and, 
as such, a personification of tradition and good sense, learns 
of the news upon entering the hotel's lobby where the other 
guests have gathered. Like those who had experienced the storm 
aboard the Euphrosyne, and like Helen and Hewet before her, 
she, too, experiences an existential awakening to the 
implacable powers of her universe, one which is dressed in 
Platonic allusions. She watches her countrymen "standing 
beside the solid arm-chairs and tables," but the human beings 
look "unreal, or as people look who remain unconscious that 
some great explosion is about to take place beside them." 
However, the commonplace of death provokes "no explosion, and 
they went on standing by the chairs and tables." Now her 
vision penetrates through them "as though they were without 
substance," and sees instead "the figure of the dead lying 
still in the dark beneath the sheets." It is there that 
reality resides in a world that now appears to her "strangely 
empty." 
Confronted with this vision of nothingness, Mrs. 
Thornbury totters on the brink of the abyss fabricating a 
desperate teleology: "And yet the older one grows...the more 
certain one becomes that there is a reason. How could one go 
on if there was no reason?...There must be a reason. It can't 
only be an accident. For it was an accident—it need never 
have happened... .But we must not let ourselves think of that." 
She wanders from room to room, guest to guest seeking meaning, 
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but the essential question remains: "There must be some reason 
why such things happen... .Only at first it was not easy to 
understand what it was." Ultimately, Mrs. Thornbury finds 
solace in an ethical utilitarianism, perhaps the epitome of 
rationalism: 
She thought very quickly and very clearly, and, 
looking back over all her experiences, tried to fit 
them into a kind of order. There was undoubtedly 
much suffering, much struggling, but, on the whole, 
surely there was a balance of happiness—surely 
order did prevail. 
The futility and speciousness of her attempts to recognize a 
cosmic balance of order and good is emphasized by her own 
recognition, as she seeks haven in the quotidian through a 
political discussion with her husband, that "every now and 
then what she was saying seemed to her oddly empty of 
meaning40." 
Woolf weighs Mrs. Thornbury's escape into the illusion of 
an ordered and benevolent universe against the emergence of an 
incipient vision in Evelyn Murgatroyd, who throughout the 
novel has sought a person or philosophy upon which she can 
shape her life. The others "keep up an elaborate conversation" 
as a way of deflecting Evelyn's obvious distress over Rachel's 
death. Evelyn will have none of it: "Why would people never 
talk about the things that mattered?" Indeed, in true 
40Cf. Richard Dalloway, a true politician, who, as he 
speaks with Rachel "lost consciousness of what he was saying" 
(68). Such passages imply Woolf's view of the essential 
unreality of practices and institutions like politics, which 
nominally are accorded the distinction of manifesting what is 
"real." 
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visionary fashion, her questions make the other guests "feel 
uncomfortable": 
"It seems so inexplicable," Evelyn continued. 
"Death, I mean. Why should she be dead, and not you 
or I? It was only a fortnight ago that she was with 
the rest of us. What d'you believe...D'you believe 
that things go on, that she's still somewhere—or 
d'you think it's simply a game—we crumble up to 
nothing when we die? I'm positive Rachel's not 
dead." (362) 
As if in support of her premonition, Rachel's spirit enters 
Evelyn's consciousness as she packs to return to England: 
"Suddenly the keen feeling of some one's personality, which 
things that they have owned or handled sometimes preserves, 
overcame her; she felt Rachel in the room with her." As the 
presence fades, Evelyn is left feeling "depressed and 
fatigued" beneath the burden of a distinctly interrogative 
consciousness: 
What had she done with her life? What future was 
there before her? What was make-believe, and what 
was real? Were these proposals and intimacies and 
adventures real, or was the contentment which she 
had seen on the faces of Susan and Rachel more real 
than anything she had ever felt? 
Faced with her own imminent proposal of marriage, Evelyn—like 
Rachel—is unsure of "exactly what I feel." When her suitor 
tells her that her presence has awakened for him "so many 
possibilities that I had never dreamed of," we might recall 
that it was just those possibilities which Rachel had labeled 
"terrible." And we sense that it is upon this knowledge that 
Evelyn backs away from the proposal which, prior to Rachel's 
"visitation", she had been resigned to accepting. Her body 
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left inviolable, her spirit infused with Rachel's example, 
Evelyn is left alone pondering her ur-questions: "What did 
matter then? What was the meaning of it all?" 
Like its penultimate chapter, The Voyage Out's final 
chapter sets forth a tone of cosmic foreboding. A silence and 
a feeling of "pressure and restraint" permeate the atmosphere 
of the hotel's dining room as a wind drives "waves of darkness 
across the earth," prelude to a "great confused ocean of air" 
which will deposit a brief but powerful storm. We are now 
clearly among the prisoners of Plato's cave as the guests 
huddle together in the great hall "far from the 
windows...(where) they could not see anything." With the 
storm's passing, a collective "comfortable sense of relief" is 
experienced; the guests, having faced manifestations of the 
fragility and contingency of their existences, react by naming 
the beast, "tell(ing) each other stories about great storms," 
and thereby distancing themselves from the destructive element 
of truth. 
Now comfortable in their familiar quotidian rhythms, the 
guests produce pastimes: chess, knitting, and cards—each an 
emblem of human fate. Their activities and sense of well-being 
fill the room with an "indescribable stir of life"; their 
conversation lulls the mind as "the words came gently one 
after another." It is at this point that St. John Hirst, the 
novel's personification of reason, returns from Rachel's 
deathwatch. His cheeks "pale, unshorn and cavernous" from his 
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glimpse into the abyss, he is in effect returning to the cave 
to tell the other prisoners of his vision. However, the change 
in ontological altitude befuddles Hirst, and he "dr(aws) his 
hand across his eyes as if some dream came between him and the 
others and prevented him from seeing where he was." 
While Hirst is clearly physically and emotionally 
exhausted, his confusion here signals something beyond 
fatigue. Unlike Plato's wrathful prisoners whom Socrates 
speculates would fall upon and murder any of their fellows 
attempting to disabuse them of their delusion, the movements 
and voices of these prisoners converge from about the hall to 
weave a seductive and subtle pattern of order and harmony: 
Hirst is "content to sit silently watching the pattern build 
itself up, looking at what he hardly saw." As if to confirm 
the illusory quality of the pattern, a flash of lightning is 
revealed to be "only the reflection of the storm which was 
over," and references to rain, air, earth, and flashing light 
further emphasize the universal and elemental stakes of the 
drama being played out in microcosm. The novel closes with 
Hirst "half-asleep, and vividly conscious of everything around 
him: 
Across his eyes passed a procession of objects, 
black and indistinct, the figures of people picking 
up their books, their cards, their balls of wool, 
their work-baskets, and passing him one after 
another on their way to bed. 
Hirst here faces an ontological decision—a choice of how 
to be—between embracing the implications of his glimpse into 
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the abyss occasioned by Rachel's apparently arbitrary passing 
or seeking haven from that vision in the comforting human 
procession provided by the shadows of his fellow inmates. Much 
earlier in the novel, after he and Rachel had come from a 
dance, Hirst observed with characteristic insouciance, "I see 
through everything—absolutely everything. Life has no more 
mysteries for me." But the narrative voice undercuts his 
hubris. observing that "near though they sat, and familiar 
though they felt, they seemed mere shadows to each other" 
(169) . Now the example of Rachel's life—essentially a leaving 
of the cave of quotidian being—has transformed her shadowy 
status into vivid if alarming existential being through the 
revelation of life's true mystery: the nothingness at its 
core. Hirst now tentatively reenacts her example; we leave him 
at the moment of choice and commitment. 
Like Hirst's position here, the experience of reading The 
Voyage Out approximates a kind of test, one which we cannot 
pass while under the illusion that this is a novel concerned 
with the vagaries of love. It is indeed a bildunqsroman. but 
the education is ours. If Rachel sees the world differently 
than do her countrymen, they all inhabit the same world: as 
Rachel is dead so, too, are they "on their way to bed." Death 
is our insoluble problem, the ultimate textual puzzle. We live 
as we read. 
198 
CHAPTER V 
BECOMING LORD JIM 
"...the question is not how to get cured, but how to live." 
(Lord Jim) 
"My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the 
written word to make you hear, to make you feel—it is before 
all, to make you see." 
(Conrad's Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus) 
"He who with eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath 
courage." 
(Nietzsche) 
When I perceive Conrad's Jim to be a visionary hero, I 
recognize his experience to be neither a lust for heroism nor 
a flight from shame but rather an increasingly profound 
commitment to what Sartre calls authentic being. Indeed, 
Olson's gloss of Sartrean "authenticity" as the experience of 
an individual who "undergoes a radical conversion through 
anguish and who assumes his freedom; (who) recognizes himself, 
not as a shepherd of being, but as the cause of there being a 
world and as the unique source of the world's value and 
intelligibility1" (139) describes the arc of Jim's career as 
1In relation to Jim's experience in Patusan, the wording 
of Olson's gloss might unintentionally raise the specter of 
imperialism and racism—charges which are hardly unprecedented 
in Conrad criticism. Humphries, for example, argues that the 
"real reason (for Jim's going to the East) is to be part of a 
particular economic system, if not to actually take an active 
part in its concrete manifestations: the imperialist pillage 
associated with colonialism." Moreover, Humphries sees, as do 
I, the genesis of Jim's journey in the "light holiday 
literature to which he is addicted" (64). While fashionable, 
this position is untenable. There certainly is no evidence of 
Jim's "addiction" to romance literature; he, for example, 
totes a complete Shakespeare with him to Patusan—"Best thing 
to cheer up a fellow"—along with two unidentified smaller 
volumes. He does, to be sure, upon Marlow's first visit to 
Patusan, observe that the Patusanians are "like people in a 
book" (260). However, Jim's arrival in Patusan is an act of 
desperation, not one of malignity. It is clear that, following 
his cowardice upon the Patna, he would have remained in 
oblivion at any of the posts to which he retreated had not the 
infamy of his experience ineluctably rooted him out. Indeed, 
his very entrance into the merchant service in the East is a 
case of Heideggerian "throwness": "The majority (of those in 
the eastern service) were men..., like (Jim), thrown there by 
some accident" (13). No, the meaning of Jim's Patusan 
experience yields itself to existential, not Marxist analysis. 
While Jim's original existential choice to join the eastern 
service may well have racial undertones in the "distinction of 
being white," his overriding motive was to "lounge safely 
through existence" in the grasp of a "safe universe." It is 
Jim's awakening to the true nature of his world and to his 
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he evolves through Sartre's fundamental—if nearly opaque— 
distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself2. In 
sum, Jim, as was his creator, is best defined by his tenacious 
and—given its seeming futility—courageous pursuit of the 
question of "how to be." Most importantly, I discover value in 
my reading of Jim's own crucible of becoming for my own; I 
realize my self to be among the "us" of Marlow's relentless 
refrain in Lord Jim3. Throughout his fiction, Conrad, who 
almost certainly never heard the term "existentialism" nor 
read the writings of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche4, reveals an 
instinctive and cogent existential posture, and, in characters 
responsibilities to himself and to others, not their 
exploitation, that constitutes the novel's greatness. As 
Sartre observes, "Total responsibility in total solitude—is 
not this the very definition of liberty?" For an excellent 
series of discussions of Conrad in relation to colonialism, 
see Hamner. 
2As defined by Hazel Barnes, these are, first, "being-in-
itself: non-conscious Being. It is the being of the phenomenon 
and overflows the knowledge which we have of it. It is a 
plenitude, and strictly speaking we can say of it only that it 
is"; and second, "Being-for-itself: The nihilation of Being-
in-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of Being, a 
desire for being, a relation to being. By bringing Nothingness 
into the world the For-itself can stand out from being and 
judge other beings by knowing what it is not. Each For-itself 
is the nihilation of a particular being" (Nothingness. 800) 
The key to the distinction is one of consciousness and 
freedom. Being-in-itself" is the thing—whether man or object-
-itself; "Being-for-itself" is an evolution or separation from 
the latter in which the existent chooses a self and 
experiences the process of becoming that self. 
3Marlow employs the phrase "one of us" on 10 separate 
occasions in the novel. 
4Conrad was deeply read in and influenced by 
Scohpenhauer. See chapter four of Johnson. 
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like Leggatt; Martin Decoud; Razumov; Kurtz; Marlow and Jim, 
offers an impressive array of specifically visionary 
experience. In my final example of the visionary hero, I will 
focus upon Lord Jim and demonstrate the descent of meaning 
from what I will outline of Conrad's life, to its thematic 
reflection in Lord Jim and ultimately the capacity of that 
representation to affect awareness and change in any reader 
willing to mentally "audition" the roles offered by this 
novel, to expose his or her vulnerability to the power of 
visionary literature. 
The inherent difficulty of Sartre's language in 
attempting to apprehend those modes of being mentioned above 
might suggest Conrad's own characteristically hazy, often 
ambiguous—if more felicitous—phraseology5. In particular, 
Conrad's fiction is rife with references to various narrators' 
inability to see—and consequently to name—events clearly and 
accurately, and the Marlow of Lord Jim repeatedly laments his 
inability to see—which is to say, to understand—Jim's 
character in a definitive way6, an ambiguity which persists 
to—indeed constitutes—the novel's conclusion. But as Bruce 
Johnson reminds us "it is too easy to smile at either Sartre 
or Conrad when they have, often for good reason, nearly 
5See Adam Gillon's article for an enlightening comparison 
and contrast between Conrad's and Sartre's thought. 
6Sartre would see nothing unusual in this, noting that 
one "cannot pass beyond human subjectivity" ("Existentialism 
and Humanism," 29). 
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exhausted the resources of language. There is nothing funny 
about the ideas involved, and...it appears that at rare 
moments Conrad is incredibly close to seeing consciousness as 
this fountain or gland of nothingness" (90) . This sentiment is 
amply borne out in Conrad's letter (translated from the 
original French) to Ted Sanderson: 
There are no converts to ideas of honor, justice, 
pity, freedom. There are only people who, without 
knowledge, understanding, or feeling, drive 
themselves into a frenzy with words, repeat them, 
shout them out, imagine they believe in them— 
without believing in anything but profit, personal 
advantage, satisfied vanity. And words fly away; 
and nothing remains, do you understand? Absolutely 
nothing, oh man of faith! Nothing. A moment, a 
twinkling of an eye, and nothing remains—but a 
clot of mud, of cold mud, of dead mud cast into 
black space, rolling around an extinguished sun. 
Nothing. Neither thought, nor sound, nor soul. 
Nothing. (Letters, vol.2, p.70) 
One of the many instances in Lord Jim where this 
struggle with the interrelated problems of language and 
vision7 is played out occurs at Jim's trial for abandoning the 
Patna: "...the sound of (Jim's) own truthful statements 
confirmed his deliberate opinion that speech was of no use to 
him any longer," and, perceiving Marlow's fixed stare upon 
him, Jim realizes that Marlow, too, "seemed to be aware of 
(Jim's) hopeless difficulty" (33) . Standing in the witness 
70f course, it could be argued that the entire 
relationship between Marlow and Jim originates from the 
fallacy of the "postal principal": that every message finds 
its recipient. The "yellow cur" incident is the first of a 
series of occasions in which language proves at best 
incidental, at worst a hindrance to the growing rapport 
between the two seamen. 
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box, Jim understands instinctively that the facts ("Facts! 
They demanded facts from him, as if facts could explain 
anything8") with which the court so assiduously seeks to 
explain and thereby bury the implications of the Patna affair9 
will prove inadequate to the task. 
An understanding of visionary literature teaches us that 
Jim's frustration here is the result of a way of seeing 
distinct from that of those who are trying him. Indeed, the 
Patna inquiry reflects the existence of types or levels of 
judgment which are endemic to the moral systems which produce 
them. Jim's solitary stand before the naval inquiry is based 
upon a systemic ethical view of the world, or what might be 
termed the fallacy of the morally symmetrical universe. In 
this instance "right" is defined as conformity to the tacit 
code of the sea, a "few simple notions" of self-sacrifice, 
valor, competence and devotion to duty. Any action extraneous 
to the code is "wrong." Hence Jim's frustration at the 
8This same distinction between what I would label the 
quotidian consciousness's focus on "facts" and the visionary's 
on instinct and emotion was noted in The Voyage Out. We also 
see precisely the same concern voiced by Leggatt in "The 
Secret Sharer": 
You don't suppose I am afraid of what can be done 
to me? Prison or gallows or whatever they may 
please. But you don't see me coming back to explain 
such things to an old fellow in a wig and twelve 
respectable tradesman, do you? What can they know 
whether I am guilty or not—or what I am guilty of, 
either?" (51) 
9For a graphic illustration of this sentiment, see 
Marlow's quote on page 214. 
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inadequacy of facts to explain the subjective and complex 
reality of his experience. What is lacking in these 
proceedings is interrogativity, a willingness to question the 
center or, obversely, to peer into the chaos and ambiguity of 
life on the margin. It is just Jim's clenched-teeth 
willingness to view the mess, to persevere through the most 
grievous doubts that is a prime motivation behind Marlow's 
unflagging devotion to Jim's ordeal of becoming. And Marlow of 
all men, having witnessed Kurtz's evisceration of the ideal, 
knows the danger and cost of ideas: "Hang ideas! They are 
tramps, vagabonds knocking at the back door of your mind, each 
taking a little of your substance, each carrying away some 
crumb of that belief in a few simple notions you must cling to 
if you want to live decently and would like to die easy!" 
(75). 
Jim, then, has perceived—at least instinctively— 
something essential about the nature of reality that others 
(witness Brierly) have heretofore suppressed or refused to 
acknowledge: "These were issues," Marlow later says of Jim's 
struggle, "beyond the competency of a court of inquiry: it was 
a subtle and momentous quarrel as to the true essence of life, 
and did not want a judge" (93). In a phrase that essence is 
the malevolent soul which lurks at the heart of things, the 
darkness that underlies the endeavors and fate of humankind, 
whereas "the facts those men were so eager to know had been 
visible, tangible, open to the senses, occupying their place 
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in space and time..." (30). It is as if Jim, enlightened 
through his plunge into the destructive element, were speaking 
a language different from that of his inquisitors. Again, 
Conrad addresses the point in a letter to Cunningham Graham, 
which reads like a primer on existentialist thought: 
The mysteries of the universe made of drops of fire 
and clods of mud do not concern us in the least. 
The fate of humanity condemned ultimately to perish 
from cold is not worth troubling about. If you take 
it to heart, it becomes an unendurable tragedy. If 
you believe in improvement, you must weep, for the 
attained perfection must end in cold, darkness and 
silence. In a dispassionate view the ardour for 
reform, improvement, for virtue, for knowledge, and 
even for beauty is only a vain sticking up for 
appearances as though one were anxious about the 
cut of one's clothes in a community of blind men. 
Life knows us not and we know not life—we don't 
even know our own thoughts. Half the words we use 
have no meaning whatever and of the other half each 
man understands each word after the fashion of his 
own folly and conceit. Faith is a myth and beliefs 
shift like mists on the shore; thoughts vanish; 
words once pronounced, die; and the memory of 
yesterday is as shadowy as the hope of to-morrow— 
only the string of my platitudes seems to have no 
end. As our peasants say: "Pray, brother, forgive 
me for the love of God." And we don't know what 
forgiveness is, nor what is love, nor what God is. 
Assez. (Letters, vol.2, pp. 16-7) 
This perception of shifting beliefs, the absence of faith, and 
the ephemeral nature of human thought begins to explain for us 
the mystical vagueness characteristic of Conrad's prose. As 
one critic has observed, Conrad labored under "a withering 
paradox...that the artist must be engaged in making shapes to 
prove that shapes cannot be made, in giving form to the 
formless" (Cox, 11). 
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At his trial, Jim quells his feelings of "revolt" at the 
absurdity of trying to capture the meaning of his experience 
through language, and attempts "through a meticulous precision 
of statement (to) bring out the true horror behind the 
appalling face of things" (30). This I would suggest to be a 
key statement of visionary being, and one, given Conrad's 
propensity for the portentous phrase, that might be easily 
overlooked. It suggests a kind of double vision that 
acknowledges the quotidian horror of events—in this case, the 
"appalling" dishonoring of the "fellowship of the craft" by 
the Patna's European crew—while insinuating the "true 
horror," which is exemplified by the recognition that 
institutionalized ideals like the "brotherhood of the sea" or 
white European cultural and racial dominance are but 
psychological fragments shoring up the ruins of futile claims 
to a teleological universe based upon clearly articulated 
conceptions of good and evil. 
I am not suggesting that Jim is fully conscious of the 
complexity of such a response here, but Marlow, his personal 
anthropologist, is. When Marlow fixes his courtroom gaze upon 
Jim—"an act of intelligent volition" unlike the "fascinated 
stares" of the others—Jim senses that he "looks at me as 
though he could see somebody or something past my shoulder" 
(32-3). I would submit that what Marlow perceives (or, as I 
will argue later, "reads"), is not the image of himself which 
the novel's refrain might suggest but rather Nothingness—his 
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own existential moment—the revelation as illusion of his 
ideals concerning his craft, his world, his self. As Royal 
Roussel makes the point, Marlow perceives "the formlessness 
behind all form, the meaninglessness behind all meaning" (85) . 
Indeed, Marlow says as much in one of his projections of 
ontological value upon Jim's person: 
He was a youngster of the sort you like to see 
about you; of the sort you like to imagine yourself 
to have been; of the sort whose appearance claims 
the fellowship of these illusions you had thought 
gone out, extinct, cold, and which, as if rekindled 
at the approach of another flame, give a flutter 
deep, deep down somewhere, give a flutter of 
light...of heat!(128) 
To be sure, Marlow's use of "illusions" here possesses a 
partially ironic cast; one does not normally seek to 
resuscitate an illusion. But Marlow's prevalent irony is, of 
course, a defense mechanism against what he sees in the course 
of his fictional encounters, and the larger point Conrad the 
artist is making, I think, is that while Marlow's (and Jim's) 
pursuit of a life sustaining and invigorating ideal of conduct 
is understandable, it is also futile. That standard can only 
be discovered individually and through considerable psychic 
cost; it can never be imposed or adopted from without—however 
willing the individual might be to accept it—for such an 
imposed code would lack both value and authenticity. 
To know anything of Conrad the man is to understand the 
profound value he placed on codes of discipline and right 
conduct. To know anything of existential thought is to know 
the emptiness of such ideals. "Nowhere is it written," Sartre 
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observes, "that the Good exists, that we must be honest, that 
we must not lie; because the fact is that we are on a plane 
where there are only men... .Therefore, he thinks that man, 
with no support and no aid, is condemned every moment to 
invent man" (282) . This was a view with which Conrad, for all 
his longing for a "fixed standard of conduct," did not 
disagree: 
Everyone must walk in the light of his own heart's 
gospel...No man's light is good to any of his 
fellows. That's my creed from beginning to end. 
That's my view of life,—a view that rejects all 
formulas, dogmas and principles of other people's 
making. These are a web of illusions. We are too 
varied. Another man's truth is only a dismal lie to 
me" (Jean-Aubry, v.l, 184). 
Herein we may better understand Marlow's indelible horror 
upon discovering the emptiness inhabiting his cherished 
concepts of the nautical brotherhood. It seems to unleash in 
him a sense of the apocalyptic. He observes of Jim's 
experience in the lifeboat: "It is as if the souls of men 
floating on an abyss and in touch with immensity had been set 
free for any excess of heroism, absurdity, or abomination," a 
judgment Jim confirms when he reveals that there was "no 
concern with anything on earth. Nobody to pass an opinion. 
Nothing mattered10" (120-1). Marlow's shock of recognition is 
10Cf. Dostoyevsky in The Brothers Karamazov: "If God is 
dead, then all is permitted." Conrad, by the way, claimed to 
loathe the Russian author, in part, undoubtedly, because of 
his family's exile following Russia's usurpation of Poland. 
But more pointedly, I think, is that Dostoyevsky so powerfully 
mirrored—and thus anticipated—many of Conrad's own views and 
themes. 
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shared with Brierly; together they personify the two frame 
questions of this study. Jim's actions, Brierly observes, 
"destroy one's confidence," and no longer able to exist within 
the cocoon of his illusion11, he chooses suicide. Marlow, 
however, chooses existence, and "takes up" Jim not primarily 
from altruism but rather from self-preservation: he must 
discover a new way to be in the awareness of his condemnation 
to freedom, with Jim ironically as his guide. What neither 
Brierly nor Marlow understand, however, is that Jim at this 
point has made no choice; like Martin Decoud, "the dilettante 
of life," he has simply casually accepted the imposition of a 
code of conduct to which he has made no commitment beyond 
throwing in his lot with those identified by "the soft spot, 
the place of decay, the determination to lounge safely through 
existence" (12); which is to say he exists within a state of 
bad faith. In contradistinction, Brierly had believed 
passionately and without question in the ideal of the craft: 
"We are trusted," he appeals to Marlow at one point, "Do you 
understand?—trusted!....We aren't an organized body of men, 
and the only thing that holds us together is just the name for 
that kind of decency" (68). The desperation implicit in 
Brierly's words reflects his perception of the personal 
consequences of calling his ideal into question. Jim, however, 
learns to exist in the destructive element of freedom. The 
11The entomological metaphor here has particular relevance 
for Stein's butterflies and thus for the entire evolutionary 
drama of becoming. 
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text of Lord Jim is the map of his evolving commitment to an 
individual code of fidelity to all men and women—his becoming 
authentic. 
But we must go further. It is a critical commonplace that 
Marlow serves as Conrad's alter ego. We have already seen 
Conrad, who moved throughout his life among the three 
languages he spoke fluently, to be grimly aware of the flux 
and slipperiness of language or with what post-structuralists 
would label its lack of "referentiality." C.B. Cox reminds us 
that Conrad's fiction was dug "out of a foreign quarry. This 
made him doubtful about the mimetic function of words, and in 
this he is characteristically modern" (8) . What was the 
experience which Conrad's language sought to capture and from 
which it evolved? Essentially Conrad, living the life of the 
exile which similarly would come to define twentieth century 
experience, spent his life staring into a void: first, 
following the exile of his aristocratic family from Poland, 
came the bitter years of wandering in the Russian steppes, a 
time which, in effect, prepared him for the sea years of 
peering into the fathomless horizon and the bottomless abyss; 
and finally the writing career, perhaps the most trying of his 
three lives, with his agonizing slowness of production, the 
gnawing doubts about recognition, indeed about basic economic 
survival; always he was tied to his writing desk, pen and 
paper—his Sisyphean rock—staring into the blankness of the 
paper, dredging through the years of exile on land, of 
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isolation at sea, fermenting that loneliness in his 
imagination to produce the dark vision of his fiction. Peter 
Glassman speaks of Conrad's character as "framed by virtually 
no external sanctions" and Frederick Karl speculates that 
Conrad deliberately—in effect existentially— 
...chose directions or careers that would force him 
to relive a teetering, near-disastrous experience. 
Comparable to his actual suicide attempt in 
Marseilles was his use of suicidal situations in 
which he could confront the worse and could wobble 
existentially while peering into the abyss. Then, 
and only then, could he apply himself at his 
highest level of achievement, whether at mate, 
captain, or novelist. (18) 
Stavrou observes that, like Camus, pessimism and/or 
nihilism is the bedrock of Conrad's thought. In 1897 Conrad 
offered the following Kafkaesque cosmology in a letter to 
Cunningham Graham: 
There is a—let us say—a machine. It evolved 
itself (I am severely scientific) out of a chaos of 
scraps of iron and behold!—it knits. I am 
horrified at the horrible work and stand appalled. 
I feel it ought to embroider—but it goes on 
knitting. You come and say: "this is all right; 
it's only a question of the right kind of oil. Let 
us use this—for instance—celestial oil and the 
machine shall embroider a most beautiful design in 
purple and gold." Will it? Alas no. You cannot by 
any special lubrication make embroidery with a 
knitting machine. And the most withering thought is 
that the infamous thing has made itself; made 
itself without thought, without conscience, without 
foresight, without eyes, without heart. It is a 
tragic accident—and it has happened. You can't 
interfere with it. The last drop of bitterness is 
in the suspicion that you can't even smash it. In 
virtue of that truth one and immortal which lurks 
in the force that made it spring into existence it 
is what it is—and it is indestructible! 
It knits us in and it knits us out. It has 
knitted time, space, pain, death, corruption, 
despair and all the illusions—and nothing matters. 
212 
I'll admit however that to look at the remorseless 
process is sometimes amusing12. (Letters, v.l, 
p.425) 
Art, then, would become for Conrad a hedge against this 
relentless indifference, a way of imbuing his experience with 
significant form, of utilizing the nihilistic demons that 
throughout his life nibbled at the edges of his consciousness. 
If life's meaning could not be apprehended, its impressions 
and vicissitudes might nonetheless be recorded. Art became, 
most powerfully, an exercise in self-definition, for "Joseph 
Conrad," a name that was the result of nearly twenty 
permutations, was a self-invention, a persona created out of 
an urgent ontological need by Josepf Teodor Konrad 
Korzeniowski as surely as Jay Gatsby was by James Gatz. Karl 
compares Conrad to Proteus, "always...in a state of defining 
and redefining himself. A final shape was not his destiny" 
(22). 
With this background, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Conrad not only portrayed Camus' philosophical imperative in 
his art, which contains at least 15 suicides13, he also acted 
upon it. Prior to the start of his literary career, distraught 
at the drift of his life, despairing at ever resolving a 
12Cf. the interrogativity implicit in this passage with 
that of the passage from Kierkegaard's Repetition quoted in 
chapter one. 
13For a listing of Conrad's fictional use of suicide, see 
Cox, page 6. His opening chapter also offers a lucid 
meditation on the issues surrounding Conrad's own attempted 
suicide. 
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fragmented sense of self, and panic-stricken with guilt and 
shame over an unpayable gambling debt, the twenty-four-year-
old Conrad placed a revolver against his chest and pulled the 
trigger. Miraculously, the bullet passed through his body 
without striking a vital organ14. 
In many ways the act seems an anomaly in the life of a 
man who was personally circumspect and conservative. However, 
Karl speculates that Conrad's decision to turn to writing— 
which, given its own inherent uncertainty and doubtful chances 
for success, seems itself an act of desperation—was very much 
a form of gambling and "the endless sheets of white paper he 
faced each day...a quotidian equivalent of suicide" (175). 
What emerges here is a portrait of Conrad as a marginal 
man. Even late in his life, having achieved mastery in the two 
quintessential professions of his adopted country—the sea and 
letters—he continued to not only harbor but be actively 
tormented by doubts regarding his identity and self-worth, 
traits—like so much else about Conrad—which mark his 
prescience for modern experience. It is within this nexus of 
marginality that Conrad, like Camus, transformed through an 
1AWhile there is no minimizing the seriousness of Conrad's 
action here, all three of his most recent biographers concur 
that it was more a cry for help than a desire to end his life. 
For example, the setting of the shooting coincided with an 
appointment Conrad made with his chief creditor, reflecting, 
observes Bernard Meyer, "an inner state of indecision, 
preparing the way for rescue by his tea-time guest in the 
event his intended self-injury should not prove immediately 
fatal" (38). 
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act of consciousness (his writing) an invitation to death into 
a rule of life. 
Lord Jim mirrors that struggle to be, the striving for 
identity and personal meaning. Even Jim's lack of a surname 
anticipates the spate of nameless protagonists in twentieth 
century fiction, many of whom I would label "visionary." That 
struggle speaks directly, of course, to existentialist 
thinkers' emphasis upon "becoming." Kierkegaard had argued in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript that man is constantly "in 
a process of becoming" (84), and again in The Sickness Unto 
Death that "a self, every moment it exists, is in a process of 
becoming; for the self is not present actually, it is merely 
what is to come into existence" (60) ; and Sartre's basic 
distinction between "existence and "essence" posits that "man 
first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the 
world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the 
existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to 
begin with he is nothing.. .man simply is" ("Existentialism and 
Humanism," 28). In sum, Kierkegaard and Sartre are arguing 
that human beings lack a defined, stable self, a view with 
profound implications for any reading of Lord Jim in that 
Marlow's narration is fueled by his faith in Jim's intrinsic 
worth and essential moral fitness15. 
15Conrad himself echoed similar sentiments in a letter to 
Edward Garnett: 
When once the truth is grasped that one's own 
personality is only a ridiculous and aimless 
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If Marlow's view is correct, then indeed Jim needs but 
"another chance," an opportunity that will allow his true 
nature to emerge; however, our understanding of visionary 
literature suggests a situation quite distinct from this. 
Early in the novel, Marlow categorizes the nautical denizens 
of the East into two distinct groups: 
Some, very few and seen there but seldom, led 
mysterious lives, had preserved an underfaced 
energy with the temper of buccaneers and the eyes 
of dreamers. They appeared to live in a crazy maze 
of plans, hopes, dangers, enterprises, ahead of 
civilization, in the dark places of the sea, and 
their death was the only event of their fantastic 
existence that seemed to have a reasonable 
certitude of achievement. 
The majority were men who, like (Jim) , thrown there 
by some accident, had remained as officers of 
country ships. They had now a horror of the home 
service, with its harder conditions, severer view 
of duty, and the hazard of stormy oceans. They were 
attuned to the eternal peace of Eastern sky and 
sea. They loved short passages...and the 
distinction of being white. They shuddered at the 
thought of hard work, and led precariously easy 
lives, always on the verge of dismissal, always on 
the verge of engagement, serving Chinamen, Arabs, 
half-castes—would have served the devil himself 
had he made it easy enough. They talked 
everlastingly of turns of luck...and in all they 
masquerade of something hopelessly unknown the 
attainment of serenity is not very far off. Then 
there remains nothing but the surrender to one's 
impulses, the fidelity to passing emotions which is 
perhaps a nearer approach to truth than any other 
philosophy of life. And why not? If we are "ever 
becoming—never being" than I would be a fool if I 
tried to become this thing rather than that; for I 
know well that I never will be anything. (Letters, 
I, 267-68) 
(I am thankful to Otto Bohlmann's work for alerting me to this 
passage.) 
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said—in all their actions, in their looks, in 
their persons—could be detected the soft spot, the 
place of decay, the determination to lounge safely 
through existence. (11-2) 
The first grouping—defined by an exclusivity based upon a 
vision and energy which set its members beyond civilization, 
dwelling in the destructive element of "mazes" and the sea's 
"dark places," and sustained only by the promise of death— 
suggests an approximation of how a quotidian mind might view 
visionary being. This is buttressed by the distinctly 
quotidian character of the second group, who, sharing a 
Heideggarian "throwness," lack either the energy or vision to 
surge up, leaving their nebulous identities to the vagaries of 
race and fortune. Most tellingly, their "everlasting" 
discussions of luck—"how So-and-so got charge of a boat on 
the coast of China" and so forth—denotes their appalling 
distance from existential responsibility. Faced with what 
Kierkegaard terms the "either/or" inherent in any decision, 
Jim chooses the values of decadence, a decision that leads to 
his berth aboard the Patna. 
It is equally clear, however, that Jim enters into his 
choice irresponsibly, in a state of "bad faith," seeking, as 
Marlow puts it, "to lounge safely through existence." 
Developing a "fascination in the sight of those men," he 
chooses absorption into the quotidian16, refusing, in effect, 
16
 Again, "quotidian" indicates simply one's existential 
attitude toward experience; in this case, the attitude toward 
their craft of the men in the East as opposed to that of those 
in the home service. 
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to transcend himself or to "surge up" and define himself in 
differentiation from those around him. Jim's service aboard 
the Patna is undertaken in what can best be described as an 
ontological trance17 or what Sartre would label "being-in-
itself." Jim is "penetrated by the great certitude of 
unbounded safety and peace that could be read on the silent 
aspect of nature.. .and, as if made audacious by the invincible 
aspect of the peace, he felt he cared for nothing that could 
happen to him to the end of his days" (17, 19-20). Jim's 
blindness at this point gives rise to his characteristic 
hubris: "At such times his thoughts would be full of valorous 
deeds: he loved these dreams and the success of his imaginary 
achievements. They were the best parts of life, its secret 
truth, its hidden reality" (20). 
At no time in the novel is Jim more blind or less 
authentic, a fact which is signaled, as so often in visionary 
literature, by the presence of a figure-ground dichotomy: 
There was nothing he could not face. He was so 
pleased with the idea that he smiled, keeping 
perfunctorily his eyes ahead; and when he happened 
to glance back he saw the white streak of the wake 
drawn as straight by the ship's keel upon the sea 
as the black line drawn by the pencil upon the 
chart. (20) 
"Conrad's imagery would support this metaphor. Just prior 
to the collision with the submerged derelict, Jim is 
repeatedly described as "sleepy" and his blood to have "turned 
to warm milk." The odious captain arrives on the bridge 
dressed "in pyjamas and with his sleeping-jacket flung wide 
open" (21). 
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Characteristically at this point in his moral evolution, Jim 
is focused upon the "figure" of the white streak left in the 
Patna's wake and its "negative," the black line denoting her 
nautical route, neatly ignoring the implications of the 
formless "ground" of sea and chart which gives each being. 
Moreover, the teleology implicit in the straightness of these 
lines suggests a geographical/ontological illusion based upon 
the human inability to perceive/see our situation in its 
totality. Indeed, the very concept of a "chart"—which is but 
a way of seeing—emblematizes the tenuousness of humankind's 
grasp of its ontological orientation, a fact soon brought 
graphically home by the Patna's encounter with the partially 
submerged and consummately uncharted derelict vessel. And it 
is that encounter, of course, that will precipitate Jim's 
literal and deliberate plunge into the destructive element of 
the sea. 
Furthermore, one might well consider the "extraordinary 
power of defying the shortness of memories and the length of 
time" of the Patna affair within the context of figure-ground 
relationships. Marlow observes to his auditors: 
It seems to live with a sort of uncanny vitality, 
in the minds of men, on the tips of their tongues. 
I've had the questionable pleasure of meeting it 
often, years afterwards, thousands of miles away, 
emerging from the remotest possible talk, coming to 
the surface of the most distant allusions. Has it 
not turned up to-night between us? And I am the 
only seaman here. I am the only one to whom it is a 
memory. And yet it has made its way out! (137-8, 
emphases mine) 
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Surely, on the quotidian level, it is the affair's 
extraordinary circumstances, its seeming to play out a moral 
drama with apparently clear delineations of right and wrong 
which define its compulsive presence in the minds of men; but 
I would contend the Patna episode's true power to be contained 
in a mythic or visionary dimension, in what Marlow elsewhere 
labels the "fascination of the abomination"; it allows the 
darkness underlying our dreams and endeavors to protrude and 
then escape from our carefully crafted psychic defenses. Jim's 
growth toward authenticity, responsibility, and freedom, then, 
is intimately and inextricably tied to his evolving 
willingness to see or acknowledge and endure that darkness or 
"ground," the chaotic, shapeless forces that underlie both the 
macrocosm (the indifferent universe he inhabits) and the 
microcosm (the primacy of emotion over reason in his own self) 
of his being. 
It is not an easy acknowledgement. Early in his career, 
Jim, injured in a shipboard accident caused by a storm which 
"force(d) it upon the mind and the heart of a man, that this 
complication of accidents or these elemental furies are coming 
at him with a purpose of malice" lies in his cabin "at the 
bottom of an abyss of unrest." Shielded from the storm's fury, 
Jim's awareness of and attitude toward its danger fades, 
becomes "shadowy." He "saw nothing.. .and felt secretly glad he 
had not to go on deck." The visionary works considered thus 
far teach us that the greater threat Jim faces here is not the 
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presence of a malevolent universe but rather his refusal to 
acknowledge its presence. Thus is he alternately gripped by a 
"rush of anguish" at his ontological lethargy and at the 
"unintelligent brutality of an existence liable to the agony 
of such sensations." This is clearly a manifestation of 
Stein's destructive element ("I tell you, my friend, it is not 
good for you to find you cannot make your dream come true, for 
the reason that you not strong enough are, or not clever 
enough."), a confrontation that fills Jim with "a despairing 
desire to escape at any cost." When fine weather returns, "He 
thought no more about it" (11). 
The significance here is not simply that Jim's early 
years are marked by a distaste for acknowledging or grappling 
with his special demons but rather that that struggle takes 
place, as it were, off stage, away from the dramatic center of 
events. This pattern will occur again in the pantomime of the 
abandonment of the Patna, as Jim stands on the margin of the 
scene, watching the frantic efforts of his fellow officers to 
launch a lifeboat, and yet again as Jim removes himself 
geographically and systematically from Europe, the novel's 
implicit center of value. The common elements in each of these 
situations are isolation, loneliness and marginality during 
which Jim must confront the anguish of his desire to be and 
even—if we recall the experience of, say, Martin Decoud 
floating alone in the darkness of the Placid Gulf—whether to 
be. By contrast, in Marlow's famous interview with the French 
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lieutenant, the latter observes that while "man is born a 
coward," habit, necessity and the eyes of others allow one to 
bear the fear. Jim, Marlow observes, "had none of those 
inducements" aboard the Patna (147). 
Yet is it not during such moments of isolation on the 
margins of existence that we are capable of seeing ourselves 
most clearly? And conversely is it not the persistent tug of 
the quotidian that obviates that vision? Marlow images the 
French lieutenant as a priest "into whose ears are poured the 
sins, the suffering, the remorse of peasant generations, on 
whose faces the placid and simple expression is like a veil 
thrown over the mystery of pain and distress" (139). As that 
seaman's heroic wounds testify, he has experienced and borne 
up under that pain; he has done, as he says, "one's possible." 
Surely his thirty-two hours aboard an apparently doomed ship 
would seem to dwarf Jim's experience. And yet does not the 
French sailor's bulk, lethargy, love of wine, and hint of 
scandal suggest his own tropism for the center and the 
emergence of his own desire to lounge safely through 
existence? 
It is on the margin, of course, that creativity thrives, 
and implicit in the very idea of marginal ity is 
interrogativity, a critique of the center. The margin is the 
region—whether geographic, psychic or artistic—that is most 
dynamic, most dangerous; at once potentially the most 
destructive and the most creative venues of human experience. 
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A similar dichotomy presents itself in Marlow's use of 
the leitmotif "one of us." As a reference to Jim, it most 
immediately refers to his membership in the brotherhood of the 
sea and its tacit rules of conduct, which Jim has abrogated. 
But like all great literature, Conrad's best work possesses 
the ability to transcend itself, accruing not just broader 
dimensions of meaning and complexities of implication, but 
more importantly a reflexive, mirror-like effect upon the 
reader wherein he or she comes to recognize the mythic quality 
of the tale and consequently the ontological share he or she 
holds in its telling. As the reader's recognition of the 
universality of Jim's odyssey of becoming matures, the weight 
of the meaning of the phrase "one of us" falls increasingly on 
Jim's marginal aspects as a human being caught in a cycle of 
failure and despair rather than on formal traits such as his 
appearance or breeding. 
Marlow in his struggle to reconcile the promise of Jim's 
appearance with the seeming perfidy of his actions feels the 
persistent tug of the center: 
...for a second I wished heartily that the only 
course left open to me was to pay for his funeral. 
Even the law had done with him. To bury him would 
have been such an easy kindness! It would have been 
so much in accordance with the wisdom of life, 
which consists of putting out of sight all the 
reminders of our folly, of our weakness, of out 
mortality; all that makes against our efficiency— 
the memory of our failures, the hints of our 
undying fears, the bodies of our dead friends. 
(170) 
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The key word here is "efficiency," a habit of moral and 
psychological convenience that allows the inhabitants of the 
center to, in Ian Watt's phrase, "secure their survival 
through various unacknowledged mechanisms for hiding and 
falsifying whatever might disturb their complacent attitude18" 
(316). Captain Brierly is their patron saint. It is precisely 
Jim's inefficient, even sloppy way of being that shocks 
Brierly into suicide and pulls Marlow, mesmerized by Jim's 
resonance for Marlow's own ordeal of becoming that had been 
played out in "Youth" and "Heart of Darkness," inexorably 
toward the psychic and geographical margins of experience. 
When Brierly rhetorically questions Jim's insistence on 
facing the Patna inquiry—"Why eat all that dirt?"—he is 
attempting to secure his own survival through avoiding the 
interrogativity—the exploration of self—that comes to define 
both Marlow and Jim. Marlow's refusal to deliver to Jim 
Brierly's inducement to flee prompts Brierly's ironic 
complaint, "You don't think enough of what you are supposed to 
be" (91-2). It is, of course, precisely Marlow's fascination 
with the question of "how to be" that is a key component of 
his visionary status: "I wanted to know," he says, aligning 
himself with Plato, "and to this day I don't know, I can only 
guess" (101). It is in the persistence and sincerity of 
Marlow's questioning that we are able to discern Howe's 
18Cf. William James and Marlow's own comment: "...it is 
my belief that no man ever understands quite his own artful 
dodges to escape from the grim shadow of self-knowledge" (80) . 
224 
comment observed in chapter one of the modernists' 
redefinition of the idea of the question; its metamorphosis 
from interrogation to "mode of axiomatic value." 
The concepts of interrogativity and marginality are 
inextricably interrelated. What is secure and unquestioned is 
in the center; yet, as Yeats told us, it is the special burden 
of the interrogative mode of being to understand the ephemeral 
nature of that center and to comprehend and confront the 
destructive element of the beast that the center's demise 
heralds. This awareness is present in Marlow's growing doubts, 
"gnawing like a worm," regarding the existence of a "sovereign 
power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct." In effect he 
is asking whether the stability of the center is not an 
illusion sustained by the very indifference of those who 
inhabit it. 
This is expressed spatially through the setting of Jim's 
"confession" to Marlow at the latter's hotel. The meeting 
occurs in the dining room among a group of world travellers, 
"people with a-hundred-pounds-round-the-world tickets in their 
pockets" (99). These are the people Conrad had caustically 
labeled "idiots," those "just as intelligently receptive of 
new impressions as their trunks upstairs." As with Marlow's 
categorization of the sailors plying their craft in the East, 
we are again meant to infer an ontological distinction between 
those concerned with the foggy adumbrations of the "Jim 
problem" (that is, Marlow and those "of us" both within and 
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without Lord Jim caught up in Marlow's "text") and those 
concerned with the extent to which they've been "done" at the 
local bizarre. While such distinctions are facile and patently 
unfair, Conrad is intent here on emphasizing the types of 
questions we allow to torment us. When Jim in the naivete of 
his solipsism blurts out "hell" in description of the ordeal 
of the inquiry, the other diners look up in "alarm from their 
iced pudding," and Marlow realizes the interview must be moved 
to an adjoining gallery. It is here on the physical margin of 
the setting, where "the night seemed to hang like a splendid 
drapery," serving as backdrop to Jim's Patna past ("the riding 
lights of ships winked afar like setting stars") and his 
Patusan future ("the hills across the roadstead resembled 
rounded black masses of arrested thunderclouds") that Jim 
actually narrates his desertion, going "through it again while 
he was telling (Marlow) these things he could not tell the 
court" (86). 
And again, following Jim's sentencing, Marlow, out of "a 
sense of responsibility," takes Jim back to his room: "On all 
the round earth...he had no place where he...could withdraw— 
be alone with his loneliness." Here Marlow oversees Jim's 
metaphysical struggle with the question of "whether to be." 
However, even the isolation of Marlow's ascetic room proves 
inadequate to Jim's torments of conscience as, his body racked 
by convulsive shudders, he bursts through the glass doors that 
lead to a veranda. Again Jim's growing marginality—and 
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therein his growing sense of self—is emphasized through 
Marlow's juxtaposition of the "feeble burst of many voices" 
emanating from the community dining room below with the depth 
of Jim's commitment to face the destructive element of his 
emotional despair. It is in this posture—with Jim "on the 
brink of a vast obscurity," and the light from Marlow's candle 
falling faintly on Jim's back—that Marlow says he "(wi)ll 
always remember" what I would term the iconic Jim, who stands 
as a paradigm of the individual's evolution toward 
authenticity. While it may seem at the very least ironic that 
the plot does not in fact turn on the Patna incident, an event 
with the power of apparently universal fascination, but rather 
here in the silences and shadows of Marlow's room, Conrad is 
once again demonstrating both his prescience in anticipating 
literature's movement inward, its ability to achieve 
communication through "an interaction between the explicit and 
the implicit, between revelation and concealment" (Iser, 169) 
and his instinctively existential outlook. For when Jim 
reemerges from the veranda and intones "That's done," he is 
signaling his readiness to "take possession of himself...to 
mould himself in his own image" (Macquarrie, 74) . Unamuno 
tells us that "we live in memory, and our spiritual life is at 
bottom simply the effort of our memory to persist, to 
transform itself into hope, the effort of our past to 
transform itself into our future" (9) . This transformation and 
creation occur on Marlow's veranda, an event so "marginal" 
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that even Marlow cannot actually witness it, and yet its 
results form the kernel of Jim's growth toward authentic 
being. 
The ideas of marginality and interrogativity may be 
profitably extended to the reader, too, through his or her 
interaction with the literal margin of the book. The blank 
areas of the printed page are, like the white areas of Jim's 
Patna sea chart, the terra incognita of the intellectual map 
and the locus of the reader's most personal and intuitively 
critical engagement with the page's center, its words, which 
denote a certain "course" that the reader may follow passively 
or question actively19. Marginalia mark the merging of reader 
and text, the interaction of which produces, in Iser's model 
of the reader's interaction with the author's text, the 
possibility of textual meaning; here, I would suggest, it 
marks the possibility of meaning beyond the literary work. 
When the reader inscribes the page's margin, its blankness, 
she or he is acting in similar ways: first, as a palpable sign 
of commitment to and engagement with the problem and 
experience of the work—what Conrad would term "fidelity." 
Where the first-time reader of Lord Jim might well exhibit 
distress or frustration that 350 pages of narrative, opinion, 
and rumination on the phenomenon of Jim concludes with "who 
knows?", what images of Sisyphean labor are conjured up by 
19Iser argues that the author's text "represents a 
pattern, a structured indicator to guide the imagination of 
the reader" (9) . 
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those of us, aware of this (non)conclusion, who nonetheless 
return repeatedly to this or any book, our journey delineated 
by the increasing density of our marginalia20? The very 
decision to read literature as a way of living as opposed to 
a way of making a living21 serves as a microcosm for the 
profound existential implications of how we fulfill ourselves 
as individuals. For it is only through its depth or intensity 
rather than its breadth that the reading experience or any 
other experience fulfills one. To engage oneself with a work 
or author is to some extent to deny the possibility of 
experiencing others, textually or personally. Again fidelity 
is the operative term. "Every decision is a decision against 
as well as a decision for; and every decision limits the range 
of possibilities that will be open for future decisions" 
(Macquarrie, 182). 
Second, marginalia are a sign of the reader's questioning 
struggle toward meaning and of a desire to counter the 
resistance of the black marks at the center of the page by 
Z0Iser reminds us that eighteenth century authors frequently 
utilized the metaphor of the journey to educate their readers 
to the rigors of apprehending longer genres like the novel. 
The reader—like the traveller—"combines all that he sees 
within his memory and establishes a pattern of consistency, 
the nature and reliability of which will depend partly on the 
degree of attention he has paid during each phase of the 
journey" (16). This recalls for us, of course, the necessity 
of multiple readings in trying to divine the "pattern" of any 
complex literary work. 
21While I am not suggesting these two ways of relating to 
texts to be mutually exclusive, I do maintain, as stated in my 
first chapter, that the former often becomes lost in the 
professional shuffle of the latter. 
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connecting the self with them through the literal and 
intellectual touching of the reader's words with the author's. 
In essence, the margin becomes, like Sisyphus' rock, the 
reader's "thing" through which the possibility of meaning is 
derived through repeated—if never wholly successful— 
readings. When that text is "visionary" in nature, the choice 
reflects Marlow's commitment to the enigma of Jim: "There was 
nothing but myself between him and the dark ocean. I had a 
sense of responsibility" (170-71) ; that is, the choice of 
visionary texts as objects of engagement signal the reader's 
commitment to the existential process of becoming just as the 
act of inscribing the book's margins reflects his or her 
passion for, questioning of and possible identification with 
the possible ethical roles offered by the work. Marginalia, 
then, function in two opposite ways: simultaneously connecting 
the reader with the page's center but also, more 
significantly, nudging him or her "over the edge" of the page 
and into a being-in-the-world renewed and intensified by the 
paradigms offered by visionary heroes. The reader's experience 
of writing and "being" in the margins of Lord Jim is consonant 
with, as mentioned above, Conrad's lifelong struggle to 
inscribe meaning upon a universe he viewed as "a mystery 
play...with an obscure beginning and an unfathomable 
denouement: (Karl, 651). 
A book itself is a "figure," a human structure created to 
encompass and give significant form and meaning to the chaotic 
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"ground" of experience. Fiction orders that experience and 
presents it for our inspection and, I believe, our judgment. 
From its opening paragraph where Conrad employs the second 
person in his narration, Lord Jim seeks to draw the reader 
into a position of moral participant; it seeks to force 
choices upon us. It was not until my third or fourth reading 
of the novel that the familiar phrase "one of us" brought me 
up short with the force of "You hypocrite lecteur, mon semble, 
mon frere," transforming the rules of my engagement with the 
book. It became no longer Jim's relationship with his craft 
that was my concern, nor even Marlow's to Jim, but rather, 
more affectively and dangerously, mine to Jim and Marlow and 
Conrad; and, by extension, to the men and women I would 
encounter beyond the margins of this book; suddenly I become 
part of "us." 
This conversion is underlined through Jim's repeated 
question to Marlow: "What would you do?" (pp. 102, 111, 121, 
130, 132, 138). The baldness of the phrase, like so much else 
about Jim's character, smacks of an adolescent naivete22, 
suggesting the manner in which a high school sophomore might 
expeditiously conclude an essay. But again an awareness of the 
nature of visionary literature reminds us that this is, in 
fact, an ur question that, like the refrain "one of us," 
22The child-like qualities of visionaries like Jim, Rachel 
Vinrace, Bartleby, and Miss Lonelyhearts speak to their 
separateness from quotidian cynicism. Their innocence is 
simultaneously compelling and threatening to those around 
them; their prototype is Dostoyevsky's Prince Myshkin. 
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serves through its very repetition to confront us with the 
novel's ethical and existential choices. And implicit in the 
idea of choice is that of action. Like the visionary hero, do 
something we must—even in the face of the probable futility 
of those actions. Indeed, much of the world's greatest 
literature seeks to subvert meaning; it beckons us, too, to 
jump ship. A novel like Lord Jim with its complex narrative 
scheme23, ambiguity of character, rudely bifurcated structure 
and refusal to "pay off" with easy truths and neat denouements 
continually encourages the "average pilgrim" (68) to abandon 
the work, to turn to more passive pursuits, to tasks more 
promising of immediate and tangible reward. In this way, too, 
the reading experience mirrors life. Ford Madox Ford observed 
that his artistic collaboration with Conrad was based upon the 
aesthetic principle "that the general effect of a novel must 
be the general effect that life makes on mankind" (Watt, 209). 
Therefore we have effects like the subversion of linear 
progression in the revelation of Jim's character (who among 
our acquaintances have revealed their stories to us 
linearally?) and, more significantly, the presentation to the 
reader of a series of moral choices. 
"Beach offers a graphic rendering of the convolutions of 
Lord Jim's narrative scheme. Assuming a linear chronology of 
the novel's events as denoted by an A, B, C, D, etc. 
progression, the book's actual chronology reads, by chapters: 
KLMP, WA, E,B, E, E, H, GD, HJ, FE, E, E, F, F, F, FK, I, I, 
R, I, KL, MN, N. Q. QPO, OP, P, QP, P, P, P, QP, P, P, Q, Q, 
Q, R, ZV, YX, S, S, S, TY, U, U, U, WXY. (363) 
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The most affecting of these, I believe, occurs at the 
conclusion of chapter 11. Jim has revealed to Marlow his 
confrontation with and rejection of suicide following his leap 
from the Patna: While he felt "sick of life," he understands 
that "that was not the way. I believe—I believe it would 
have—it would have ended—nothing." Jim then abruptly and 
characteristically turns on his auditor (among whom we have 
been prepared to number ourselves), asking with violent 
emotion: "What do you believe?" Again, the question Jim asks 
is "whether to be," whether he should have committed suicide. 
While the question forces the engaged reader into conscious 
moral participation in the analysis of Camus' philosophical 
question, even more instructive is Marlow's reaction to Jim's 
decidedly unrhetorical query: 
A pause ensued, and suddenly I felt myself overcome 
by a profound and hopeless fatigue, as though his 
voice had startled me out of a dream of wandering 
through empty spaces whose immensity had harassed 
my soul and exhausted my body. 
The passage possesses the signature Conradian note: doomladen 
and complex. Marlow's image of wandering heart and soul sick 
amidst a vast immensity (Ford would employ similar imagery in 
The Good Soldier) has implications existentially and for the 
related themes of marginality and nothingness. Indeed the word 
"nothing" reverberates throughout this and the ensuing 
passage, in the process accruing something of its 
transformational power in another visionary novel, A Passage 
to India. 
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The complexity of the present passage manifests itself in 
several ways: first, the subtle transition into simile of 
Marlow's "dream" here recalls both Jim's condition when the 
Patna struck the submerged derelict ship and of the potential 
condition of the Patna's pilgrims, who, if Jim had chosen to 
rouse them to the ship's condition, would have "leap(t) out of 
sleep into terror" (105) . In so doing, it reinforces the 
novel's frequent distinctions between levels of consciousness 
or being. Secondly, the weltschmerz Marlow expresses is 
triggered grammatically by Jim's question, "What do you 
believe?" By implication it establishes action as the antidote 
to the angst of Marlow's image of wandering through an 
immensity of empty spaces. While a cursory reading might 
suggest that weariness to result from the enigma of Jim, it in 
fact results from Marlow's heretofore avoidance of just the 
questions Jim is forcing upon him; that is, Jim's question 
"startle(d Marlow) out of dream" he had already inhabited. The 
axis of this key passage, though, is the "pause," the interval 
of silence which suggests both Marlow's reflection upon the 
implications of Jim's question and the ontological gulf which 
separates individuals. It is during this chronological/psychic 
Iserian "gap," instigated by Jim's question, that Marlow 
confronts his enervating passivity and consequently the 
necessity of choice. 
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In essence, Marlow is attempting to "read" Jim much as we 
are. Marlow, who never answers Jim's question, observes at the 
beginning of chapter twelve: 
The mist of his feelings shifted between us, as if 
disturbed by his struggles, and in the rifts of the 
immaterial veil he would appear to my staring eyes 
distinct of form and pregnant with vague appeal 
like a symbolic figure in a picture24. 
While the "mist" emphasizes the inherent isolation of each 
character, the attempt of Marlow's "staring eyes" to divine 
the meaning of Jim as symbol reflects the reader's own 
experience of the text. Marlow finally breaks the silence by 
intoning "I see," but "more," he claims, "to prove to myself 
that I could break my state of numbness than for any other 
reason." The point I would wish to make here is that Marlow 
can break his condition of "numbness" only through "seeing," 
which is to say, understanding Jim's odyssey of becoming. And 
like the novel's emphasis upon the creative possibilities to 
be realized in the margins of existence, that understanding 
emerges in the silences between the words where empathy and 
compassion reign. 
The passage also illustrates Morson's theory of 
"Prosaics" mentioned in chapter one, which "privileges" the 
novel over poetry as offering a special way of thinking about 
the world before our eyes and about the ethical problems we 
Z4Cf. the "film" that obscures Racel Vinrace's vision, p. 
163. 
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constantly face" (527) . It is only in novels that we can 
discover: 
...descriptions of situations rich enough to 
educate our moral sense...that offer a rich sense 
of the psychological and moral milieu of living 
people....The entire impulse is to provide just 
such information, as "thickly" as possible. Ethics 
is a matter of prosaics, and great prose develops 
our ethical sense....In novels we see moral 
decisions made moment by moment by inexhaustibly 
complex characters in unrepeatable social 
situations at particular historical times; and we 
see that the value of these decisions cannot be 
abstracted from these specifics. (526) 
When the naive reader (if such exists) chooses to read 
Lord Jim, he or she is ostensibly opting for a romance, a tale 
of high adventure, large deeds and exotic setting. Such is the 
focus of the world. "Most philosophers and historians tend to 
focus on big events...and individual people tend to tell 
themselves the story of their lives in terms of exceptional 
events and big decisions." One is reminded again of Beckett's 
observation that "all life is figure and ground." And indeed, 
Jim's existence seems swallowed up by the few hours the Patna 
incident takes to play itself out, an absorption imaged by 
"the shadow of a silent cloud (that) had fallen upon the ship 
from the zenith, and seemed to have extinguished every sound 
of her teeming life" (105). 
Yet I am suggesting that visionary fictions subvert any 
expectation of meaning being discovered in the events which 
typically form the foreground of experience and find it 
instead in the paradoxical isolation and interaction of 
reading, often in the form of letters—the most personal of 
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human documents and the genre which offered both form and 
credibility to the earliest English novels: Miss Lonelyhearts 
hunched over the train of human misery represented in his 
correspondents' letters; Seeger's shock of recognition as he 
reads his father's letter; Bartleby's despair generated almost 
by osmosis in the Washington dead-letter office, perhaps the 
most marginal of venues; and in the more traditional "texts" 
pursued by Rachel Vinrace in her shipboard cabin, South 
American room and even its wilderness; and finally Jim, the 
genesis of whose entire odyssey lies in his pursuit of "a 
course of light holiday literature" (5). In this light, Morson 
asks a question rooted in the distinction between center and 
margin, and rooted, too, in the power of questions to change 
the way we think and consequently live: "But what if the 
important events are not the great ones, but the infinitely 
numerous and apparently inconsequential ordinary ones, which, 
taken together, are far more effective and significant?" 
(519) . The center of Lord Jim is not truly to be discovered in 
the Patna incident nor in Jim's martial exploits in Patusan, 
but rather in the awkward, intensely intimate moments Jim and 
Marlow spend together sorting out Jim's experience or in the 
equally mundane decisions Jim makes in presiding over the 
quotidian affairs of the Malayans. This is where he "surges 
up" in the world, where he takes his most significant steps 
toward authenticity, and where the book truly lives. "Art," 
Tolstoy observed, "begins where the tiny bit begins." So in 
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that brief pause as he sits on the physical and psychic 
margin, having been confronted by Jim's raw question, Marlow 
experiences a subtle readjustment, an interrogation of self. 
There is moral movement. 
Ultimately it is Marlow more than Jim who is our 
visionary model for it his task to read, perceive and 
comprehend Jim's experience. And Marlow proves a cogent 
reader. Drawing upon the work of R.D. Laing, Iser tells us 
that "all men are invisible to each other. Experience is man's 
invisibility to man" (165) . This is an insight Marlow 
instinctively shares: 
I at least had no illusions; but it was I, too, who 
a moment ago had been so sure of the power of 
words, and now was afraid to speak, in the same way 
one dares not move for fear of losing a slippery 
hold. It is when we try to grapple with another 
man's intimate need that we perceive how 
incomprehensible, wavering, and misty are the 
beings that share with us the sight of the stars 
and the warmth of the sun. It is as if loneliness 
were a hard and absolute condition of existence; 
the envelope of flesh and blood on which our eyes 
are fixed melts before the outstretched hand, and 
there remains only the capricious, unconsolable, 
and elusive spirit that no eye can follow, no hand 
can grasp. (180) 
Communication between individuals and between readers and 
texts, Iser argues, results from individuals' efforts to fill 
in these existential "gaps" or "blanks" or "indeterminacies" 
with others or with the silence of the text. And again, Marlow 
shows himself a competent reader: "...but I would have been 
little fitted for the reception of (Jim's) confidences had I 
not been able at times to understand the pauses between words" 
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(105). Iser points out that because "we have no experience of 
how other experience us" our understanding of one another 
results from "interpretation." Thus does Marlow "read" Jim. 
Marlow's (and the reader's) exegesis of Jim's character 
is aided by a series of "reflectors" whom he encounters in the 
pursuit of his "text." The character of Brierly represents an 
obvious example, his suicide offering a radical example of the 
individual's failure to attain being-for-itself. Arguably the 
most central reflector is the French lieutenant, who evokes in 
Marlow perhaps the book's most cogent existential moment with 
the commonplace remark "how the time passes." Marlow labels 
his experience "a moment of vision," but while its mundane 
catalyst is similar to those generating Joycean epiphanies, 
the visionary nature of Marlow's experience is evident in its 
emphasis upon quotidian blindness, not insight: 
It's extraordinary how we go through life with eyes 
half shut, with dull ears, with dormant thoughts. 
Perhaps it's just as well; and it may be that it is 
this very dullness that makes life to the 
incalculable majority so supportable and so 
welcome. Nevertheless, there can be but few of us 
who had never known one of these rare moments of 
awakening when we see, hear, understand ever so 
much—everything—in a flash—before we fall back 
again into our agreeable somnolence. (143) 
Marlow's existential moment allows him to perceive the 
Frenchman as indeed "left...hopelessly behind with a few poor 
gifts." Those gifts, it is made clear, are heroic in nature, 
"the raw material of great reputations," but most 
significantly, I feel, they hint at Jim's own experience: 
following his youthful shipboard accident, he, too, had been 
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"left behind," (11) his persistent lameness portending the 
Frenchman's own heroic scars. Indeed, at one point in the 
recitation of his part in the Patna affair, the lieutenant 
turns to Marlow and sounds Jim's leitmotif, "What would you 
(do)" (140)? Clearly, he is intended to reflect what Jim may 
become through the passage of time. 
Similarly, the vignette of Bob Stanton (pp. 149-51) 
functions only to mirror Jim's experience. Jim's situation as 
a water-clerk is, Marlow observes, surpassed in its aridity 
only by the position of an "insurance canvasser" a career 
which Stanton briefly endured. It is Stanton, of course, who 
later dies because he will not abandon a passenger paralyzed 
by fright at their ship's impending sinking. But we as readers 
recall, too, that in Lord Jim's narrative scheme, we have just 
been told by the French lieutenant of the role of "the eye(s) 
of others" that allows individuals to bear the horror of 
experience, and we know, also, that, unlike Jim, the eyes of 
Stanton's shipmates were riveted upon him throughout his 
ordeal. 
While Marlow does not dwell upon the perhaps too obvious 
parallels of these situations, the fact that he includes them 
in his narrative at all attests to the importance of his 
continuous process of ethical weighing and balancing, aided by 
the parade of "reflectors" he encounters. Textually this is 
continued in short order with the appearance of Chester 
(pp.161-69), who ironically announces himself to Marlow with 
240 
"Man overboard!" Chester, whom Marlow later characterizes as 
a "strange idealist" (172), asseverates the need to "see 
things exactly as they are—if you don't, you may as well give 
in at once. You will never do anything in this world." 
Chester's vision, not accidently, is of a literal world of 
shit, a guano island upon which he seeks to place Jim, who, 
with two six-shooters, would be "supreme boss" over forty 
"coolies." The scheme, of course, is meant to represent a 
variant foreshadowing of Jim's Patusan period, another way he 
can possibly become, and evokes in Marlow a complementary 
existential, even Promethean, image: 
I had a rapid vision of Jim perched on a shadowless 
rock, up to his knees in guano, with the screams of 
sea-birds in his ears, the incandescent ball of the 
sun above his head; the empty sky and the empty 
ocean all a-quiver, simmering together in the heat 
as far the eye could reach. 
Accompanying Chester is Captain Robinson, "an emaciated 
patriarch in a suit of white drill." Jim, too, we recall, was 
dressed in white in Marlow's initial description; moreover, 
there exists the air of scandal and infamy around "Holy-
Terror" Robinson. Nonetheless, charges of cannibalism 
following a shipwreck leave Robinson undeterred: 
Three weeks after (rescue) he was as well as ever. 
He didn't allow any fuss that was made on shore to 
upset him; he just shut his lips tight, and let 
people screech. It was bad enough to have lost his 
ship, and all he was worth besides, without paying 
attention to the hard names they called him. 
Robinson, then, would appear to balance in Marlow's and the 
reader's minds Bob Stanton's "way of being"; one simply exists 
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in a condition of moral solipsism refusing, in Brierly's 
phrase, "to eat all that dirt." However, herein an essential 
distinction lies. To be sure, as Marlow says of Jim's case, "a 
little coarser nature would not have borne the strain; it 
would have had to come to terms with itself—with a sigh, with 
a grunt, or even with a guffaw; a still coarser one would have 
remained invulnerably ignorant and completely uninteresting" 
(177). While Robinson clearly falls into the latter category, 
we are reminded that the existentialists argue repeatedly for 
the importance of the individual's escaping the constraints of 
the "they," the crowd, who would seek to drag the existent 
back into the grasp of quotidian moral lethargy. "Existenz," 
Jaspers observes, "warns me to detach myself from the world 
lest I become its prey" (2:5). The case of Robinson—and 
Chester for that matter—is a quite different matter in that 
their disdain for the world is rooted in a desire to 
appropriate others as objects (in Robinson's case in a 
particularly grisly manner) . Chester and Robinson's venture to 
the guano island is a case of sordid manipulation and material 
lust profoundly dissimilar to Jim's existential need to 
discover a place "where he could have it out with himself 
without being bothered by the rest of the universe" (171). 
It is this defining habit of conscience and moral 
introspection which sustains Jim's quest for authentic 
selfhood. Patusan is the setting and realization of that quest 
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and is framed by yet two other reflectors, Stein and Gentleman 
Brown. 
Gripped by political anarchy and suffused by the 
ubiquitous threat of violence and death, Patusan possesses in 
its sheer alienness to Jim's experience the potential to 
become for him another world of shit, but as Sartre teaches us 
in works like "The Wall" and No Exit, the coward may transform 
himself into a hero; we are what we make of ourselves. It is 
in Patusan, then, that Jim attains authenticity by a sheer act 
of will. 
It might be argued that Jim's Patusan experience is 
another instance of Heideggerian "thrownness"; indeed, Stein 
states that "a man that is born falls into a dream like a man 
who falls into the sea" (214). In fact, however, Jim grasps 
with avidity Patusan's potential for reinventing himself: "He 
left his earthly failings behind him and that sort of 
reputation he had, and there was a totally new set of 
conditions for his imaginative faculty to work upon" (218). 
Its very alienness and danger—Marlow observes that if Stein 
"had arranged to send him to a star of the fifth magnitude 
that change could not have been greater"—reify the 
"destructive element" posited by Stein as humankind's only 
salvation in a world where they are "not wanted, where there 
is no place for (them)" (208). 
Stein's pronouncement of humankind's essential alienation 
is curious for he suggests, I feel, a theistic pole opposed to 
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Gentleman Brown's atheism. Stein's "intense, almost passionate 
absorption" with butterflies25 is conducted with a 
concentration of vision which intimates a Paleyan argument 
from design: 
...he looked at a butterfly as though on the brown 
sheen of those frail wings, in the white tracings, 
in the gorgeous markings, he could see other 
things, an image of something as perishable and 
defying destruction as these delicate and lifeless 
tissues displaying a splendour unmarred by death. 
(207) 
In addition, while his rapid and incisive "diagnosis" of Jim's 
problem as romanticism further marks him as a master "reader," 
Stein's Camusian prescription of suicide as the sole remedy to 
the human condition—"'One thing alone can us from being 
ourselves cure!' The finger came down on the desk with a smart 
rap"—and his summation of our condemnation to freedom by the 
arch-ur question "how to be" mark him as the novel's prime 
existential voice. 
If Stein has discovered meaning in his existence, it has 
emerged through a process of becoming abetted by reflection. 
While Marlow characterizes him as "one of the most trustworthy 
men I have ever known" (202), Stein understands fully the 
price of that attainment: "And do you know how many 
opportunities I let escape; how many dreams I had lost that 
had come in my way" (217)? Thus, while Marlow imbues Stein's 
character with a certain ontological inevitability—"I saw 
25The butterfly, of course, is an ancient symbol for the 
human soul and, as mentioned above, also carries resonance for 
Jim's metamorphic project of authenticity. 
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only the reality of his destiny, which he had known how to 
follow with unfaltering footsteps"—the committed reader's 
repeated encounters with Jim's reflectors has taught him to 
perceive Stein as another26 possible way for Jim to be. 
Stein's own awareness of the precariousness of existence 
is symbolized in his pursuit of entomology: he collects not 
only butterflies but also beetles. From a human perspective 
those species may be seen to reflect the authentic and 
inauthentic, the evolutionary and the stagnant. Stein's 
fascination with them functions as a kind of memento mori, a 
reminder of the cost and implications of his finally being 
able to pronounce, "I exist, too" (217). The "beetleness" of 
humanity is personified in Jim's final reflector, Gentleman 
Brown. 
The figures of Brown and Cornelius, who dog and 
ultimately destroy Jim, suggest a remanifestation of Chester 
and Robinson in the same way that their guano island 
prefigured the destructive element of Patusan. It is as if in 
his use of reflectors Conrad were offering a series of quizzes 
Z6Cf. Stein with Siegmund Yucker (pp. 198-99), in whose 
employ Jim briefly pursues his existence as a water clerk. 
Yucker may be seen to foreshadow Stein in that Yucker and 
Marlow discuss the possibility of sending Jim into the 
interior to tend the Yucker Brothers "concessions," a plan 
obviated by Jim's "secret" Patna past again reemerging. 
Nonetheless, Conrad's rhetorical strategy appears to be to 
create positive and negative "reflections" of characters as if 
to emphasize the centrality of the human struggle—and 
frequent failure—to achieve authenticity. 
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or problems27 on certain ontological principles, changing only 
the problems' components. Indeed, when we see this—that is, 
when we understand Lord Jim as visionary in genre—we 
actualize Iser's comment that "as the reader passes through 
the various perspectives offered by the text and relates the 
different views and patterns to one another he sets the work 
in motion, and so sets himself in motion, too" (21). 
That Conrad's stated aim was not only to make us "see" 
but also to depict the drama of authenticity is further 
reflected in the seeming awkwardness of Lord Jim's 
Patna/Patusan structure. It will be recalled that the genesis 
of Jim's pursuit of heroism lay in "a course of light holiday 
literature" (5) . But as I hope has been demonstrated, that 
quest was marked by "bad faith"; Jim never committed himself 
to the ideals and roles offered by those texts but rather 
merely assumed a casual pose that proved woefully inadequate 
to the actual rigors of existence. His leap from the Patna is 
an act of indecision, which remains for Jim unresolved even in 
retrospect: "I jumped—it seems." 
In Patusan, however, Jim discovers what Kierkegaard 
called an "idea for which I can live and die" (Journals, 15). 
Nor has his early reading been in vain for he observes that 
the Patusanians "are like people in a book" (260). What has 
changed is Jim's vision of his being-in-the-world and of his 
Z7The reader will recall mention in chapter two of 
Ignatius' "Spiritual Exercises." 
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being-wlth-others: "It seemed to come to me," he tells Marlow. 
"All at once I saw what I had to do" (261) . Jim's vision is of 
a way to relieve the internecine warfare that has dissipated 
Patusan, a plan for which "he had made himself responsible for 
success on his own head" (263) . Most significantly, Jim's 
commitment and sense of personal responsibility imbue him with 
"the gift of finding a special meaning in everything that 
happened to him" (305). 
Jim's ultimate manifestation of that responsibility 
before the chieftain Doramin following Gentleman Brown's 
savage ambush is the culmination of a process that began with 
Jim's resolve to stand before his nautical tribunal; that is, 
one's authenticity results not from an existential moment, 
which can only reveal one's situation in the world, but rather 
through a psychological, spiritual and, as we saw in "Act of 
Faith" and again in Lord Jim, even physical odyssey. It 
persists here through what Marlow terms Jim's "retreat" 
through various Eastern ports of call, turns on Jim's "leap of 
(good) faith" from the Rajah's compound and concludes with his 
"proud and unflinching glance" in the face of his own death. 
Beyond the love of his wife and the unquestioning devotion of 
Tamb' Itam—not inconsiderable gifts—Jim, once again, is left 
with nothing beyond his hard-earned sense of self, his 
authenticity. 
Jim serves the reader as a paradigm of becoming, not 
necessarily as a way, specifically, to be. That is a decision 
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we must each make alone, abetted, ideally, by a plethora of 
"texts," both literary and human. As Booth says, "If I do not 
practice courage frequently enough to make it habitual, how 
can I ever become courageous?" (253). Jim's manifest failure 
aboard the Patna is the sign of his humanity, marking his 
common cause with Adam and Eve, who, like Jim, were "not good 
enough" and were also subsequently dissuaded by the forces of 
darkness from fidelity to a sacred code. As for them, the 
question for Jim becomes how to live in a hostile world 
outside the bounds of romance. This question becomes Jim's 
rock, which he chooses to embrace and push toward the summit. 
It is a task, undoubtedly, as arduous, harrowing and fraught 
with the likelihood of failure as the dragging of the cannons 
to the peak of Doramin's mountain. Yet like Camus's Sisyphus, 
"this universe without a master (must have finally seemed) to 
Jim neither sterile nor futile....The struggle toward the 




In his essay on the novel in Fiction and Repetition. J. Hillis 
Miller does not view Lord Jim as a source of ontological 
strategies but instead as a work that fails to provide its 
reader with a definite answer to whatever question it raises. 
Miller seems virtually obsessed with the idea of a literary 
work's offering an unequivocal, "visible thematic or 
structuring principle which will allow the reader to find out 
its secret, explicate it once and for all, untie all its knots 
and straighten all its threads" (25) . In reviewing the book's 
numerous reflections and resonances, he complains that "no 
episode serves as the point of origin, the arch-example of the 
mythos of the novel" (33-4); nor does the literary sleuthing 
of critics like Sherry and Watt "serve as a solid and 
unequivocal point of origin by means of which the novel may be 
viewed, measured, and understood" (37) ; nor do its image 
patterns offer "a last place where an unambiguous meaning may 
be found" (37) . From this Miller asseverates: "I claim, then, 
that from whatever angle it is approached Lord Jim is a work 
which raises questions rather than answers them" (39). We 
have, of course, heard this before. The words are— 
essentially—those of Irving Howe quoted above, and the 
principle is the interrogativity which defines modernity and 
is endemic to visionary fictions. 
As a deconstructionist, Miller documents on the one hand 
the "undecidability" of Lord Jim's multiple viewpoints; on the 
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other, he refuses to distinguish among them. Is Chester's 
determination to "see things as they are" motivated by the 
same ethical values as the equally unencumbered vision of the 
French lieutenant? Is Gentleman Brown but another version of 
Jim stripped of Jim's reassuring physical form? Now 
admittedly, Miller's point may be that there is nothing either 
within or beyond the "text" upon which we can definitively 
discern the answers to these questions, and he would be right. 
The supreme irony is that—like Jim's guilt—Miller's 
deconstructive objections and observations are manifest and 
unquestionable—and finally quite beside the point. 
During his final meeting with Jim, Marlow speaks alone to 
Jim's wife, Jewel, who tells of her mother's death after a 
lifetime of abuse and degradation at the hands of the 
scrofulous Cornelius. The tale, Marlow relates, 
...had the power to drive me out of my conception 
of existence, out of the shelter each of us makes 
for himself to creep under in moments of danger, as 
a tortoise withdraws within its shell. For a moment 
I had a view of a world that seemed to wear a vast 
and dismal aspect of disorder, while, in truth, 
thanks to our unwearied efforts, it is as sunny an 
arrangement of small conveniences as the mind of 
man can conceive. But still—it was only a moment: 
I went back into my shell directly. One must—don't 
you know?—though I seemed to have lost all my 
words in the chaos of dark thoughts I had 
contemplated for a second or two beyond the pale. 
These came back, too, very soon, for words also 
belong to the sheltering conception of light and 
order which is our refuge. (313) 
Marlow's existential moment harbors the answers to Miller's 
contention of the "undecidability" of Lord Jim or of any other 
text. Marlow's "second or two beyond the pale" in which he 
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loses "all (his) words" is in essence and function another 
Iserian "gap," the moment constitutive of meaning in which the 
words (or text) that he has heard (Jewel's story) and the 
consciousness with which he seeks to interpret those words 
interact. In Iser's model it is the dynamic of these two 
forces (the "artistic" or textual pole and the "aesthetic" 
pole, the "realization accomplished by the reader" [21]) which 
produces the synthesis of meaning. But always this process is 
aided by the reader's filling of textual "gaps," the 
information which the silent text does not nor can not yield. 
This textual silence mimics the cosmic silence against which 
the visionary hero seeks to define him or herself in the same 
way that Iser's conception of the "implied reader" (clearly an 
addendum to Booth's "implied author") relates to my own 
suggestion of the committed reader who will not only perceive 
textual patterns and structure but also act upon that vision 
beyond the text. 
Indeed, the figure-ground dichotomies which have appeared 
so prominently in visionary fictions are equally important in 
Iser's theory of reading. For Iser, a text can never be 
grasped wholly but only as "a series of changing viewpoints, 
each one restricted in itself and so necessitating further 
perspectives. This is the process by which the reader realizes 
an overall situation" (68). The relevancy of this conception 
for the "reflectors" operating in Lord Jim would seem clear. 
Moreover, these viewpoints are alternately thrust into what 
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Iser calls the "foreground and background" or "theme and 
horizon." It is through the reader's continual acts of 
comparison and contrast among these views (always abetted by 
gap-filling) that meaning is produced. 
Readers exist in the silence of gaps more than we ever 
can in our processing of a text's words. I am reminded of 
Kierkegaard's observation in Fear and Trembling that Abraham's 
true trial and his greatest courage were not manifested in the 
beginning of the downward sweep of his dagger toward Issac's 
throat but instead during the three day's journey to Mount 
Moriah which preceded that aborted act when he lived in 
silence with the imminence of his task permeating his mind, 
all the while attending to the quotidian tasks that, absurdly, 
sustained the life he was committed to end. Abraham, of 
course, was himself sustained by his faith, which, in effect, 
filled up the terrible silence and the emptiness of his fate 
with a vision of God: "He believed the ridiculous" (54). 
It is perhaps equally ridiculous to believe that anyone's 
engagement with literature will effect a more moral, or 
meaningful, or happy existence. Kierkegaard speculates that 
had Abraham lacked faith, he would have done something else— 
something equally great, but different—and pictures him 
plunging his knife into his own breast. In this way, 
Kierkegaard writes, "he would have been admired in the world 
and his name never forgotten; but it is one thing to be 
admired, another to be a guiding star that saves the 
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anguished" (54). Visionary fictions are guides on our own 
anguished journeys toward selfhood; they aid us in the hard 
task of becoming by presenting us with codes toward which we 
can act with fidelity or, if the journey should appear too 
arduous or its destination doubtful, with cynicism. As 
Kierkegaard unquestionably found in his contemplation of the 
Abraham legend, the choice we make reminds us of why art and 
its criticism are important. 
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APPENDIX 
The use of a figure-ground dichotomy is found at the very 
center of Stephen Crane's "The Blue Hotel" (1899), a story 
that anticipates later visionary fictions and whose structure 
is designed, like theirs, to virtually ambush the reader into 
self-awareness. The figure of the Palace Hotel, we are told in 
the opening line, takes its distinctive color from "the legs 
of a kind of heron, (which) causes the bird to declare its 
position against any background" (104). Indeed, the immediate 
background we are given is a singularly hostile one—a 
blizzard described as "a turmoiling sea of snow"—against 
whose fury the hotel's inner sanctum, described in religious 
imagery, remains unaffected: "No island of the sea could be 
exempt in the degree of this little room with its humming 
stove" (106). That this blithe sanctuary of the story's five 
main characters seems to ineluctably disintegrate into a 
brutal fistfight, a cold-hearted ostracism, and a vicious 
murder is perhaps not surprising. The assiduously observed 
code of conduct which sustains the hotel's veneer of civility 
is increasingly revealed as an ineffectual, even desperate 
maneuver against the implacable and indifferent chaos inherent 
in human and physical nature. 
However, the rhetorical ante is raised in the denouement 
of "The Blue Hotel" in a way it is not, say, in "The Lottery" 
(1949), which also addresses the theme of human kind's 
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atavistic nature. In Shirley Jackson's story, for all the 
genuine outrage its first readers felt and expressed, there 
remains a certain aesthetic buffer; our complicity in the 
story's culminating stoning is theoretical; that is, "The 
Lottery's" exposition and structure—while perhaps implicating 
us in its unthinking savagery—do not maneuver us into 
psychologically choosing to become one of the scapegoaters. We 
perhaps react to the climax as we would to films of Nazi war 
crimes: with a horror leavened by our presumed moral distance 
from the monsters who perpetrated them. 
Like that of "The Lottery," the ending of "The Blue 
Hotel" harbors the shock of recognition for the reader. But 
our collusion in the violence of Crane's story is actual. 
Crane manipulates the Swede's alternating puling and bullying 
to engender our visceral and therefore complicitous reaction. 
I suspect the reader's pulse quickens during the brawl between 
Johnny and the Swede over the latter's charge of cheating (the 
Cowboy, an Everyman figure, is reduced to an atavistic 
bloodlust). And I suspect that reader's ego deflates upon the 
Swede's unexpected victory. Seemingly instinctively, we choose 
to stand against this "outsider," the marginal man who, alone 
among the tale's five primary characters, is denied a name 
even to the point of being stripped of his proper ethnicity. 
But the revelatory dollop of exposition placed in the 
story's denouement collapses the margin between fiction and 
reality. We learn that for all his repulsive behavior, the 
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Swede is both the victim of human duplicity (Johnny had 
cheated) as well as a kind of amoral visionary who 
instinctively names the latent violence lurking at the edges 
of the Blue Hotel. With that knowledge, the reader is left 
stranded either in the camp of the Easterner's pusillanimity 
in failing to name Johnny's cheating when he saw it (the 
terror of vision) or in that of the Cowboy—inarticulate and 
uncomprehending (the inertia of blindness)—who ends the story 
with a plea copped in various guises from grammar school to 
Nuremberg: "Well, I didn't do anythin', did I?" "Every sin," 
the Easterner/Crane teaches us, "is the result of a 
collaboration." 
"The Blue Hotel"'s denouement has generally not fared 
well at the hands of the critics. It is, as several have 
pointed out, a second ending, offering a "moralizing appendix" 
(Stallman) to the story's first, more dramatically concise and 
aesthetically satisfying conclusion in which the mortally 
wounded Swede stares up into "a dreadful legend" resting atop 
a cash register: "This registers the amount of your purchase." 
Indeed, Stallman contends that the two endings "contradict 
each other in their philosophical import. What traps the Swede 
is his fixed idea of his environment, but according to the 
second conclusion it is the environment itself that traps him. 
The two endings thus confound each other and negate the 
(story's) artistic unity" (488). 
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However, it is only when we view this story within the 
context of visionary literature that we see that these two 
endings are not contradictory but rather complementary. The 
Swede is indeed "trapped" by the chaos of his environment. 
Physical nature in the form of a blizzard howls and screams; 
the hotel's color is said to "howl and scream"; and the men 
that hotel harbors will literally howl and scream as well. 
Moreover, the Swede's movement from the hotel—where "a 
guest. . .has sacred privileges"—to the infernal saloon—marked 
by "an indomitable red light" where he meets his death—is no 
movement at all. He moves across a blasted, existential 
landscape— 
He might have been in a deserted village. We 
picture the world as thick with conquering and 
elate humanity, but here, with the bugles of the 
tempest pealing, it was hard to imagine a peopled 
earth. One viewed the existence of man then as a 
marvel, and conceded a glamour of wonder to these 
lice which were caused to cling to a whirling, 
fire-smitten, ice-locked, disease-stricken, space-
lost bulb. The conceit of man was explained by this 
storm to be the very engine of life. One was a 
coxcomb not to die in it. (311) 
—and arrives where he began in a setting marked, like that of 
the hotel, by an outward calm but harboring a cold, sudden, 
virtually indifferent leathalness. 
The Swede—like Bartleby and Miss Lonelyhearts—is a good 
reader. His conception of the West, garnered from "dime store 
novels," may indeed be a monomania, but it is a true and 
accurate rendering of the essential nature—the environment— 
of his world. That Crane's literary text is about learning to 
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competently read the text of the world is emphasized by the 
Easterner (who is Crane's persona) who observes that the man 
who killed the Swede "isn't even a noun. He is a kind of an 
adverb." The grammar of the visionary is harsh and 
uncompromising. 
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